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Abstract 
Securing external borders and combating irregular migration currently 
rank among the top priorities in EU migration management and are often 
quoted as evidence of a growing securitisation of (non-EU) migration. On 
the contrary, despite increasing numbers of both internal and international 
migrants, border enforcement in China has been relaxed over the last 
decades. This thesis presents new insights on the current trend of 
securitisation of non-EU migration characterising the European context 
through a comparative study of China’s migration regime.  
The thesis begins with a rebuttal of the commonly held notion that 
borders are territorial or natural entities. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality as a mode of operation of government which has the 
population as its main target, I argue that borders exist as processes 
governing the mobility of populations. I adopt a definition of borders as 
shifting conglomerates of laws, policies and measures operating as obstacles 
or incentives to mobility across politico-legal spaces. I further posit a 
comparative legal perspective with China as the most apt way to gain a fresh 
perspective on borders and their securitisation in the EU context. 
The comparative enterprise commences with an outline of the recent 
history of migration legal frameworks and categories of mobility in the 
European Union. The narration identifies a growing trend of securitisation 
of (non-EU) migration as a correlate of the abolition of internal border 
controls as well as of the constitution of EU citizenship. I further postulate 
that as humanitarian and security concerns are currently the main currencies 
in EU migration management, the way in which the latter operates has deep 
economic underpinnings which are not openly articulated in legal and policy 
discourse. I then pan to the recent history of China’s migration regime and 
categories of mobility. The account reveals how from severe restrictions on 
internal and international migration during Maoism – where unplanned 
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migration was perceived as a security threat to the socialist state – the 
management of migration has recently shifted to a more liberal approach as 
a result of China’s transition to a socialist market economy. I also highlight 
how the overall de-securitisation of migration in the Chinese context has 
been driven by an open, at time ruthless, pursuit of economic growth as the 
main policy goal in migration management. 
The comparative account on migration management in the two contexts 
leads me to identify a forthright economic approach to migration 
management in the Chinese case as opposed to a tacit market approach to 
the management of migration in the EU context, where humanitarian 
discourses and security concerns have become the two main categories 
through which non-EU migration is framed. Tackling the issue of migration 
predominantly as an economic matter, China’s current migration system 
stands as an alternative to the present conventional wisdom framing non-
EU migration as a security matter in the EU context. The counterpoint of 
the Chinese migration regime further allows for a better understanding of 
the very dynamics at play in the continuation of the securitisation trend. 
 
Keywords: Borders, Human Mobility, Governmentality, Foucault, 
Migration Management, Comparative Law, European Union, China, Hukou 
System, Internal Migration, Neoliberalism. 
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Introduction 
     Whether to pursue better education and job opportunities or simply 
to join a loved one, being a passport holder of a developed country has 
greatly facilitated the execution of my choices to move to different countries 
over the last decade. Other migrants face similar dilemmas but enormously 
greater legal impediments, even within their own state. This awareness has 
driven my interest in the different ways politico-legal systems control human 
mobility.1 In this thesis, the joint consideration of two different migration 
systems, namely the European Union (EU) and China, will help to achieve 
new insights on the state of borders and their management in contemporary 
EU, where non-EU migration is currently the object of growing security 
concerns. 
1. The problem 
     The 2015 so called EU migrant crisis - leading to the reintroduction of 
internal border controls and fences in many Member States – is perhaps the 
latest example of what scholars have described as a trend of securitisation of 
(non-EU) migration (Guild and Baldaccini 2007, Guild 2009, Andreas 2003, 
Bigo 2000, 2002, 2005; Huysmans 2000 and 2006; van Munster 2009).  In 
2014, at around the same time internal borders were re-established as an 
emergency measure between some EU Member States, a landmark Opinion 
by the Chinese government gave a substantial push to the erasure of its 
                                                          
1For a matter of convenience, I shall use the words “migration” and “human mobility” interchangeably 
in the rest of this thesis. I prefer the latter over the former for the expression human mobility 
indicates that population movement is a constant pattern – rather than an exception - in human 
history. On the contrary, in the EU context the term migration has increasingly come to designate an 
austere category, “denoting a paucity of the social embeddedness that citizenship offers, or what a 
path to citizenship through permanent residence offers” (Hansen 2017: 135). The interchange of the 
two throughout this work will act as a constant reminder of the fact that population movement is a 
normal occurrence in human history. 
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internal borders by mandating that the distinction between rural and urban 
hukou - which had defined the administration of its gargantuan population 
until then – should be gradually abolished.2 Similar to a system of internal 
passports, China’s household registration (hukou) system has notably been a 
key instrument in the administration of China’s population, demarcating a 
regime of internal borders and administrative areas which shares many 
commonalities with the restrictions enacted by international borders. 3 With 
292 million internal migrants affected by this system, the numbers of 
internal migrants in China impressively exceed the total of the world’s 
international migrants, estimated to be at 244 million. 4  International 
migrants are also present in the China and over the last three decades their 
presence has exponentially grown as a result of China’s opening up to the 
outside world in the Reform era.5  
The overall situation of migration management in the Chinese context 
strikes as opposite to the EU context.  In the latter, fight against irregular 
migration and the security of EU external borders appear as the current top 
                                                          
2Branigan, T. "China reforms hukou system to improve migrant workers' rights", The Guardian, 31 
July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/31/china-reform-hukou-migrant-workers 
Accessed 5 September 2017. It should be noted that while some Western media misunderstood this 
policy declaration for the cancellation of this system as a whole, scholars and more accurate 
reporters welcomed this measure as both a semantic reform and a substantive progress whose true 
impact remained to be seen. 
3 Although the hukou system has a millennial history, China’s current household registration system 
was instituted in 1958 along the administrative distinction between urban and rural household 
registration, which divides Chinese citizens into different categories according to their birth location. 
The workings of such system will be explored in detail in Chapter III of this work. 
4 Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on the 2016 National Economic and 
Social Development, 28 February 2017, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/201702/t20170228_1467503.html Accessed 5 March 
2017.The United Nations International Migration Report estimated the total of the world's 
international migrant population at 244 million in 2015. See United Nations, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016). 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/Migr
ationReport2015_Highlights.pdf Accessed 5 September 2017 
5 This trend is attested by the increasing choice of migrants from the global South to move to China 
instead of countries in the global North, attracted by its comparatively less restrictive visa policies. 
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priorities in the management of non-EU migration. Within such context, the 
only logical answer to even small increases in migratory flows has become 
“more security”. Security concerns – which most recently have started to be 
paired with humanitarian concerns - have come to monopolise politico-legal 
discourses of migration management. In other words, the issue of security 
has become the default way of thinking about (non-EU) migration in the 
European context. The Chinese context presents us with a different 
scenario. Despite growing numbers of migrants, their management has been 
characterised over the last decades by what could be described as an overall 
de-securitisation of migration. As will be discussed at length in Chapter III 
of this thesis, the latter has been the result of the country’s transition to a 
socialist market economy which radically shifted from a principle of 
opposition of class struggle to the pursuit of economic growth as the main 
principle orienting migration management.   
As a nation state which limits the internal mobility of its own citizens, 
China might appear as a somewhat backward exception to the “norm” of 
free movement for citizens within national boundaries characterising the 
contemporary state system (Torpey 2000: 9). If one adopts this lens, the 
liberalisation of China’s internal borders has been indeed long overdue. Yet, 
if instead of focusing solely on the control of human mobility across 
national borders we look at the sheer size of China’s 1.3 billion population 
and the number of those affected by its internal migration system, another 
picture emerges. China has more migrants than the whole of world’s 
international migration. As hukou system expert Fei Ling Wang reasonably 
argued, if the contemporary global realm was a single political unit, its 
immigration laws and policies would reveal the same purposes and effects of 
China’s administrative borders (Wang 2005: 31). China’s experience can thus 
offer lessons and policy implications for other countries, including 
developed nations (Ibid). 
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One of the main assumptions of this work is that it is more fruitful to 
focus on how populations and their mobility is governed – regardless the 
national, sub-national or supranational connotation of the borders in 
question – rather than on instances of borders simply because they share the 
same national connotation. For the latter often obfuscates more than it does 
reveal. For example, China’s provinces alone have a size of the population 
that is larger than most nation states. Taken individually, provinces such as 
Sichuan or Guangdong have a bigger population than countries such as the 
United Kingdom or Germany. These numbers compel us to put into 
perspective migration statistics in the EU: according to the latest statistics 
available for example, in 2016 some 54.4 million migrants between EU and 
non-EU citizens 6  resided in the EU as opposed to China’s 292 million 
internal migrants. Regretfully, migration management in these two contexts 
has been very rarely compared, probably owing to the sub-national 
connotation of China’s migration system.7 Contributing to fill this gap, this 
work offers an original contribution to EU migration law studies, which are 
either solely focused on the EU context or limit themselves to comparisons 
among EU Member States or between the EU and migration systems in the 
global North.  
A pressing concern that shapes this multi-sited investigation of borders 
and migration regimes is indeed also to exit the Euro-American centrism 
that normally characterizes studies on migration. While the focus on one’s 
own context is to be expected - after all, even the most abstract and 
universal of theories ultimately originates from its theorist’s experience of a 
specific political space (Galli 2001) – comparative perspectives, and 
                                                          
6http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statisti
cs Accessed 5 September 2017 
7 In English speaking literature, few exceptions are Pries (ed.) 2013 who compares boundaries of 
belonging in China and EU countries from a sociological perspective, Kovacheva et al. 2012, who 
compare EU Countries nationals’ migration within the EU and China's internal migration from the 
perspective of social rights. From a labour economics perspective, a pioneer study by Cheng et al. 
2014 compares inter-migration within the European Union and China. 
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particularly uncommon ones, can enable better understandings of one’s own 
context.  
     With its gigantic population, China is not a typical nation state. As 
already mentioned, the peculiarity of the Chinese case is that it is 
characterised by internal borders of migration as the hukou system ascribes a 
different legal status to its citizens according to their birth registration. The 
distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural status defines a citizen’s 
relationship with the state, as well as the eligibility for a range of state-
provided benefits (Josephs 2011:298).  On the other hand, the EU is a 
supranational entity which is often considered as a step beyond the nation 
state, having instituted free movement and establishment for EU citizens 
across Member States. The European experiment has nevertheless shown 
that “a world with open borders would not be a world without borders” 
(Bauböck 2007: 400), given that the external borders towards non-EU 
citizens have been notably strengthened.  
Both the EU and China have been described - in separate contexts - as 
“migration regimes”8 and are characterised by internal and external borders. 
My assumption is not only that these two migration regimes are comparable, 
but also that a comparison with China’s migration regime can valuably 
elucidate aspects of the EU migration regime which would not be detectable 
when considering it by itself or when comparing the latter with more similar 
migration systems.  It should be stressed that the purpose of this thesis’ 
comparative outlook is not to carry out an assessment of which system 
presents with the fairer or most desirable migration regime. Such an 
evaluation would make little sense given the different conditions, economic 
levels and histories of the two contexts. Rather, the goal is to gain new 
insights on current trends of migration management in the EU through the 
                                                          
8 See, for China: Fan 2008, Nyíri 2010, Josephs 2011, Xiang 2007. For the EU, among many: Rigo 
2007, Amaya-Castro 2011, De Genova and Peutz eds. 2010, Guild and Mantu eds. 2011. 
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lens of the Chinese perspective. I like to think of this work as a return trip 
from Europe to China. 
     The main hypothesis with which I started this work is that the diverging 
trends in migration management in these two contexts – securitising 
migration in the EU and de-securitising migration in China - could be traced 
back to different historical legacies. My comparative inquiry confirmed this 
hypothesis. With its open, at times ruthless, pursuit of neoliberal economic 
growth as its main policy goal, China’s migration regime further shed light 
on how the EU migration regime remains for the most part ambiguous 
regarding the connection between migration and its economic role, its uses 
or benefits. This is so despite the deep economic underpinnings of the EU 
migration system. My argument in this thesis unfolds through the following 
research questions: 
i. What do we understand as borders and their securitisation in the 
EU context?  
ii. Why a comparison, and why specifically a comparison between 
China and the European Union, is an apt way to achieve a better 
understanding on current trends of migration management in the 
EU?  
iii. How have borders evolved in the European Union and what are 
the main features of the current management of migrant 
populations in the EU? 
iv. How have borders evolved in China and what are the main 
features of the current management of migrant populations in 
China? 
v. Which convergences and divergences emerge from this 
comparative outlook between the EU and China and what new 
insights can be learned about EU migration management?  
2. Theses 
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i. Borders are not to be understood as geographical nor 
national givens, but rather as shifting conglomerates of 
laws, policies and measures operating as obstacles, 
impediments or incentives to mobility across politico-
legal spaces at various levels (sub-national, national, 
supranational). In adopting this definition, I advocate for 
a focus on the management of populations and their 
mobility, shifting the attention from national 
demarcations of borders to the governmentality of 
migrant population management at different 
administrative levels. Within this framework, the tendency 
of securitisation of borders in the EU is to be understood 
as a restrictive and control oriented approach which is 
being pursued to a significant extent through legal and 
policy frameworks regulating migration. In such context, 
comparative legal perspectives – especially those between 
very diverse legal systems – present the opportunity of 
gaining different viewpoints on one’s own context. By 
doing so, they also have the potential to reveal aspects 
that are normally taken for granted when considering only 
one’s own context.  
ii. China as a case of comparison is significant because due 
to its huge internal migrant population, it can offer 
lessons on how to cope with growing numbers of 
migration in the EU. Moreover, China’s trend of de-
securitisation of migration over the last decades is 
relevant as it runs opposite to the increasing securitisation 
of non-EU migration in the European context. China’s 
inverse tendency stands as an alternative to the currently 
predominant notion that growing numbers of migrants 
necessarily call for more security measures. Thirdly, the 
 17 
 
consideration of China’s internal and external borders 
widens the scope of comparative studies with the EU 
migration regime, which normally only refer to other 
migration regimes in the global North as terms of 
comparison.  Fourthly, the selection of China allows for 
an investigation of borders beyond the yoke of 
methodological nationalism. 9 Lastly, a comparison 
between migration management within an authoritarian 
political system such as China and within a supranational 
entity composed of liberal-democracies such as the EU 
allows to investigate the institution of borders beyond the 
different immediate facades of politico-legal systems.  
iii. The recent history of migration legislation in Europe 
shows that the increasing securitisation of (non-EU) 
migration has emerged as a correlate of the abolition of 
the internal border controls instituting the EU internal 
market. The securitisation of non-EU migration has 
further been instrumental to the very definition of EU 
citizenship and appears to be oriented by an underlying 
economic rationale which accepts hyper skilled or high 
waged migrants while rejecting low waged migrants as 
dangerous for host societies. Nevertheless, the economic 
underpinnings of EU migration management are not 
clearly stated in legislation and official language as 
humanitarian and security concerns currently dominate 
the scene of migration management in the EU. 
iv. The historical perspective on China’s internal and external 
borders highlights a general tendency to de-securitise both 
                                                          
9Wimmer and Schiller have defined methodological nationalism as that pervading assumption within 
social sciences that the nation state is the natural social and political form of the modern world 
(Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 327).  
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internal and international migration over the last thirty 
years or so. The trajectory of de-securitisation 
characterising China’s internal and international borders 
has been intertwined with China’s pursuit of economic 
development as the government’s main policy goal and 
source of legitimation for political power. Particularly in 
the case of internal borders, this straightforwardly 
economic approach to migration management has also led 
to an open acknowledgement of the role of migrants for 
China’s economy in legislation and official language.   
v. In spite of several diverging trends in migration 
management in the EU and China, both migration 
systems appear to be characterised by a similar economic 
rationale that derives from their embeddedness within 
neoliberal economy. The comparison with contemporary 
China, characterised by a forthright economic approach 
to migration, sheds light on the lack of an open 
articulation of the economic dimension of non-EU 
migration in Member States’ official and public 
discourses. This lack of articulation feeds into the 
conceptualisation of movement into the EU as a security 
issue which is deemed legitimate only when it is framed in 
terms of humanitarian protection.  
3. Limitations 
     While Chapter I will discuss at length the methodology and scope of 
this work, it is worth outlining here in brief its limitations. The first is that 
my analysis does not delve into the migration and citizenship nexus. Various 
scholars have importantly reflected upon such nexus in both the European 
and Chinese contexts and illustrated from different perspectives how the 
issue of migration discloses the limits of current theories and existing forms 
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of legal citizenship.10 The migration/citizenship perspective also importantly 
reveals how the politico-legal theorising of membership of contemporary 
political communities is predominantly defined on a territorial basis and is 
characterised by a bias towards the sedentariness of the population (Rigo 
2007 and 2011). Although the European Union to some extent creates a 
different logic of belonging for EU citizens, as shall be seen in Chapter II, it 
is based on the same exclusionary logic as national citizenship towards non-
EU migrants (Rigo 2007, Balibar 2003, Lindahl 2009). The migration 
citizenship nexus in the Chinese context further enriches and complicates 
the picture. Similarly based on the territorial principle, the hukou system 
enacts different degrees of citizenship for nationals of the same state based 
on their territorial affiliation and a similar bias towards sedentariness. These 
divisions trigger debates about the meaning of citizenship beyond its legal 
definition, as a contested practice, defined by acts rather than a legal status 
that is assigned from above by law (Isin and Nielsen 2008, Nyers 2006). This 
framework has been employed and expanded through analyses of the 
Chinese context of migrant NGOs’ activism (Jakimow 2015). Although a 
very interesting avenue for enquiry, the analysis of the migration and 
citizenship nexus as well as the notion of citizenship as practice from below 
will not be part of this thesis, which for practical reasons will stop at a 
citizenship from above approach, looking at how governments frame 
migration through legislation and policies. 
 Secondly, this work does not explore nationalism or ideas of nation and 
belonging attached to them and how they play a role in border formation 
and migration management. It could be in fact argued that this work 
deliberately ignores discourses of national belonging and all those elements 
that build up nations as imagined communities. This is not to imply that 
perceptions of national belonging do not matter in our imaginations or do 
not impact on the functioning of world politics. Yet, as argued above, my 
                                                          
10 For the Chinese context see for example Solinger 1999, Jakimow 2015, Guo 2014. For the EU 
context see Rigo 2007, Zagato ed. 2010, Sciurba 2009, Isin and Nielsen eds. 2008. 
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assumption is that it is more fruitful to focus on how populations and their 
mobility is governed – regardless of the national, sub-national or 
supranational connotation of the borders in question – rather than on 
instances of borders because of their shared national connotations. The 
hope is that such neglect of national determinations will help to expose 
dynamics that are usually hidden behind national ideology and 
methodological nationalism. 
     A third drawback of this thesis is that it does not touch upon the 
connection between migration regimes and racism. 11  This connection is 
deeply present in both contexts of analysis and follows different logics, 
which have their own histories. As scholars have noted, the racial hierarchies 
upon which European colonialism was based re-emerge in various forms 
and are complemented by narratives of migrants as victims whose lives are 
somewhat less important than those of “civilized” Europeans (Cuttitta 
2015). In spite of this, the literature on the securitisation/criminalisation of 
migration in the EU is for the most part neglectful of the way in which 
migration legal frameworks are productive and reproductive of racial 
categories (El-Enany, forthcoming 2018).  
The Chinese context is also characterised by different but equally 
influential forms of racism. One pertains to the traditional perception of 
superiority of the Han ethnic group,12 not only compared to other ethnic 
groups in China (Law 2012) but as the most superior and civilised culture in 
                                                          
11 I understand the notion of racism here as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and 
exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (Wilson Gilmore 2006:28). 
12 Although China’s national narrative concentrates on the union of fifty-six ethnic groups recognised 
in the Constitution, the overly predominant (90 percent) Han ethnic group has been historically at the 
centre of a racial discourse based on the notion that the Han are superior to the other minority 
groups. While most of these ethnic groups currently have peaceful relations with the Han majority, 
two notorious exceptions are the Uighurs and Tibetans, pushing for more autonomy or 
independence at the bordering regions of the Chinese state. Seen as a matter of security of national 
borders, the Chinese government has historically responded to such pressures by encouraging 
migration of Han into such areas. 
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the world (Dikotter 1992).13 Hierarchies further exist within the Han group 
and pertain to the racialisation of rural migrant labourers (mingong) based on 
the binary urban citizen versus peasant institutionalised by the hukou system 
(Han 2009). Rural hukou holders are normally depicted as being characterised 
by a low individual quality (suzhi) and in need of improvement.14 As a marker 
of peasants’ low quality is dark skin tone, scholars have noted that relational 
connections exist in Chinese perceptions of rural peasants and people of 
colour, as documented by experiences of Africans in China since Mao’s era 
(Law 2012: 112).15 More generally, mono-ethnicity appears to be a constant 
and problematic leitmotiv in Chinese perceptions – a product of a long 
history of relative isolation - which can be further detected in the rarity of 
naturalisations of foreign nationals as well as in the government’s 
consideration of ethnic Chinese as Chinese in spite of their foreign 
passports. Although an intrinsic element in the government of migration, for 
reasons of scope of my enquiry this work will not explore the link between 
questions of race/ethnicity and migration legal frameworks. 
4.  Outline of chapters 
     The argument that despite the deep economic underpinnings of the 
EU migration regime, the pursuit of economic growth through migration 
management in the EU context is not an outspokenly enunciated policy goal 
                                                          
13 This perception is reflection in the word “China”, which in Chinese language is “Zhongguo” literally 
translating as Middle Kingdom or The Centre of the Universe. This reflects China’s long-standing 
perception of itself as superior to other civilisations and cultures. 
14 Suzhi is a fundamental keyword of contemporary Chinese popular and official discourses. The 
word refers to “the innate and nurtured physical, psychological, intellectual, moral, and ideological 
qualities of human bodies and their conduct” (Jacka 2009: 534). It is currently referred as a measure 
for the “quality” of individuals and divides individuals into those with low suzhi and those with high 
suzhi. While to some extent the notion of “race” converges with the concept of suzhi, the latter is 
something that is more malleable, for suzhi can be increased through education and other “civilising” 
initiatives, aimed at making rural migrants more trained for the labour market and thus also more 
governable (Xu 2009; Yan 2003). 
15 During Maoism, while in China racism was publicly labelled as a Western problem as the PRC 
championed as leader against ‘white imperialism’, the state was also marked by distant patronising 
attitudes towards “inferior”, “ugly,” dark people (Dikötter 1992). 
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as in the case of the Chinese migration system will be gradually substantiated 
through a detailed politico-legal analysis of the two migration systems.  
Chapter I introduces the methodology and theoretical framework of such 
analysis. It begins with a rebuttal of the common-sense notion that borders 
are territorial or natural entities. In its place, Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, as a new mode of operation of government in the modern 
era which has the population as its main target (Foucault 2007) is put in 
conversation with the issues of borders and migration. As a result, I define 
the borders investigated in this thesis as shifting legal processes governing 
migration which are made of conglomerates of laws, policies and measures 
and operate as obstacles, impediments or incentives to mobility across 
politico-legal spaces. I further define the securitisation of migration in the 
EU context as a process which is observable within legislative measures, 
policies and official statements which in various ways restrict free movement 
and constructs migrants as potential threats. I then move to explain why a 
comparative legal perspective with China can be beneficial to current 
understandings of borders and their securitisation in the EU context. After 
that, the chapter delves into the “how” of the comparison, drawing attention 
to the epistemological biases and challenges existing when dealing with non-
Western legal contexts from a Western perspective.  
     Chapter II traces the recent history of the EU internal and external 
borders through legislation and policies. The dynamics of the EU’s external 
borders are observed at both the EU level and then more concisely in one 
national case, Italy. The narration progressively individuates a correlation 
between the increasing levels of securitisation of (non-EU) migration, the 
abolition of internal border controls as well as the constitution of EU 
citizenship. The joint consideration of the history of EU migration policies 
and the legal categories through which migration is currently defined as such 
and channelled further exposes the deep economic underpinnings of the EU 
migration regime. I argue that despite its underlying economic rationale, 
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contemporary EU migration management lacks an open articulation of the 
connection between neoliberal economic growth and migration management 
in its legal and policy discourses, which are instead dominated by 
humanitarian and security concerns. 
     Chapter III begins with a short introduction on China’s legal system 
and its main characteristics. It proceeds with the historical outline of the 
legislation and policies constituting China’s internal and external borders. 
This is followed by a consideration of the legal categories through which 
migration – internal and international - are presently defined and channelled 
in the Chinese context. While the narration is mainly focused on the level of 
central government, the chapter succinctly explores also the implementation 
of internal borders at the level of local government in Beijing. The chapter 
progressively exposes that from a severe restriction of internal and 
international migration during Maoism – where spontaneous migration was 
perceived as a security threat to the socialist state – the management of both 
internal and international migration in China has shifted to a more liberal 
approach following the country’s transition to a socialist market economy. 
This general tendency of de-securitisation of migration has been driven by 
an open pursuit of economic growth as the main policy goal and has been 
forthrightly enunciated in legal and policy documents.  
Chapter IV summarises and discusses the outcomes of this thesis’ 
comparative account of borders in the EU and in China. It first enunciates 
the main divergences and convergences between the two contexts. I 
individuate as the main convergence the pursuit of an economic rationale in 
migration management in the two contexts and note how this rationale has 
been coupled with a growing securitisation of migration in the EU context, 
and with an overall de-securitisation of migration in China. I thus identify 
two different approaches in migration management in the light of the 
comparative perspective: a forthright approach to migration and its 
capitalisation in the Chinese case and a less transparent pursuit of economic 
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goals in EU migration management. In the latter, although notions of 
protection and risk as related to non-EU migrants are heavily influenced by 
economic considerations, security and humanitarian concerns currently 
dominate the official language and legal categorisations of non-EU 
migration. Tackling the issue of migration predominantly as an economic 
matter, the counterpoint of the Chinese case dramatically stands as a 
reminder of the arbitrariness of legal categorisations and their impact on the 
way in which migration is popularly perceived and managed. The 
comparative perspective further leads me to hypothesise that the centrality 
of humanitarian concerns in contemporary EU migration management 
contributes to the occlusion of the economic rationale that orients its 
migration-related legislation and policy making. The chapter ends with a 
consideration of possible future scenarios and the consideration that current 
trends in the two contexts might continue or reverse.  
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CHAPTER I 
Securitising Borders of Migration and the Benefits of a 
Comparative Perspective 
  
横看成岭侧成峰， 
                                        远近高低各不同。 
不识庐山真面目， 
                                                                                 只缘身在此山中。  
                                                                                                                                       
《题西林壁》苏轼             
                                                                                                                          
Seen from the front it is a mountain ridge 
Seen from the sides it is one towering peak. 
The view changes from far or near, high or low.   
 I do not know Mount Lu’s true shape 
This is because I am in the midst of the mountain. 
                                                                                
Su Shi, Inscription on the Wall of Xilin Temple                                            
                                         
     Introduction 
     This thesis is an attempt to yield new insights on current processes 
of securitisation of borders in the EU by way of comparing them with 
migration management in China, which over the last decades underwent 
a trend of de-securitisation of migration. This task is not an easy one. 
Comparative perspectives complicate rather than facilitate analytical 
investigations. This is so because different contexts never fully match and 
often make academic arguments appear less analytically consistent or 
necessitating further explanations which would not be needed when 
dealing with one context. It is perhaps partly to avoid these analytical 
limitations that most studies on borders and migration normally deal with 
one case study at a time: however, by doing so, one-study approaches 
miss out on the theoretical gains that can be yielded through comparisons 
(Walters 2013: 209).  Nevertheless, as the epigraph above beautifully put 
it, the best way to know the “true shape” of mount Lu is not to remain in 
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its interior, but by exiting it, as distance from it enables one to catch a 
better sight of its form - even if a unitary view of its shape is ultimately 
unattainable. A similar awareness characterises the methodological 
approach in this work and will be specified throughout this chapter. On 
the one hand, a comparative view is adopted to achieve a better 
understanding of the EU reality. On the other, this comparative 
perspective is only one partial grasp of this reality, which is unavoidably 
determined by the observer’s position.  
The chapter begins with a rebuttal of the common-sense assumption 
of borders as geographical or natural entities. In its place, it emphasises 
borders’ key function of controlling populations and advances a working 
definition of borders as legal processes governing migration which 
operate as obstacles, impediments or incentives to mobility across 
politico-legal spaces. It then specifies the notion of securitisation of 
migration. The second part moves to explain why a comparative legal 
perspective can be beneficial to current understandings of borders and 
their securitisation in the EU context. This is followed by the reasons in 
support of a comparative selection specifically with China. After that, the 
chapter delves into the “how” of the comparison, drawing attention to 
the epistemological biases existing when dealing with non-Western legal 
contexts from a Western perspective. The chapter ends with few 
methodological caveats which will inform the rest of the work. 
 
PART I. DEFINITIONS 
1. Refuting the geographical-territorial assumption about borders 
In an essay on the notion of the border, philosopher Balibar remarks 
that any simple definition of a border will be absurd (Balibar 2002: 76). 
The reason for that, Balibar claims, is rather ordinary: when looked at 
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from an historical perspective, borders cannot be assigned with an 
enduring substance. Looking at the borders of Europe from an historical 
viewpoint, he notes the abyssal difference between the borders of the 
Roman Empire and those demarcating XIX century European kingdoms, 
or between the borders promoted by XIX century European 
cosmopolitanism and the increasingly fortified borders drawn by the 
Schengen Agreements (Ibid: 75). More fundamentally, Balibar posits that 
“the very representation of the border is the precondition for any 
definition” (Ibid: 76).  Changes in the configuration of political borders 
do not only indicate that borders are historically fluctuating entities; the 
impossibility of a fixedly a-historical definition of borders reflects more 
profoundly the mutable nature of any identity delimitated by them.  
While a philosophical perspective enables us to grasp this fundamental 
fact about borders, it is also true that even if the borders of nation states 
historically shift, before and after such shifts they continue to be 
considered territorially natural objects. In other words, contemporary 
borders are generally assumed to be natural, self-evident geographical 
entities, not only in popular common sense but also by various domains 
of social sciences, including legal and migration studies. Drawing on 
insights from critical geographers, this first section disproves the 
common assumption that borders are fixed because they are territorial. 
This move will set the scene for the working definition of borders which 
I will introduce later in the chapter. 
One of the main common ideas about borders is that they are 
tangible, territorial entities. The inappropriateness of theorisations of 
borders as self-evident geographical lines has been highlighted by a 
postmodern tendency which has developed over the last twenty years 
within the field of borders studies (Kolossov 2005: 607-614). Going 
against traditional approaches to border studies, which focus on issues 
such as historical mapping, typologies, functionality or politics of (state) 
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borders within international relations and conceive of borders as self-
evidently present entities, these postmodern accounts highlight borders’ 
deep connectivity with what they exclude (Newman and Paasi 1998: 195). 
For example, some of these accounts concentrate on de-centring the 
border as an entity which “is never simply ‘present’, nor fully established, 
nor obviously accessible. Rather, the border is manifold and in a constant 
state of becoming” (Parker and Vaughan Williams 2012: 728). As a result, 
an emphasis on the process of bordering has been advocated, rather than 
on borders as outcomes of processes. (Newman 2006: 148). Accordingly, 
processes of borders’ demarcation and management would be key to the 
definition of any border.  
The process through which borders are demarcated and 
managed is central to the notion of border as process and 
border as institution. The demarcation and management of 
borders are closely linked to each other. The former (the 
process of demarcation) determines the way in which the 
latter (the management of borders) is put into effect 
(Newman 2006: 148).   
While this quote importantly stresses how the institution of a border 
relies upon processes of demarcation and management, these 
characteristics are often concealed by the neutrally geographical status 
with which borders are normally apprehended. The neutrality of this 
status has been convincingly confuted among others by Delaney, who 
asserts that any territorial configuration is a political achievement 
(Delaney 2005: 11-12). The naturalness with which a territory is 
presented and taken for granted would be indeed a crucial aspect through 
which the creation of a territory, or else, “territoriality” works.16 While it 
                                                          
16 Following Delaney, I understand “territoriality” as the mechanism through which a territory is 
established and maintained through practices of “drawing lines, bounding spaces, assigning 
meanings to these and assigning consequences to crossing lines” (Delaney 2010: 138). 
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is through such practices that a territory is continually maintained, in 
order for a territory to be successfully perceived as politically neutral and 
self-evident element these need to be out of sight (Delaney 2005: 11).  
The suggestion is that when a specific territory is confronted with 
challenges to its existence - for instance when new national territories are 
created or national borders are contested - the arbitrariness and political 
implications of territorial arrangements come to light. The etymologies 
associated with the word ‘territory’ can further elucidate this point. From 
the Latin terra (land) and the suffix torium (belonging to or enclosing), the 
word territorium originally indicated the area surrounding a city over which 
the city government ruled (Dorsett and McVeigh 2012: 39, Elden 2013: 
220-227). Connected to that, the etymology of the word territory is also 
being derived from the word terrere “to terrify”, as an area within which 
the sovereign rules and has the fundamental right of expelling individuals 
(Dorsett and Mc Veigh 2012: 39, Elden 2013: xxxviii-xxx).  
A study by Elden documents this evolution of the notion of territory 
(Elden 2013).  By way of a survey among key Western thinkers from 
ancient Greece to the seventeenth century, the study exposes current 
understandings of territory to their contingency. Elden remarks that while 
in the modern understandings territory typically refers to a circumscribed 
space controlled by a group of individuals (normally a state), what has 
been understood at each historical moment by naturally bounded 
territory involved particular practices (such as mapping, cartography and 
statistical measuring) as well as politico-legal control over a certain 
terrain. The notion of modern territory is here derived from Michel 
Foucault’s – whose work will be discussed in detail in the next section - 
as “first of all a juridical-political one: the area controlled by a certain 
kind of power” (Ibid: 9). Accordingly, territory “should be understood as 
a political technology or perhaps better as a bundle of political 
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technologies” (Ibid: 322). Political technology is to be grasped as a 
technique of governance which includes 
… legal systems and arguments, political debates, theories, 
concepts and practices, colonization and military excursions; 
works of literature and dictionaries; historical studies, and the 
technical in the narrower sense – geometrical instruments, 
statistical handbooks, maps, land surveying instruments, 
statistical handbooks, maps, land surveying instruments, and 
population controls. Territory is not simply an object: the 
outcome of actions conducted toward it or some previously 
supposedly neutral area. Territory is itself a process, made 
and remade, shaped and shaping, active and reactive (Ibid: 
17).  
Crucially, this argument advances a definition of territory (and by 
extension, of territorial borders) which leaves the question of territory 
open (Ibid: 323). The notion that the seeming natural status of borders is 
produced through techniques which continuously shape borders’ identity 
resonates with both Newman’s definition of borders as well as Delaney’s 
considerations about territoriality. If territory is not an essence but rather 
a process resulting from certain practices, the attribute of territoriality 
loses its alleged centrality within current interpretations of borders 
(including within legal definitions). In its place, political technologies such 
as law assume a key role. However, this claim cannot be fully understood 
without a more in-depth discussion of the processes which characterise 
contemporary borders. For this reason, the claim of the significance of 
legal frameworks to the institution of present-day borders is temporarily 
set aside to first suggest that another possibility of considering borders, as 
the next section explores, is to identify them as processes governing 
migrant populations.  
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2. Borders as processes governing migrant populations: a 
Foucauldian approach 
The rebuttal of traditional geographical approaches to borders as 
territorial and politically neutral entities in the previous section triggered 
the consideration that borders are better conceived of as processes 
enacted through a bundle of political technologies. This section ascertains 
more specifically these processes from the perspective of their 
fundamental function of controlling the mobility of populations. A key 
theoretical foundation of this notion as well as of this comparison is 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality. By positing the population as the 
main tool and target of modern political power, this notion enables an 
understanding of the occurrence of modern state formation and its 
borders without taking the state as a natural or immutable element in the 
analysis.  
Notably, the concept of governmentality was first introduced by 
Foucault in his 1977-1978 lectures at Collège de France as a new form of 
power, or else a new “art of government” within modernity (Foucault 
2007: 143). In the triple definition provided, governmentality firstly 
designates “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, calculations, and tactics” which enabling the government 
of the population (Foucault 2007: 108). Secondly, governmentality is to 
be seen as a “tendency” in Western history to develop “a series of 
specific governmental apparatuses” and “a series of knowledges” (Ibid). 
Thirdly, governmentality points to “the result of the process by which the 
state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘governmentalized’” 
(Ibid: 108-109). It is within the framework of this governmental regime 
that the concept of biopolitics can be also grasped as “the attempt, 
starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalise the problems posed to 
governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living 
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beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birth-rate, life expectancy, 
race” (Foucault 2008: 317). Governmentality and biopolitics are 
symptoms of the different modalities in which political power operates in 
the modern era.17 In place of the  pre-modern monarchical power of a 
sovereign over its subjects - as a power to punish and forbid - power in 
the modern era would be exercised over a population, as an entity that is 
“ruled by processes and biological laws” and who has “a birth rate, a rate 
of mortality, (…) an age curve, a generation pyramid, a life-expectancy, a 
state of health”, who can “perish or, on the contrary, grow” (Foucault 
2007b: 161).  
With the emergence of the population as the main subject of modern 
politics, political power would crucially need to cultivate political subjects 
and their well-being. A key way in which governmental power gets a hold 
of population(s) is the welfare state model which - despite its current 
vacillations - characterises the art of government of contemporary 
European states. As Foucault observes, the development of European 
states has been pursued since the seventeenth century in reliance both on 
military-economic growth - to compete with other states – and the 
specular goal of securing internal order by granting the wellbeing of its 
individuals (Foucault 2007: 474). Through the welfare state, 
governmental power provides and promotes the health and well-being of 
its population and in doing so fosters itself.18 As Nielsen observed, the 
welfare state model affirmed itself in post-war European countries as a 
key tool to ease social tensions and promote internal cohesion by way of 
                                                          
17 While both governmentality and biopolitics describe a modality of administering the population in a 
way which maximises its life and self-government, in agreement with Golder and Fitzpatrick this work 
understands the difference between the two as “one of emphasis” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009:32). 
On the one hand, governmentality entails a focus on governmental strategies, technologies and 
historical evidence of the new phenomena of modern power, on the other, the notion of biopolitics 
serves to stress more broadly the management of life characterising these phenomena (Ibid). 
18 The notion of welfare state can also be related to what Foucault described as pastoral power - 
which traditionally characterised Christian church’s art of government – as a benevolent power 
wielded over individuals in the form of care (Foucault 2007: 161-174). 
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promoting worker’s well-being, but also, it has been a key tool to foster 
external strength against the spectre of international socialism during the 
Cold War era (Nielsen 2016, unpublished).  
Despite Foucault’s focus on the population, the connection between 
population management and borders is relatively unmentioned in 
Foucault’s lectures. As a matter of fact, borders and migration are 
subjects which are cited within Foucault’s governmentality lectures only 
en passant 19  and their connection with the notion of governmentality 
remains mostly unexplored in his work (Walters 2011: 140). Due to their 
most recent popularity, analyses connecting the issues of migration and 
borders with governmentality have nevertheless flourished.20 One of the 
main insights connecting the two with governmentality is that the 
Foucauldian focus on the population enables us to see contemporary 
borders as a “privileged instrument to regulate national and transnational 
populations - their movement, health, and security” (Walters 2002: 571).  
Another oft-quoted Foucauldian inspired position is that the nation 
state’s appropriation of the legitimate crossing of borders has enabled the 
very constitution of national populations. As submitted by Torpey, while 
Foucault’s work on governmentality meaningfully sheds light on how 
states were able to appropriate and govern modern societies, it still lacks 
an engagement with how specifically a population is individuated and 
                                                          
19For example, borders are mentioned by Foucault in relation to “the administrative state, born in the 
territoriality of national boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to a 
society of regulation and discipline” (Foucault 2008: 145). Similarly, the issue of migration is hastily 
touched upon as an element making up human capital in the era of liberalism in one of Foucault’s 
lectures on biopolitics (Foucault 2008: 130). 
20 See for example Walters (2002, 2011, 2015), De Genova and Peutz (2010), Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2013) and Salter (2007). The relevance and limits of using Foucault’s toolbox in the 
analysis of borders and migration have been the topic of a recent scholarly conversation in the 
Foucault-themed Italian journal Quaderni Foucaultiani (De Genova, Neilson and Walters in 
Cremonesi et al. 2013). The use of Foucauldian concepts to analyse themes upon which Foucault 
himself did not touch upon is in line with his envisaging of theory as a “toolkit”: an interpretive 
instrument which is to be modified and improved on the basis of situations, rather than a dogmatic or 
comprehensive theory (Foucault 1980: 145). 
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administered along the lines of nationality (Torpey 2000: 5). In his work 
documenting the invention of the passport in XIX-XX century Europe, 
Torpey shows instead how (national) populations in modern European 
states have emerged through a “monopolisation of the legitimate means 
of movement” (Ibid: 4).21 Carried out to a significant extent through legal 
instruments such as passports and visas, this monopolisation would have 
not only granted nation states the “exclusive right to authorise and 
regulate movement” over populations (Ibid: 5-6). It would have also 
enabled the individuation and administration of a national population 
along the lines of nationality, by enacting the distinction between citizens 
and non-citizens (Ibid: 5).  
Bigo and Guild have similarly remarked that being still working in a 
“national mindscape”, Foucault failed to see how policing can be pursued 
in the name of freedom of national citizens to the detriment of non-
citizens (Bigo and Guild 2005: 3). While Foucault spoke of surveillance as 
something that was directed at the whole population indiscriminately, 
surveillance and control in migration management would be enacted to 
“sort out, filter and serialize who needs to be controlled and who is free 
from that control, because he is ‘normalized’”, in other words, migration 
surveillance would be constitutive of the very distinction between citizens 
and non-citizens (Ibid). 
3. Governing through inclusion and exclusion 
Not only would surveillance mechanisms enact the distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens. Legal categorisations of the migrant 
population (i.e. regular/irregular status, long or short-term legal status, 
long-term residence or citizenship and so on) enact a “system of stratified 
                                                          
21This expression echoes Karl Marx’s remarks on capitalists’ monopolisation of means of production 
and Max Weber’s famous considerations on the state’s monopolisation of means of violence; 
similarly, nation states would have monopolised and appropriated from individuals the legitimate 
“means of movement”, principally (but not only) across nation states borders (Ibid: 4).   
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rights” or “civic stratification” whereby the governance of migration 
takes place both through the granting and the withholding of rights 
(Morris 2003: 7).22  According to this view, rights would be a tool of 
governance, understood in the Foucauldian sense. According to Morris, 
[t]he granting of rights to non-citizens involves, in 
Foucauldian terms, the development of ‘political rationalities’ 
for inclusion or exclusion, while also extending the available 
‘technologies of government’ through the institutional 
framework for their delivery… . In other words, the 
elaboration of rights for categories of non-citizen also 
provides the opportunity and the means for exercising 
surveillance and control (Morris 2003: 146).  
These insights, connecting different degrees of citizenship rights with 
the management of migrants and local populations, importantly puts in 
the fore how legal categories of migration are to be conceived as a 
political technology to divide and govern populations based on 
differential allocations of citizenship rights. 
Although not drawing on the Foucauldian grid, in his theoretical 
discussion of the hukou system Wang reflects upon the same mechanism 
of division through inclusion and exclusion of the population (Wang 
2005). For Wang, all politico-social groupings are based on exclusions 
which enable the organisation of society and allocation of resources for 
its members (Ibid: 4). According to such perspective, institutions are not 
neutral in respect to the social realm: instead, as a manifestation of 
society, politico-legal institutions would be unavoidably promoting some 
sort of exclusion, “institutional exclusions” to be precise (Ibid). Wang 
                                                          
22 Morris develops the notion of “civic stratification” as described by Lockwood as a system of social 
inequality within the state which is both expansive and restrictive, in the context of migration 
management (Lockwood 1996 in Morris 2003: 7). 
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draws attention to the fact that the most common human grouping of the 
contemporary era, the nation state (and its corresponding international 
state system) is based on a division of the population based on a location-
based type of exclusion, combining birthplace and family relations.23 This 
type of institutional exclusion further characterises China’s internal 
division of the population according to the hukou system, where every 
Chinese citizen is assigned at birth to a location to which corresponds a 
socio-political status and identity. While this criterion of division of 
populations is currently predominant and considered legitimate in the 
international realm, it is not considered so within nation states. This 
mechanism of assigning membership based on location and assignation at 
birth – typical of both the hukou system and national citizenship - has 
been notably likened by Carens to Middle Ages’ feudal status: allocated at 
birth, generally unchangeable despite the person’s will and efforts and 
with a huge impact upon that individual’s life prospects (Carens 1992: 
26).  
This section’s review of philosophical and sociological accounts of 
borders in their connection with populations and their mobility helps us 
to further see borders from the perspective of their fundamental function 
of controlling the mobility of populations. The next section discusses in 
more detail the role of legal and policy frameworks addressing migration 
and puts forward the working definition of borders which will be 
employed in the rest of the thesis. 
                                                          
23 Based on the observation of current politico-legal organisations, Wang identifies four types of 
institutional exclusion that determine different divisions of populations in different nations and 
historical periods (Ibid). According to Type One, populations are divided and institutionally excluded 
because of who they are in terms of their racial, ethnic, caste, linguistic, sexual, religious identity and 
so on. Based on Type Two, populations are divided and excluded based on what they have 
regarding their wealth or property. Type Two is the most widespread and enduring of institutional 
exclusions, as well as the most accepted, in that at least in theory it allows mobility among classes. 
Based on Type Three, populations are excluded according to where they are located in terms of their 
birthplace or family relations. Based on Type Four, the population is divided and excluded according 
to its conduct (loyal vs outlaw members) within a given society (Wang 2005). 
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4. A working definition of borders and their securitisation 
The notion of borders as shifting processes controlling the mobility, 
security and welfare of populations which has been progressively 
delineating in this chapter compels us to see the active role of migration 
and citizenship laws in the construction of borders. This approach is in 
stark contrast with mainstream migration legal studies, which assumes 
(national) borders as natural givens and views the restriction of migration 
as a natural consequence of it. El-Enany has individuated two main 
declensions of this position in the scholarship. The first one consists of 
“legal idolisers” who, fetishizing the law as the ultimate tool for seeking 
justice, fail to see the exclusionary function of migration law (El-Enany 
2015: 9). Within this approach, particularly common among scholars of 
refugee and human rights law, the law is celebrated for its potential to 
empower migrants through the invocation of fundamental rights that can 
be enforced in courts of law (Ibid: 10). The second attitude characterises 
the so called “pragmatist-realists” who, accepting the reality of nation 
states’ need to restrain migration, seek incremental improvements in the 
condition of migrants by arguing for “more ethically sound responses to 
the movement of people rather than the abolition of border controls” 
(Ibid: 22). What all these accounts do not see is that migration law is 
instead continually constitutive of the same borders to which it refers, as 
critical accounts of migration law have variably remarked.24  
In line with these considerations, in this work I define borders as 
shifting legal constructs or processes governing migration. These 
processes consist of shifting conglomerates of laws, policies and 
measures which operate as obstacles, impediments or incentives to 
mobility across politico-legal spaces. Such impediments or incentives may 
manifest as legal or policy conditions and modalities under which 
                                                          
24 Calavita 1998, De Genova 2002, Dauvergne 2008, Guild 2009, Mitsilegas 2015b, Amaya-Castro 
2011, Rigo 2007. 
 38 
 
individuals may access, reside, work or settle within a given politico-legal 
space. I further see borders as demarcated by migration law as filters: 
through different legal categories of mobility, they assign different 
degrees of citizenship rights and enable the division and governance of 
populations. The idea is that in migration management, legal 
categorisations and different types of visas work as “economic, political 
and cultural filters” (Gaibazzi 2014, unpaged), enacting what scholars 
have defined as “citizenship at variable geometry” (Zagato 2010: 219) in 
relation to a person’s status and her mobility.  
Legal categorisations of migrants and their mobility determine 
extremely different experiences of borders, along a wide spectrum of 
governmentality of migrant populations which can range from the 
acquisition of citizenship to detention. I see these legal statuses as a 
product of the same governmental logic, and have to do with how 
political-legal units get a hold of their populations at a given time.25 In 
contrast with mainstream migration studies’ notion that migration law is a 
consequence of fixed national borders, it will be clear by now that my 
definition does not see migration laws and policies as a second order 
effect of a world divided into nation states, but rather, as an apparatus 
that is partly constitutive of borders and the international system of states 
(Walters 2015: 14). 
A similar constructivist approach characterises the notion of 
securitisation of migration in this thesis. Several migration and security 
studies scholars have spoken of a securitisation of migration in the EU 
context (Waever et al. 1993, Andreas 2003, Lazaridis 2011, Bigo 2000, 
2002, 2005; Huysmans 2000 and 2006; van Munster 2009, Bourbeau 
                                                          
25This biopolitical dimension is however historically contingent. For instance, in the 19th Century, 
particularly in countries in the American hemisphere, newly formed nation states aimed at attracting 
immigrants rather than excluding them: immigration was seen as a way to increase the national 
population, and at times even to select this growth according to certain desirable ethnic 
characteristics (Amaya-Castro 2012). 
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2011, Baldaccini et al. 2007, Guild 2009).26 While there seems to be a 
general agreement that a general trend of securitisation of migration is 
taking place in Europe and more generally in the global North, 
interpretations over the nature, the time frame, and the consequences of 
this phenomenon are extremely diverse and at times irreconcilable. For 
example, according to some, the events of 9/11 encouraged a 
securitisation of migration over concerns about terrorism (Andreas 2003; 
Lazaridis 2011). Others have argued instead that the securitisation of 
migration in North America or Europe started much earlier (Bourbeau 
2011; Huysmans 2000; Kostakopoulou 2000, Baldaccini et al. 2007) or 
even, that it remained unaffected by the 9/11 events in the European 
case (Boswell 2007).27  
The differences among these approaches derive from different 
conceptions of what is security and what are its effects in relation to 
migration (Huysmans and Squire 2010). Following the classification of 
such conceptions, two main understandings of the security and migration 
nexus have been identified. The first one, which characterises mainstream 
Security Studies and IR scholarship, considers security as a fact or a value 
to be achieved and by doing so it implicitly assumes the existence of a 
threat connected with migration (Ibid: 172). According to such views, 
migration could be a threat for the integrity of states -  as a threat to its 
demographics, internal social cohesion, availability of the job market and 
                                                          
26 A classic definition of securitisation among security studies is that proposed by the Copenhagen 
School, according to which “securitisation” is to be understood as a process through which issues 
which are seemingly not connected to security are turned into pressing security matters by “speech 
acts” such as political speeches, reports, legislation, policies and so on. Security in this conception 
has a dual meaning: state security, principally linked with sovereignty over a territory, and societal 
security, dealing with “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or actual threats” (Waever et al. 1993: 23). For the advocates of this view, 
migration emerges as a security problem when political elites and decision makers claim it to be as 
such through rhetoric, legislation and so on (Wæver 1995: 54). 
27 A narrower understanding of the notion of securitisation of migration is to see it as a direct 
association of migration and security or alternatively as a convergence between measures tackling 
terrorism and those tackling migration (see Boswell 2007 in Squire 2015). 
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so on (Loescher 1992, Rudolph 2006 in Huysmans and Squire 2010: 
171). 28  A different understanding of security is advanced by critical 
security scholars, who view security as a practice, a type of knowledge, 
discourse or technology rather than a value or a condition to be achieved 
(Ibid: 172). According to such accounts, the politics of security, or better 
the “politics of insecurity” connected with migration (Huysmans 2006), 
would be a (contested) process rather than a predetermined value and 
would be embedded within other social processes (Huysmans and Squire 
2010: 170). The notion of security as a process has been investigated 
through inquiries of sites such as migrant detention camps and border 
areas (Nyers and Moulins 2007; Bigo and Guild 2005; Salter 2008), the 
growing importance of security experts in migration management 
(Guiraudon 2003b) and the increasing use of security technologies (visas, 
asylum procedures and surveillance) in migration management (Bigo and 
Guild 2005; Salter 2003).  
The securitisation of migration would be part of a “politics of 
insecurity” revolving around the dangers of migration (Huysmans 2006), 
employed by national governments to increase their ability to control the 
national population. According to this view, which once again relies upon 
Foucauldian insights, processes of securitisation of migration constitute a 
key “transversal political technology” for governments and institutions to 
govern their own populations, by first creating threats from which 
national populations can then be protected and reassured (Bigo 2002: 65). 
This type of government is based on the construction of fear as well as 
on the anticipation of risks for the polity. As Bigo put it, 
                                                          
28 An alternative declination of this same idea of security understands migration as a threat to the 
individual security of migrants rather than national security. This approach coincides with a 
humanitarian take that has been advocated in relation to the security of refugees, asylum seekers 
and trafficked migrants (Huysmans and Squire 2010: 171). Although different from the prioritisation 
of national security, the human security approach views the migrant as a disempowered victim rather 
than as a political subject and does not question the national framework of security operations (Ibid: 
172). 
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[t]he form of governmentality of postmodern societies is 
not a panopticon in which global surveillance is placed upon 
the shoulders of everybody, but a form of ban-opticon in 
which the technologies of surveillance sort out who need to 
be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, because 
of his profile. … The emphasis is no longer on curing or 
promoting individual development but on playing with fears 
by designating potentially dangerous minorities Neither 
reducible to sovereignty and punishment nor to biopolity and 
power over life, this political technology is based on 
proactive, anticipative, and morphing techniques and aims at 
mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management 
focusing only on risky groups (so-identified) or groups at risk 
(Ibid: 81-82). 
The constitution of migration as a security matter thus points towards 
a modality of government which governs the population by way of 
sorting out potentially threatening categories (i.e. migrants) and 
protecting the rest of the population from such alleged risk. This type of 
governmentality, which relies and continually constructs notions of 
collective identity versus a “risky” migrant population, would thus draw 
on the spectre of potential threats to gain popular support and 
legitimation.   
Informed by these critical insights, in this work I similarly conceive of 
the notion of securitisation of migration as a process that is primarily 
oriented at the management of the population, both local and migrant. I 
understand it as an exclusionary practice which constructs certain 
migrants as a potential threat, restricts their movement and is observable 
over a certain timeframe within legislative measures, policies and official 
statements. Insofar as a practice, this process is a constant possibility for 
politico-legal communities, even for those which might not be 
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securitising migration for the time being. Chapter II will further 
substantiate the notion of securitisation of migration by looking at the 
current EU context as both a relative trajectory of legal and policy 
frameworks over a certain period and a specific mode of migration 
management which entails the use of specific practices such as detention, 
biometric databases, border agencies and other technologies. The 
definition of the reverse trend of de-securitisation is derived from this 
same explanation. The latter will be substantiated in Chapter III when 
considering policy frameworks regulating mobility in China, where I will 
observe the shift from a situation where unplanned movement equalled 
to treason to the socialist state, to one where free movement is mainly 
viewed as an economic opportunity for the state.  
Having provided a working definition of borders and their 
securitisation, this work’s focus on policy and legal frameworks requires a 
further clarification of how to conceive of the relationship between 
borders, law and governmentality. 
5. Securitisation of migration, law and governmentality 
Legal and criminology scholars have documented the emergence of a 
securitisation of migration in the terms of a criminalisation of the latter, 
as the employment of criminal law to sanction immigration violations as 
well as the addition of immigration law penalties to criminal convictions. 
This connection, which has also been described as a “crimmigration” 
(Stumpf 2006) has been investigated in the EU context by several studies 
(Aliverti 2012, Zedner 2013, Guild 2009, Mitsilegas 2015, Parkin 2013). 
Parkin distinguishes three dimensions of criminalisation of migration: 
first, as discourse, second, as an increased use of substantive criminal law 
to control and punish migration law violations and third, as the legal 
institution of immigrant detention (Parkin 2013). Mitsilegas similarly 
looks at the use of substantive criminal law in migration management and 
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the practice of immigrant detention and further includes in the 
criminalisation of migration mechanisms of prevention and pre-emption 
before migrants reach the EU borders (Mitsilegas 2015: 2). On the one 
hand, these notions of criminalisation of migration are broad enough to 
include security practices such as preventive operations at the EU border. 
On the other hand, the criminalisation of migration within law could 
itself be considered an instance of a broader trend of securitisation of 
migration. Conceived in such a way, the notion of securitisation of 
migration is in fact undistinguishable from the notion of criminalisation 
of migration (Squire 2015: 27). In a similar vein, this work shall use the 
expressions “securitisation” and “criminalisation” of migration 
interchangeably.29 
Enacted to a significant extent through legal frameworks, the 
criminalisation of migration puts irregular migrants in an ambiguous 
status. On the one hand, the irregular migrant is hyper visible in the 
media precisely due to her criminalisation, assumed to be a dangerous 
subject to be monitored. On the other hand, she is invisible because her 
lack of institutional recognition impedes the conceptualisation of her 
juridical and social status as a subject of rights within liberal democracies 
(Brighenti 2009: 95-6). It is important to note that although ostensibly a 
matter of security or nationality, irregular migration is a product of law. 
As a matter of fact, definitions of illegal or irregular migration are defined 
“against the benchmark of migration law”: an individual who infringes 
the law is attributed to an illegal or irregular status (Kubal 2013: 555; 
Dauvergne 2008: 12, Amaya-Castro 2011: 143-144). Not only the content 
                                                          
29 Squire has proposed to employ the notion of "`irregularisation"'of migration to join the two under 
the same umbrella (Squire 2009, 2011). Although quite suitable for the European context, I do not 
adopt the notion of “irregularisation of migration” as it does not quite fit the Chinese context, where 
processes of securitisation and criminalisation of migration do not immediately translate in the 
“irregularisation” of certain categories of mobility and more generally the perception of irregular 
status is different from the EU context. 
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of who is legal and who is illegal is variously determined by legislation 
which shifts across time but also, the repercussion of irregular status it is 
determined by its implementation. In the absence of implementation 
efforts, the illegal condition “is no more than the proverbial tree falling 
silently in the forest”: as a result, the very phenomenon of illegal 
migration would be considerably reduced by halting efforts to implement 
existing laws (Dauvergne 2008: 15). The uneven implementation of the 
hukou system in the Chinese case will be a powerful example in this 
respect.  
Even if different migration regimes are characterised by different 
degrees of legal enforcement, they all subsume a category of people who 
are not entitled to be on the territory and are hence “illegal”: in this sense 
Amaya-Castro has described migration regimes as “illegality regimes” 
(Amaya-Castro 2011). Illegality regimes across the globe are characterised 
by different degrees of enforcement which depend on resources 
availability and governmental scopes in the management of migration 
(Ibid: 142). Crucially, illegality regimes do not simply affect irregular 
migrants but also regular migrants, asylum seekers, and even citizens 
themselves: for example, in attempt to verify the legal status of the 
population, a state may infringe upon some rights of its citizens, such as 
the right to privacy (Ibid: 159). As a result, illegality regimes and 
citizenship are deeply co-implicated. As mentioned above through the 
concept of civic stratification by Morris, rights - their delivery, their 
partial granting or denial - are powerful tools of governance of both 
migrant and local populations.  
This Foucauldian-inspired interpretation of rights requires at this 
point the clarification of a thorny issue: namely, the ambiguity of the role 
of law within Foucault’s writings. In his discussion of governmentality, 
Foucault often sets his analysis of modern power against what he defines 
as a sovereign, juridical conception of it: associated with a pre-modern 
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notion of power conceived as prohibiting and negative. As a result, the 
prevailing approach is to conceive of law in Foucault as “a pre-modern 
harbinger of absolutism” or alternatively, as a tool at governmental 
power’s disposal (Hunt and Wickham 1994: 59). Yet, as a number of 
scholars have observed from different perspectives, while some 
Foucauldian passages appear to confirm this view, others present law as 
vitally co-implicated with disciplinary and governmental strategies (Ewald 
1991, Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, Martire 2012).30 In this work, I will 
maintain the ambiguity embraced by this second position in the literature.  
6. Migration legal frameworks: a spectrum of governmentality 
This work’s close look at the management of migrant populations will 
confirm the idea that law can be both a tool at government’s disposal, a 
prohibitive power but also, a positive power enabling individuals through 
rights. Legal categories are key enablers of the division of the population 
between nationals and non-nationals, migrants and citizens, desirable 
migrants and undesirable migrants on which politico-legal units are 
organised. These categorisations should be seen along what I see as a 
spectrum of governmentality of migrant populations which can range 
from the acquisition of citizenship to practices of detention or 
deportation for the crime or irregular entry or stay. Detention measures 
for irregular migrants are indeed exemplary of what Foucault understood 
as a more traditional type of power: sovereignty. Practices such as 
detention are often characterised by repressive and at times all-
encompassing sovereign acts which suggest that sovereign power – as a 
repressive and punishing mechanism opposed to bio-power – has not 
actually been expelled from modernity as an orthodox reading of 
                                                          
30 A representative case supporting this co-implication is lecture two of the Birth of Biopolitics, in 
which Foucault observes that while with the old government of raison d’État, the legal system simply 
opposed government’s attempts to be unrestricted, within modernity the relationship between law 
and government becomes characterised by a law which endorses government’s self-limitation and 
allows the unrestricted flowing of the market (Foucault 2008: 37-38). 
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Foucault’s notion of governmentality would have it.31 More accurately, in 
the management of migration I see sovereignty as currently permeated - 
rather than rejected or superseded - by biopolitics. This permeation has 
possibly expanded governmental power over life, as Agamben has 
notably remarked (Agamben 1998).  
According to Agamben, what Foucault labelled a pre-modern, 
repressive type of sovereignty manifests within advanced liberal societies 
in terms of a negative biopolitics: as a deprivation and nullification of 
human rights as well as of life and the body.32 According to this view, 
politico-legal sovereignty manifests itself as a constant capacity for 
political power to expose populations to their bare life:33 such exposure is 
for Agamben the hidden “originary political element” of contemporary 
politico-legal systems (Agamben 1998: 88). Following this account, 
although apparently excluded from Western politics, the authority to 
reduce a subject to bare life crucially constitutes a fundamental attribute 
of sovereign power within modernity, where the distinction between the 
exercise of sovereign power in exceptional circumstances and the exercise 
in times of normality is increasingly blurred (Ibid: 122). While an 
historical instance of such type of biopolitics would be the institution of 
concentration camps by totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century 
(Ibid: 119), this perspective is connected to Agamben’s witnessing the 
                                                          
31 Foucault himself in various passages clarifies that the governmental viewpoint does not entail that 
sovereignty would be completely ejected from the biopolitical analysis. As he claims in one passage 
“one of the greatest transformations that the political right underwent in the nineteenth century was 
precisely that, I wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let live – was 
replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but 
which does penetrate it, permeate it” (Foucault 2003: 241). 
32 A key instance of this type of biopolitics would be the institution of concentration camps by 
totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century (Agamben 1998: 119). 
33 Agamben’s concept of bare life is defined as a “simple, natural life” as opposed to a conception of 
human existence conceived as “private life and political existence” (Agamben 1998:187). Despite 
appearing to be set outside of the field of the political, bare life is politicised “through abandonment 
to an unconditional power of death” which sovereign power might exercise over its subjects (Ibid:88). 
 47 
 
emergence of irregular migrants’ detention centres in Italy. 34  Several 
migration studies - often focusing on refugees and asylum seekers - have 
drawn on these remarks in their analyses of the government of migration 
in present-day Western liberal democracies (De Genova 2002 and 2010, 
Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004, Zartaloudis 2013).35  
While the detainable condition of irregular migrants at times resulting 
in the condition of bare life represents an extreme depiction of the 
consequences of biopolitics, given the activities and techniques 
migration-receiving states increasingly dedicate to assist irregular migrants 
in maintaining their physical existence, the condition of detained migrants 
has been further described as a “minimalist biopolitics” (defined by 
Redfield and then refined by Walters) (Redfield quoted in Walters 2011: 
144). Instead of merely reducing its subjects to bare life, detained 
migrants would more specifically submitted to a lesser treatment 
compared to that reserved to the national population: while the latter’s 
health is to be nourished and increased, the former’s wellbeing is only to 
be maintained at a survival minimum (Ibid). This problematic link 
between politics of exclusion and care has been conceptualised through 
the notion of a “humanitarian border”, to indicate how contemporary 
borders are increasingly carved through discourses of securitisation but 
also, through the rhetoric of humanitarian assistance (Ibid: 146).36In the 
                                                          
34 In a 1997 article, Agamben condemned the death of a hundred Albanian boat migrants who 
drowned in Otranto channel while trying to reach Italian shores (Agamben 1997). Again, in a 1998 
interview for the Italian newspaper “Il Manifesto”, Agamben compared the emergence of migrants’ 
detention centres to Nazi lagers, where sovereign power discloses its regulation of bare life and 
hence its biopolitical reach. See Agamben, G. and Caccia, B. "Nei Campi Dei Senza Nome." in: Il 
Manifesto, 3 November 1998. 
35 For example, for De Genova the phenomenon of detention for irregular migrants enacts a regime 
within which the mere possibility of being deported (“deportability”) rather than deportation per se 
transforms undocumented migrant labour into a “disposable commodity” (De Genova 2002: 438). 
36 The humanitarian border will be considered in the case of the EU’s external borders. This type of 
border is of course contextual to the governance of specific zones delineating migration from the 
global South to developed countries (Walters 2011: 146). However, it will be seen that the same 
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EU context, scholars have further illustrated how humanitarian concerns 
in migration management have evolved into a central device of 
government of the migrant population through notions of compassion 
(Fassin 2005 and 2012, Cuttitta 2014, 2015, 2017). 
The connection between security and migration is further 
characterised by two opposed approaches towards the role of legal 
frameworks within the literature. On the one hand, some see the 
securitisation of migration as a process that entails states advocating 
exceptional extra-legal measures, on the other hand, some view in the 
hidden advancement of ordinary laws and technocratic measures the 
main channel for the securitisation of migration (Campesi 2012). 
According to the first approach, borders are an exceptional, a-legal zone 
which is excluded from the ordinary juridical–political territory of the 
state, despite being “an integral part of that juridical–political territory”, 
ensuring its demarcation and integrity (Vaughan Williams 2009: 73). 
Drawing on the Agambenian notions mentioned earlier, according to this 
first approach borders would be the spaces of exception upon which the 
political order is based and would be characterised by fuzziness between 
norm and exception, exemplified by practices such as detention camps.37 
According to the second approach, which could be traced back to 
Foucault as its theoretical source, the securitisation of migration has 
taken place through ordinary laws and practices (Campesi 2012: 16-17). 
The prevention of migration would have become a permanent condition 
that is implemented through ordinary legislation and securitisation and is 
silently advancing as risk management (Bigo 2002, Huysmans 2006, Van 
Munster 2009), or through illiberal practices at border zones which are 
                                                                                                                                               
differentially distributive mechanism presides over the distinction between local urban residents and 
migrant residents characterising China’s internal borders. 
37 Similarly referring to the Agambenian framework, Sapio considers China’s practice of detaining 
internal migrants (a measure which was repealed in 2003) among the instances of administrative 
detention stemming from law in China (Sapio 2010). 
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entrenched in ordinary measures implemented by liberal democracies 
(Basaran 2008).  
In line with the analysis proposed by Campesi, in this work I consider 
these two approaches as complementary rather than opposed. On the 
one hand, the way in which borders have been securitised over the last 
decades in the EU is not the consequence of a radical political rupture or 
the proclamation of a state of emergency (Campesi 2012:19). 
Nevertheless, the securitisation of EU borders has been speeded up by a 
series of political events or “crises”, such as the push given to it by the 
EU enlargements in Eastern Europe or the movements triggered by the 
Arab uprisings (Ibid).38 It is important to remark that even in exceptional 
times, the main scope of migration regimes is not simply to impede 
migration but to “immunize the internal space through the filtering of 
positive and negative circulation” (Ibid, my translation). As a matter of 
fact, practices such as the deportation and detention of irregular migrants 
- which have currently become standard procedures of migration 
management in the global North - fuel a “border spectacle” where 
draconian measures of border policing stage an exclusion that disguises 
the actual inclusion of irregular migrants within receiving states’ labour 
markets (De Genova 2002, 2012, 2013). The intersection between the 
construction of borders, migration management and market economy is a 
key tenet of this work’s theoretical framework and shall be briefly 
discussed in the next section. 
7. The economic dimension of migration law in a neoliberal era 
                                                          
38A further distinction can be made between the EU and national level: while the emergency logic in 
the management of migration often characterises national politics - where the political dividends of 
security crises can be cashed in on by governments - at the EU Level the reaction is often 
technocratic, inviting governments to make use of the EU system of containing risks (Campesi 
2012:23-24). 
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As just posited, security discourses around migration normally elide 
how irregular migration translates into “cheap and easily exploitable 
manpower” which continually enables “the carrying out of some 
desirable short-term economic objectives, such as the decrease in 
production costs, the survival or even the growth of many enterprises 
and the rise in exports” (Tsoukala 2005: 162). One of the main 
assumptions underpinning this work’s comparative overview is that 
regardless the reasons why individuals migrate, human mobility has an 
economic dimension insofar as destination countries or localities “are 
concerned with the role of migrants in meeting demand for labour and 
skills” (Castles et al. 2014: 240). This assumption draws to some extent 
on historical-structural theories of migration, according to which the 
control and exploitation of labour by states and corporations is 
fundamental for the capitalist system of market economy to survive: in 
such context, migration is one of the main indicators of capitalist 
infiltration (Massey et al 1998: 34-41). Migration phenomena would 
represent an unlimited source of lower priced and a more submissive 
workforce to fill the gaps of local labour markets. While traditionally this 
function is attributed to low-skilled migration, high skilled migrant labour 
is also key to satisfy the structural demand to perform production tasks in 
capitalist economies (Castles et al. 2014: 35). In this framework, 
restrictive migration policies, public racism, xenophobia and so on would 
not only perform a politico-symbolic function but would serve to 
“facilitate and legitimize the exploitation of migrants on the labour 
market by depriving them of their basic rights” (Ibid: 36).39  
                                                          
39 Marxist theories view states, multinationals and employment agencies as the main causes and 
determinants of migratory movements: the structural demand for high and low skilled labour to fuel 
capitalist economies would be the main driver of migration. have the advantage of foregrounding the 
connection between migration management and receiving states’ labour markets. Yet, the centrality 
they attribute to the economic sphere ends up depicting the phenomenon of migration as a mere 
consequence of the economic superstructure and this centrality “rules out human agency” (Castles 
et al. 2014: 36). 
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Somewhat differently from the reading above, in this work I conceive 
of market economy as an important dimension of migration management 
rather than the only driver or determinant of the choice to migrate and 
migration control. While individuals migrate for a variety of reasons 
which may not have to do with economic determinants, I hold that 
nonetheless the choice to move always has an economic dimension. The 
idea being that the demand for both low and high skilled migrant labour 
is a structural feature of neoliberal economies (Ibid: 253). This feature 
crucially intersects with legal categorisations of migration. While those 
held culpable of irregular entry or stay are the most visibly vulnerable, 
regular migrant statuses (i.e. student, tourist, work-permit holder and so 
on) also engender different degrees of rights and restrictions, as seen 
earlier through the notion of civic stratification. The intersection between 
migration legal frameworks and labour markets gives rise to a spectrum 
of migrant statuses that involves differentiated employment and social 
rights (Zou 2015: 43). To highlight this dynamic, Zou has suggestively 
described immigration laws as labour market regulation (Ibid). The 
enduring and shifting impact of non-citizen status on employment and 
social rights has been further captured through the notion of “precarious 
legal status”, a notion which encompasses both regular and irregular 
migrant statuses (Goldring et al. 2009: 245).40 While this analysis primarily 
refers to migrants, the concept of precarious labour status can be seen in 
tandem with a neoliberal tendency “to make citizens increasingly 
individually responsible for their existence”, and part of a broader 
process to curb the welfare state and social citizenship as a whole in 
advanced economies (Ibid).  
The construction and reproduction of borders which will be examined 
in this work is more specifically situated in a context of neoliberal market 
                                                          
40  An example for this are Temporary Migrant Workers programmes, making regular status 
dependent upon employment. For an analysis of temporary migrant status and labour work relations 
see Zou (2015, 2016). 
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economy. In the European context, Foucault has theorised neoliberalism 
at the end of the 1970s as an emergent notion of good government which 
assumes that economic and social progress is endangered by too much 
intervention by governments (Foucault 2008: 27-47). This notion further 
models the general exercise of political power according to the principles 
regulating market economy, which are “projected on to a general art of 
government” (Ibid: 132). Differently from liberalism, 41  neoliberalism 
would be rooted in the discovery that neither the market nor individual 
economic behaviours are natural: in order to exist and produce results, 
the market economy system requires government intervention and the 
guarantee of certain conditions (Ibid: 2008:120). The same would apply 
to the idea that both competition and the economic benefits generated 
from it are natural (Ibid). The enforcement of legal measures is key in 
securing and maintaining the conditions for the existence of the market 
and enable ‘free’ competition.42 Nevertheless, as Brown has remarked, 
legal provisions and political decisions intervening to guarantee the 
conditions of the market do not entail the control of the state over the 
market (Brown 2009: 41). As a political rationality, the market rather 
becomes “the organising and regulative principle of the state and 
society”, promoting a depiction of the individual as a homo oeconomicus 
                                                          
41 For Foucault, neoliberalism is an evolved version of liberalism. The latter is to be understood as 
both an abstract recognition of the principle that government must be limited and a practice of 
individuating the principle of the limitation of government and calculating the effects of this limitation 
(Foucault 2008: 20, unnumbered footnote by editor). Within such view, liberalism is to be conceived 
as a political rationality characterised by the fact that “there is no economic sovereign” and hence the 
presumption of political neutrality (Ibid: 283).  
42 Perhaps the best illustration for this, as shall be seen in Chapter III, is China’s transition to a 
market economy, which has been heavily dependent on the reconstruction of a legal system to 
guarantee the conditions for the market to develop. 
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which should provide for her own needs and care for herself (Ibid: 40-
41).43  
Consequently, the neoliberal political rationality ends up becoming 
productive of political legitimation. In contrast with traditional renditions 
of the state as legitimised by an ideal constitutional pact with its people, 
economic performances and continuous growth would become the main 
grounds for state’s legitimacy (Lemke 2001: 196). As Brown puts it:  
… the health and growth of the economy is the basis of 
state legitimacy both because the state is forthrightly 
responsible for the health of the economy and because of the 
economic rationality to which state practices have been 
submitted. Thus, “It’s the economy, stupid” becomes more 
than a campaign principle; rather, it expresses the legitimacy 
principle of the state and the basis for state action — from 
Constitutional adjudication and campaign finance reform to 
welfare policy to foreign policy, including warfare and the 
organization of “homeland security” (Brown 2009: 42, 
original emphasis). 
While this quotation refers to the North American context, I would like 
to suggest that the same critique of governmental rationality applies to both 
the European context (where Foucault first formulated it) and to 
contemporary China (Dutton and Hindess 2016).  
As Dutton and Hindess have exposed, the notion of neoliberal 
governmentality is apt to understand China’s current context due to a useful 
historical coincidence (Ibid: Kindle Locations 790-791). More specifically, 
                                                          
43 One of the few hasty allusions Foucault makes to migration precisely relates to his application of 
the neoliberal perspective to the phenomenon of migration by equalling migration to an investment, 
and the migrant to an investor (Foucault 2008: 130). 
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the neoliberal context currently characterising both the EU and China would 
stem from two concurrent yet different crises of Marxism: in the European 
context, the notion of neoliberal governmentality picked up notably through 
Foucault’s works in the late 1970s as a theoretical critique of Marxist 
theories of the State (Ibid). In China, accidentally at around the same time, 
governmentality was experimented with in practice as the country’s Marxist-
inspired system embarked on a path of radical economic reforms (Ibid: 
Kindle Locations 308-315). In Europe, Foucault has theorised neoliberalism 
as an emergent notion of good government “as the least possible intervening 
government, dissolving political power away from the State into countless 
regimes of care” (Ibid: Kindle Locations 725-726). In China, the practice of 
neoliberalism has instead germinated from the prevailing notion of “frugal 
government” characterising China during Maoism, consisting of “a mass-line 
mode of government that used constant mobilisation of the population to 
achieve national progress while employing the least possible material 
resources” (Ibid: Kindle Locations 740).44With the introduction of economic 
reforms, such principle progressively moved from being a “moral pillar” to 
becoming an “abstraction” translated in a practice of pursuing efficiency 
(Ibid: Kindle Locations 742-745).45 As will be showed later on in this work, 
the delivery of economic results and continuous economic growth have 
arguably become the main basis of legitimation for China’s ruling party.  
This section’s discussion of the economic dimension of migration 
management and neoliberalism in different contexts triggers the 
consideration that all the notions discussed so far – from the definition of 
                                                          
44 Within such context, frugality – translated as an individual and collective pursuit of self-reliance - 
was a moral tenet of a political agenda aimed at enabling the party state to be one with its people “in 
thought and deed” (Ibid). 
45 As will be considered more in detail later in this thesis, before the era of economic reforms in 
China notions of development or social transformation were driven by “political intensity born of 
sacrifice and passionate commitment” (Dutton 2005: 163). The transition to market economy 
transformed instead politics and the state into “a rational, protective shell surrounding an economic 
machine driven by market-based incentives” (Ibid). 
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borders to that of securitisation of migration - are in fact mainly based on 
evidence from the European context. The methodological problems of 
approaching the Chinese context with Western-based definitions directly 
brings us to matters of the methodology of this work and its challenges. The 
next section seeks to explain why a comparative legal perspective can be 
beneficial to current understandings of borders in the EU context, followed 
by the why of the specific comparative selection and the how of such 
comparative task. 
 
PART II. THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
8. Why compare?  
Having put forward the working definitions of the notions of borders 
and securitisation of migration adopted in this thesis, this section shall 
proceed to a discussion of comparative law as its method. This section 
discusses approaches and aims of comparative legal perspectives and 
posits that comparative perspectives can reveal insights which would not 
be visible when analysing a single context.  
A rich diversity of comparative purposes exists within comparative 
law scholarship. By and large, the purpose of comparative law as a 
discipline has also substantially changed over time. For example, at the 
outset of the discipline, conventionally dating back to the second half of 
18th century, the main scope of the comparative eye was to observe the 
general nature and development of legislation and to compile the 
advancement of a universal legal history. Later on, the object and 
purposes of the discipline evolved to pursue issues such as: principles and 
legal methods that distinguish various legal families, the study of ideal 
types of legal systems, harmonisation of laws, legal transplants, legal 
change and so on (Stramignoni 2002:8-11). While at its origins 
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comparative law was mostly preoccupied with legal rules per se (the so 
called “formalist” approach), it progressively shifted to a “relational” 
method, promoting the consideration of different legal realms and not 
only legal texts (Ibid: 11). Gradually, the principle that different things 
can be compared as long as they fulfil the same legal function was 
embraced. The so-called “functionalist approach” has been described as 
the most influential approach within the comparative law discipline to the 
present time (Frankenberg 1985: 428–29; Legrand 2005:632; Ruskola 
2002:187).46 The principle, as defined by Zweigert and Kötz, states that 
[t]he basic methodological principle of all comparative law 
is that of functionality. From this basic principle stem all other 
rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the 
scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of 
comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot usefully 
be compared, and in law the only things which are 
comparable are those which fulfill the same function … . 
The proposition rests on what every comparatist learns, 
namely that the legal system of every society faces essentially 
the same problems, and solves these problems by quite 
different means though very often with similar results 
(Zweigert and Kötz 1998:34, original emphasis). 
Functionalist approaches maintain that in order for two things to be 
comparable, they need to be fulfilling the same function. Assuming that 
societies experience the same problems but employ diverse legal solutions 
to them, the functionalist method would enable scholars to compare 
things in order to seek “better solutions” (Ibid: 15). In doing so, 
functionalism would be able to deliver legal policy recommendations and 
                                                          
46 On the contrary, according to Graziadei despite being one of the most notorious working tools over 
the past century, functionalism was never the only approach in comparative scholarship (Graziadei 
2003:100). 
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provide a wider choice of solutions than those offered by legal studies 
dealing with one legal system, broader than the range which “could be 
thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was 
corralled in his own system” (Ibid).  
Zweigert and Kötz’s approach has been subject to a number of 
criticisms. 47  For example, for Legrand the functionalist approach 
problematically overlooks the epistemological conditions under which the 
achievement of legal knowledge takes place; by doing so, this approach 
would hinder the accomplishment of any useful knowledge (Legrand 
2005: 655). Legrand moves instead from a notion of comparative legal 
research as mediation between different forms of legal context: 
“comparison must involve the primary and fundamental investigation of 
difference” (Legrand 1997: 23-24). According to such account, when 
approaching different contexts, comparatists cannot but see them 
through the lenses of their own understanding and experience of what is 
law.  
Most reasonably, comparative legal studies is about law. 
But who undertakes comparative work equipped with a 
theory of law? Who has a sense where the law begins and 
where it ends? Who has reflected upon what counts as law 
and what counts as non-law? Where is the boundary to be 
drawn between the normal and the deviant, the normal and 
the pathological? For most ‘comparatists’, the matter is easily 
resolved. … In short, the law is to be found in legislative 
                                                          
47 Critiques of mainstream comparative scholarship have sometimes associated themselves with the 
movement of Critical Legal Studies. There is no agreement over whether the wave of so called 
Critical Comparative Legal Studies transcends mainstream Comparative Law or rather belongs to 
the same collective effort (Mattei 2008). For this author, the debate is ultimately a personal matter of 
preferring the label of mainstream comparativist over that of critical comparativist. A more substantial 
problem is mainstream comparative approaches’ attitude of ignoring the epistemological conditions 
under which comparisons take place. Such indifference is also reflected in the unimportance 
accorded to Asian legal systems within world’s comparative taxonomies, as will be seen below. 
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texts and judicial decisions. And, it is that which 
‘comparatists’ emphatically study. However, their conviction 
is not the outcome of deep reflection on the ontology of law. 
Rather, it is the mere extension of what these ‘comparatists’ 
were taught about the meaning of law, often by teachers who 
themselves were not comparatist or theoreticians but were 
simple technicians of the national law (Legrand 1996:235). 
For comparative law compares law as it is inscribed within different 
cultural traditions, the act of comparing would always be characterised by 
a (more or less conscious) act of determining law against some content. 
Consequently, in comparing two situations where law differs, 
comparative law is potentially in a good place to illustrate the “alterity-in-
the-law” characterising all law (Legrand 2005: 707). In other words, 
comparatists would be in a privileged position to deconstruct their object 
of investigation and to create a possibility for “cross-legal/cross-
cultural/cross-traditional mediation” (Ibid: 710).  Accordingly, for 
Legrand not only comparative legal studies can most aptly be seen as 
deconstruction but also, deconstruction can in fact “be better understood 
in the light of comparative legal studies” (Ibid 2005: 717).48 While such 
insights are crucial to this work and wink at a far-reaching comparative 
realm, Legrand himself does not address the non-European dimension of 
comparative law in actual comparisons (Menski 2000:16).  
Legrand’s criticisms of the functionalist approach echo Frankenberg’s 
accusation of the “legocentrism” characterising mainstream comparative 
legal studies, which would be treating law 
                                                          
48Legrand draws on a Derridean notion of deconstruction which posits that “[d]econstruction is about 
an encounter with something, with something else in a way which, on every occasion, intimates an 
assumption of responsibility to the reader who must answer for his interpretation” (Legrand 2005: 
692). 
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 … as a given and a necessity, as the natural path to ideal, 
rational or optimal conflict resolutions and ultimately to a 
social order guaranteeing peace and harmony … Lego-centric 
thinking and legalism, its political strategy, draw their 
strength from an idealized and formalized vision of law as a 
set of institutions, rules and techniques that function to 
guarantee and, in every possible conflict, to vindicate 
individuals’ rights. If legal provisions do not live up to the 
promises inherent in the rule of law, this may be interpreted 
as an unfortunate and atypical accident, a singular event of 
justice miscarried. Thus, the overall legitimacy and efficiency 
of the legal order remain intact (Frankenberg 1985: 445). 
Legocentrism - which Frankenberg attributes to mainstream 
comparative legal studies - would not just prevent from a deeper 
understanding of geographically different contexts. Within comparisons 
between Western and non-Western perspectives, 49  the mainstream 
attitude often translates into a discursive colonisation of other cultural 
contexts, enduring a legal mind-set which affirms Euro-American cultural 
superiority over the legal traditions of the rest of the world (Baxi 
2003:49).   
This thesis acknowledges the shortcomings of the functionalist 
approach and adopts as a result a cautious notion of functionalism which 
will be specified later in this chapter. This notion does not give too much 
attention to the institutions but rather to the function of the legislation 
and policies in question: namely, the function of controlling mobility and 
dividing the population. The thesis assumes that the (political, legal, 
                                                          
49 This work’s definition of West is an identity in no way definitive or complete: as will be explored 
later on in the case of legal Orientalism, countless versions of West and Orient exist. As the case of 
Chinese law from a Western perspective will make evident, the definition of each of these two 
identities relies on each other.  
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cultural and economic) dissimilarities between China and the EU are not 
an obstacle to comparison. Quite the contrary, I maintain that 
comparative dissimilarities allow for the revelation of insights which 
would not appear in the pursuit of traditionally safe comparisons, such as 
those of Euro-American countries (Frankenberg 1985, p.452-453).50 As 
Örücü has reasonably noted 
[i]t is not only similarities but often differences that help 
us to develop theories. Comparative law thrives on 
differences. It is a fact that comparisons complicate rather 
than facilitate research; yet this enhances the quality of 
research. Therefore, scholarly comparative law research, by 
increasing detailed understanding of legal phenomena will 
point in the direction of diverse systems: the more diverse 
the systems, the more rewarding the findings (Örücü 2004: 
34).  
Comforted by the promise of rewarding findings, one of the 
assumptions of this work is that the political, legal, cultural and economic 
dissimilarities between China and EU do not represent an obstacle to the 
comparison. Quite to the contrary, they expose to prospects which would 
not appear possible when pursuing traditionally secure comparisons, such 
as those among Euro-American countries. My assumption is that not 
only are these two migration regimes comparable, but also that a 
comparison with China’s migration regime can valuably elucidate aspects 
of the EU migration regime which are not visible when comparing the 
latter with more similar systems, such as the US migration regime. The 
next section articulates few specific reasons for why China is a good fit 
for a comparative perspective on borders in the European Union.  
                                                          
50 Interestingly, Frankenberg mentions China as an example of a profitable term of comparison with 
Euro-American contexts (Ibid: 243). 
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9. Why a comparison with China?  
While an extensive amount of socio-legal work exists on migration in 
the EU and in China respectively, as already mentioned in the 
introduction to this work, very few socio-legal studies in the English 
language have attempted a comparison between the two. The rareness of 
comparisons between these two migration regimes can perhaps be 
attributed to the fact that China is a nation state and the EU a 
supranational organisation, thus a group of states. Given the seemingly 
different nature of the two politico-legal units in question, the 
comparison between the two would be inappropriate. Earlier in this 
chapter, I nevertheless rebutted notions of borders as fixed and natural 
national entities. In their place, I put forward a definition of borders as 
processes which consist of shifting conglomerates of laws, policies and 
measures which operate as obstacles, impediments or incentives to 
mobility across politico-legal spaces. This definition of borders conceives 
of migration laws and policies as constitutive of borders rather than a 
second order effect of a world where mobility is restricted in the name of 
a world “naturally” divided into nation states.  As a result, the legislation 
and policies operating as obstacles to mobility in the EU and in China are 
comparable because they fulfil the same function of controlling the 
mobility of migrant populations.51  
                                                          
51 Differently from mainstream functionalist approaches, my approach is nevertheless careful not to 
assume that migration management within these two politico-legal systems shares the same 
problems and that they necessarily solve them through law. As will be seen in Chapter Three, this is 
particularly true in the Chinese context, where laws are considered as consolidations of successful 
policies, which are prioritised over law. Given that comparative law methodologies primarily compare 
corresponding areas of law, another objection related to the previous one is the type of legislation 
and policies that will be reviewed in this work. The multi-level analysis of borders in this thesis will 
make necessary a consideration of immigration legislation in the EU and China together with 
administrative laws and policies establishing China’s internal borders. Again, the idea is that the 
function of regulating populations and their mobility characterises both national borders and the 
administrative borders instituted within some nation states.  
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Although as mentioned earlier comparisons between the EU and 
China are extremely rare, the possibility of comparing China’s internal 
borders with international borders has nonetheless been raised in passing 
by a number of Chinese scholars.  Xiang has observed for instance that 
from the perspective of Chinese migrants, the obstacles to migration 
among regions in China are not dissimilar from those inhibiting freedom 
of movement at the international level (Xiang 2005: XIII). Others have 
directly equalled China’s household registration system to national 
immigration systems (Wang 2005, Zhao 2003). By way of an explanation, 
China’s severe economic disparities between cities and countryside would 
resemble the world in a smaller scale, whereby Chinese cities correspond 
to rich developed countries and China’s countryside would equate to that 
of developing countries. Defending the existence of China’s internal 
borders, some have gone as far as to say that “hukou is everywhere”: 
despite not being seen in the same “benign” light of international 
borders, internal borders in China would have the exact same nature 
(Zhao 2003: 18).   
As anticipated in the introduction, a key case in favour of a 
comparison with China is its sheer number of internal migrants, which 
alone is seven times larger than (EU and non-EU) migrant population in 
the Union and exceeds the total of the whole world’s international 
migration. Numbers speak for themselves and make China’s migration 
regime a fascinating case study for the unusual size of migrant population 
compared to any other context in the world. Moreover, the idea is that 
the consideration of the Chinese context and its management of such 
huge numbers can offer lessons and cautionary tales in migration 
management, especially on the issue of how to cope with growing 
numbers of migration in the EU.  
The second reason for selecting China as a term of comparison with 
the EU is that, as already posited, China’s overall trend of de-
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securitisation of internal and international migration over the last decades 
runs opposite to the increasing securitisation of non-EU migration in the 
European context. As a result, the consideration of the Chinese context 
may offer an alternative response to the present conventional wisdom in 
the European context, framing non-EU migration as a security matter 
and holding that increasing numbers of migrants necessarily call for more 
security measures. 
Thirdly, the consideration of China’s internal and external borders 
widens the scope of comparative studies with the EU migration regime. 
As migration studies typically focus on evidence from the European or 
American contexts and the investigation of South to North migration, 
the question of the production and policing of borders in the rest of the 
world is relatively underrepresented in migration studies. In this sense, 
the exploration of the Chinese context can enrich the evidence and 
current understandings of the global governmentality of borders. 
Moreover, the selection of China further moves beyond the focus on 
South to North migration and includes in the picture North to South 
migration as well as South to South migration – whose numbers are again 
underrepresented in studies of migration, disproportionally focused on 
South to North migration.52  
While contemporary migration scholarship conventionally takes the 
nation state as the basis of distinctions between internal and international 
migration, legal and illegal migration and so on (De Haas 2009: 19), 
remarkably, one of the first systematic studies on migration did not 
distinguish between internal and international migration, explaining them 
as one phenomenon mainly caused by unevenly distributed economic 
                                                          
52 This is so despite the fact that according to IOM statistics, the actual size of South to South 
migration has recently surpassed in size South-to-North migration https://www.iom.int/news/iom-
releases-global-migration-trends-2015-factsheet  Accessed 5 September 2017 
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resources (Ravenstein 1889). 53A fourth reason for this comparison is that 
by looking at internal borders, this comparative selection of China further 
allows the investigation of borders beyond the yoke of methodological 
nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). 54  The comparative selection 
with China allows us to go beyond national determinations of borders 
and focus instead on how different politico-legal units organise 
themselves around location-based divisions of the population. The 
comparative outlook on national borders (despite their supranational 
import) in the European case and administrative borders in China will 
uniquely enable a juxtaposition of “natural” national borders with 
“unnatural” administrative borders. In doing so, the comparative 
selection offers a fresh perspective on borders from a conceptual 
viewpoint: for China’s internal borders are not obscured by the 
ideological aura surrounding and grounding borders in the European 
Union.55  
Finally, this comparative selection enables us to see the management 
of migration and its connection with security within two different 
politico-legal types of government: in the EU case, a union of liberal-
democratic states and in the Chinese case, an authoritarian state. By 
considering the management of migration within these two contexts, this 
work’s comparison further sheds light on migration management and its 
connection with the issue of security beyond the different facades 
political-legal systems may show.   
                                                          
53 German–English geographer Ravenstein posited that migration always concerned 
mobility from poorer to richer areas (Ravenstein 1889).  
54Supra, footnote 9. 
55 Borders in the EU may have been erased internally and drawn together as supranational borders 
externally but remain conceived as national at heart. On the contrary, the legislation and practices 
associated with China's internal borders are not vitiated by the idea of "being geographically there" 
as in the European case. 
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Having enunciated the main reasons why China is a good case for 
comparison, the next section the next section moves on to a discussion 
of the challenges and the methodology with which this thesis comparison 
will be undertaken. 
10. How to compare?  
As mentioned above, comparisons complicate rather than facilitate 
research due to the differences between the two terms of comparison. De 
Cruz has identified a few practical challenges to legal comparisons worth 
recollecting here (De Cruz 2009). Perhaps the most obvious obstacle is 
linguistic differences, and the connection between linguistic structures 
and legal structures (Ibid: 2). 56  In our case, compared to European 
languages, Chinese is a language where many notions can be left open 
(i.e. often undefined number of things, undefined singular/plural), the 
closure of which is often provided by the context to which they refer. 
Accordingly, when connecting linguistic structures with legal structures, 
the translation will pay attention to the context. A second complication is 
the cultural difference between systems: an understanding of Chinese law 
clearly requires an understanding of the values and attitudes binding the 
legal system together, determining its position in society (Ibid: 3). I will 
try to prevent the risk of misreading cultural differences between the two 
systems through an introductory section on the main characteristics of 
the Chinese legal system in Chapter III. Another impediment has to do 
with the fact that the selection of the objects of study is subjective and 
dependent on the purpose of the comparison: as a result, there is always a 
risk that aspects considered for comparison might not be the most apt or 
                                                          
56 An oft-quoted example for that is the term “equity” (Aequitas, equite, Billigkeit) which has different 
meanings in civil law and common law jurisdictions. In continental Europe judges apply the term 
when they wish to apply a broad interpretation of a legal principle; in English law, “equity” describes 
the body of law originating from the Courts of Chancery from around the 15th century as opposed to 
the legal principles being developed by the common law courts (De Cruz 2009: 2).  
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the only ones suitable for comparison (Ibid). Comparability values are 
also very much influenced by cultural, political and economic factors. In 
the specific case of this work, the goal of achieving a better 
understanding of the current dynamics of borders in the EU is only one 
possible path, not necessarily the best.57 Another danger which this work 
will not escape is the researcher’s desire to see a general pattern of 
development in legal systems and, related to the previous point, the 
tendency to impose her own conceptions and expectations about the 
legal system (Ibid: 4). Finally, there always exist dangers of keeping out 
some extra-legal rules or overlooking extra-legal factors which influence 
the state of the law (Ibid). These two last difficulties are particularly 
insidious when dealing with Chinese law from a Western perspective. As 
will be seen shortly, disregarding them can easily turn into a discursive 
colonisation of cultural contexts different from one’s own.  
Legal comparisons with the Chinese legal context are furthermore 
challenging because of the more general status that Chinese law is normally 
accorded within comparative law taxonomies.  A survey among the most 
popular comparative law taxonomies58 by Peerenboom remarks how China 
                                                          
57I experienced this criticism in particular on one occasion, when presenting my research to a 
Chinese-only audience during my fieldwork in Beijing. My presentation raised a lot of perplexities for 
its lack of specific practical suggestions for policy or legal reform. As a counterargument, one could 
claim (as I did) that legitimising academic research only on the basis of what is immediately useful 
for policies and legal reform can be reductive and endanger the achievement of a more 
comprehensive knowledge on borders and migration. 
58 Peerenboom surveys some popular comparative legal taxonomies. First is David’s one, which 
distinguishes between common law, civil law, socialist law and a category defined as “other”, which 
includes Muslim, Hindu and Jewish law, African and that of the Far East. China’s legal system is 
included in the Far East category and described as a system where law “is an instrument of arbitrary 
action rather than the symbol of justice; it is a factor contributing to social disorder rather than to 
social order” (David 1985 in Peerenboom 2003:40). The second taxonomy considered is that 
elaborated by Glenn (Glenn 2000), who not too dissimilarly allocates China to an Asian Legal 
Tradition strongly influenced by Confucianism (Glenn in Peerenboom 2003: 41). The third example 
thoroughly discussed by Peerenboom is Mattei’s tripartite taxonomy of three types of legal systems 
(on the basis of whether the foundation of social norms and order is law, politics, or philosophical 
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(together with several other non-Western countries) often stands as an 
example of despotic customary rule as an antithesis to Euro-American 
countries, characterised instead by a professionalisation of law, centrality of 
legal procedures, formality and rationality of their legal systems 
(Peerenboom 2003: 40-41). Peerenboom reasonably blames these 
taxonomies of Orientalism as an attitude of representing Western legal 
systems as culturally superior to others (Ibid: 41). Within such perspective, 
the disorder, arbitrariness and discretionary despotism associated with non-
Western countries would assist the constitution of an image of Western 
countries as a sanctuary of order, rationality, bureaucratic rigour and 
predictability (Ibid). Whereas the impact of culture on modern law seems to 
vanish in the latter’s case, the former’s legal systems would often be depicted 
as exceeding in culture (religious beliefs and philosophical traditions); in the 
Chinese case more specifically, Confucianism and several “Chinese” features 
are held responsible for the failure to achieve a modern rule of law (Ibid:42). 
Yet the damage produced by (the indifference to one’s own) 
epistemological preconceptions goes beyond the risk of summary depictions 
of non-Western legal systems. Drawing on post-colonial studies, Ruskola 
proposes a subtler and more profound meaning for the term Orientalism as 
it has occasionally been brought up within comparative legal studies. His 
explanation relies on Said’s insights on Orientalism, remarking on how 
knowledge about the Oriental other is a fundamental tool of defining one’s 
own identity (Ruskola 2002, 2013).59 Said’s analysis importantly illustrates 
                                                                                                                                               
and religious tradition), which presents China among those systems grounded on philosophical and 
religious tradition (Mattei 1997 in Peerenboom 2003: 44-95). 
59 Through an analysis of various European literary works and arts, Said powerfully reveals how 
European culture has created the concept of Orient in various ways: political, sociological, military, 
ideological, scientific and imaginative. Western culture has a long tradition of depicting Asia, in 
general, and the Middle East in particular. Orientalism is defined as a discourse that constructs the 
East, and created the “others”, at times as exotic, primitive, traditionalist, violent, lustful etcetera. The 
Orientals in other words have been standing for what the West was not. These representations of 
the Orient have helped to establish the West’s own identity as such (Said 1978). 
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how European literary and artistic production in the last few centuries has 
often depicted the Oriental other as a deviation of Western culture, and 
accorded it an inferior status. This representation - which has entertained a 
close relationship with the legitimation of colonial and imperialist ambitions 
- has been fundamental for the definition of Western identity and is 
appropriately transferred by Ruskola to the field of legal studies.  
Ruskola shows how historically the United States have erected their 
cultural identity against China from the point of view of law: the depicted 
lack of Chinese legal subjectivity or/and the supposed Chinese lack of an 
indigenous tradition of law have fundamentally served to mark the identity 
of American Law and the constitution of its legal subject (Ruskola 2013). 
Crucially, such an attitude would have furthermore shaped the field of 
knowledge in which comparative studies of Chinese law unfold today: 
narratives of what he describes as “legal Orientalism” are played against 
Western conceptions of law, by way of asserting what Western law is not.  
By the term legal Orientalism … I refer on the most 
general level to a set of interlocking narratives about what is 
and is not law, and who are and are not its proper 
subjects … . Of course the West - to use a purposely 
imprecise term - has many Others, and the Orient is only one 
of them. At the same time, the Orient itself is a radically 
determinate category, denoting an entity of the European 
imagination that extends from Morocco in North Africa to 
Japan on the eastern edge of Asia … the cultural world of 
China represents only one instance of Orientalism (Ruskola 
2013: 5).  
As Ruskola notices, not only multiple “legal Orientalisms” exist when 
considering Western representations of Chinese law. The picture is 
further complicated by the fact that, in turn, Chinese scholars use 
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representations of Western law for their own purposes, to confirm their 
own self-understandings of what Chinese law is. This often exists in the 
form of Chinese “self-Orientalism”, espousing the idea of a Western legal 
superiority, but also, alternatively, as Chinese “Occidentalism”, as self-
definition against the Western Other (Ruskola 2002: 223).60 Crucially, all 
these identifications would be instrumental: even when Chinese scholars 
declare the inferiority of the Chinese legal system in respect to Western 
ones, such ranking is used as a tool to impact on their social context. In 
other words, Chinese and Western law are present in both Chinese and 
Western imaginations and “are inter-subjectively linked”: the knowledge 
about Western law is instrumental to the formation of the Chinese legal 
subject and vice versa, knowledge of Chinese Law has helped the creation 
of the Western legal subject (Ruskola 2002: 197, Ruskola 2013: 36). The 
notion of legal Orientalism thus stands as a powerful warning of the 
unavoidable epistemological biases underlying all comparisons, yet it does 
not entail that comparisons are not possible. As Ruskola observes, the 
remedy to the fact that “we cannot help essentializing others and even 
ourselves” cannot be a prescription “not to Orientalise”, as this would in 
essence invalidate any comparative enterprise (Ruskola 2013: 54). Rather, 
the only solution appears to be an “ethics of Orientalism” (Ibid), 
acknowledging that we cannot help but to some extent “Orientalise” – or 
else, employ our own preconceptions about law when approaching other 
legal contexts. Rather than invalidating comparisons, this ethics ought to 
trigger an effort to take into account the ways in which our perspectives 
limits the agency of the comparative others as subjects and represents 
them as subjects of agency (Ibid: 55).   
Following these remarks, this work is not only oriented by an ethics of 
Orientalism in its methodology, but such ethics somewhat orients the 
                                                          
60 To be sure, since the first contacts between Europe and the middle Kingdom the Chinese have 
often referred to Western “barbarians” to construct consciousness of Chinese identity (Ruskola 2013: 
35-36). 
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main goal of this work as well. Indeed, the comparative outlook on China 
is aimed at gaining new critical insights on migration management in the 
EU (the context where this author writes from) rather than an assessment 
of the Chinese context. The next section puts forward a few concluding 
caveats to the methodology of the comparative analysis this work 
undertakes. 
11. Concluding caveats 
A few methodological caveats are still in need of being specified. A first 
caveat has to do with theoretical foundations of this work, which mainly 
employs Western theories to examine borders in the two contexts. A 
prominent instance is my use of Foucault’s insights on governmentality and 
population as a key theoretical orientation of the comparative perspective. In 
line with what was discussed above, I do not see a problem in employing 
concepts from different contexts, provided that the origin of the theories is 
made clear. The notion of governmentality is a particularly apt one to shed 
light on China’s migration system61 and has been already employed in several 
China area studies [Dutton 1992, 2005, 2009, Dutton and Hindess 2016, 
Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005, Bray 2005, Jeffeys and Sigley 2009 (eds), 
Bray and Jeffreys 2016 (eds)].  
On the one hand, socialist China’s arts of government resemble those of 
Western liberal democracies in their concern with managing populations’ 
welfare, security and health; on the other, Maoist China diverged from 
liberal democracies in the way it dealt with the possibility of knowing the 
subject it governs (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 7). Whereby liberal approaches 
shape population’s behaviour without aiming to fully grasp the object to be 
governed, China’s socialist governmentality has been characterised by a 
                                                          
61 In doing so, this thesis joins a number of China area studies which have employed Foucault’s 
toolbox to describe various topics such as crime and punishment (Dutton 1992), policing (Dutton 
2005 and 2009), the governance of the work-unit (Bray 2005) and population reproductive policies 
(Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). 
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peculiar Marxist-Leninist belief that the full knowledge of the governed was 
scientifically possible (Dutton 2009: 35). This supposition gave rise to a 
“passionately governmental” system of revolutionary governmentality during 
Mao’s era (Ibid: 24). Within it, “the mentality of government defined life 
itself” and produced a new kind of political subject, one which was directly 
deployed against the enemies of the government (Ibid: 35). Such process 
gave rise to the internalisation of political commitment by political subjects, 
which “demanded and produced a homologisation of all facets of life” 
(Ibid).62  
While after 1978 economic reform policy this type of governmental 
approach gradually faded away, the biopolitical focus on the population 
began to intensify in some spheres. One of the most striking examples for 
that is the recently amended one child policy, which since the 1980s has 
limited Chinese citizens’ reproduction to one child per couple for the good 
of the population. 63 The intensification of government concerns on the 
population during China’s re-entry into the capitalist economic system - as 
exemplified by the one child policy – appears to be a textbook example for 
Foucault’s connection between biopolitics and the rise of neoliberalism 
(Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005: 320). More generally, many of the 
governmentality features which Foucault observes emerging in modern 
Europe appear to have characterised China’s mode of power during ancient 
times (Dutton 1992). An example of this is precisely the millennial tradition 
of the hukou system, which makes China “the first nation to use statistical 
records to plot and police its people” (Dutton 1992: 3). Similarly, the notion 
of self-policing individuals - which Foucault sees emergent in modernity as 
opposed to a coercive and negative traditional power - has characterised 
                                                          
62 The political question became so internalised by subjects that “as each person asked this same 
question of their friends, neighbours and themselves, they found themselves, either through fear or 
commitment, acting upon it in an intense and passionate way” (Ibid).  
63 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Resolution about revising the child-bearing 
policy(全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于调整完善生育政策的决议), NPC Standing Committee, 28 
December 2013. 
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political rule in the middle Kingdom for millennia (Ibid). As Dutton 
illustrates, in ancient China policing did not solely depend on state coercion 
but primarily relied on a complex web of relations, which were ultimately 
grounded upon the family unit and in turn policed by a maze of self-
checking units (Ibid: 3). This type of organisation and capillary policing 
arguably contributed to maintain China as a unitary politico-legal unit for 
millennia (Ibid). All these examples appear to allow for the application of a 
Foucauldian analysis to the Chinese case.64  
A second caveat has to do with the level at which this comparison will be 
undertaken. Comparative literature categorises objects of comparisons as 
falling within levels of macro or micro comparisons: while macro-
comparisons deal with accounts of legal systems/legal families/legal cultures 
more generally, micro-comparisons are instead to do with specific legal 
phenomena, such as laws or customs and traditional rules (Örücü 2004: 41, 
47). Clearly, these two levels complement each other: micro-comparisons 
presuppose macro-comparisons and vice-versa (Ibid: 41). While this 
comparative perspective on borders in China and the EU falls within the 
category of micro-comparisons, the comparative discussion will nonetheless 
be complemented with an occasional consideration of the macro-
comparative level and the main characteristics of the legal systems in 
question. The introduction to the Chinese legal system at the beginning of 
Chapter III will enable a better understanding of the legislation and policies 
constituting borders in the Chinese context which will be dealt with in the 
rest of the chapter. 
A third caveat pertains to the timeframe of the legislation and policies 
considered. I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the absurdity of 
                                                          
64 To be sure, since the abovementioned phenomena are ‘millennial’, they may further be said to 
disqualify an orthodox reading of Foucauldian analysis, which tends to see them instead as products 
of modernity.  
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giving a stable essence to borders becomes immediately evident from an 
historical perspective. The broader the timeframe, the more visible the 
outcomes. Yet, the analysis will be restricted in this work to the main 
legislation and policies which have shaped borders in China and the EU 
over the last sixty years or so. As far as borders of the EU are concerned, 
the study will consider the evolution of the EU’s borders since 1951. In the 
case of China, the study will concern only the post-1949 People’s Republic 
of China.  
A fourth caveat about this thesis is that by concentrating on legal and 
policy frameworks, it might appear to move to the background the topic of 
the agency of migrants as political subjects. This is a somewhat unavoidable 
outcome of a legal perspective which focuses on laws and policies. The 
notion that apart from governments migrant individuals shape global 
borders in a way which cannot be reduced to economic factors or migration 
policies has been acknowledged by mainstream migration studies for some 
time now (Castles et al. 2014: 317). In this sense, I see human mobility not 
as an object of migration laws and policies but a phenomenon which, as an 
agglomerate of individual decisions, impacts on legal and policy frameworks. 
In this respect, the notion of migration as agency, although it finds no space 
in this thesis, is always kept in mind in this investigation of how legal 
frameworks variably shape borders of migration. 
A fifth caveat is that throughout this thesis, by speaking of “China” or 
“the European Union” I might give the impression of conceiving of the two 
as monolithic actors of migration management rather than the multi-level 
and complex systems of government that they both are. Different 
administrative levels sometimes pursue very different lines in migration 
management. In the EU context, fundamental differences exist between the 
EU and Member States, and within the EU government itself (such as the 
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the EU 
Parliament, as well as agencies implementing policies such as FRONTEX). 
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As per the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU is to develop a common immigration 
policy in order to achieve common rules on: procedures for issuing long-
term visas and residence permits, entry and residence conditions for long-
term migrants, the rights of migrants living legally in an EU country, tackling 
irregular immigration and illegal residence, the battle against human 
trafficking, agreements on the readmission of Third Country nationals 
returning to their own countries, incentives and support for EU countries to 
promote the integration of migrants.65 In this respect, this work will mainly 
rely upon analyses of the directives and regulations that have been adopted 
so far. 
The Chinese context is characterised by similar levels of complexity. The 
highest level is the central government, after which follows the provincial 
level (which apart from provinces includes municipalities, autonomous 
regions and special administrative regions), the prefectural level, the county 
level and township and towns level as the bottom of the ladder. Although 
basic (and often purposely vague) guidelines regulating China’s borders are 
defined by the central government in Beijing,66 regulations and policies vary 
substantially across China and exist at a municipal, provincial or local level.67 
While migrant populations are tackled at multiple legislative levels within 
both the EU and Chinese contexts, this work mainly focuses on legislation 
at the EU level in the European case and at the central government level in 
the Chinese case. While different governmental levels and institutions hold 
different views on migration and pursue different agendas, this thesis mainly 
looks at the broader picture and will not offer insights into the politics 
pursued by different institutions within each politico-legal unit which is at 
                                                          
65 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (Treaty of Lisbon), 17 December 2007, OJ C 306, Art. 79. 
66 See for example 1958 Household Registration Administrative Regulations mentioned above or the 
legislation establishing temporary residence permits, 暂住证申领办法 (Method for application for 
temporary residence permits) 2 June 1995, Ministry of Public Security. 
67 Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan will not be considered in this work as their immigration legislation 
is further separated from that of mainland China. 
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the basis of migration management. Nevertheless, occasionally the 
discussion will shift to national or local levels, as in the case of the section 
on external borders in one national case (Italy) in the chapter on the EU, 
and the section on internal borders in one local government case (Beijing 
municipality) in the chapter on China. I selected Italy since it is a particularly 
significant viewpoint from which to analyse the dynamics of EU borders: 
owing to its peninsular position sharing sea borders with Third Countries, 
the country is often seen as one of the gate keepers of the European space. 
The choice to consider Beijing in the Chinese case is due to the fact that 
China’s capital is the city with the most sought-after hukou and the strictest 
hukou legislation in the whole of China. 
A sixth caveat has to do with the implementation of such legislation, 
both in the EU and in the Chinese case. In the EU context, the 
implementation of regulations and directives takes place at the national level. 
National levels are of course characterised by different characteristics and 
different levels of implementation, determined by their specific conditions.68 
In the Chinese context, the implementation of the laws issued by the central 
government cannot be conceived of separately from the policies of the 
central government and varies significantly across different localities. As will 
be posited in Chapter III, the different implementation of legislation is 
facilitated by the intentional vagueness of the formulation of laws at the 
central level in order to suit different local conditions.  
A final caveat pertains to the limits of this comparison. As observed with 
reference to Legrand, the practice of comparison has the potential of 
revealing that any object in comparison is not ultimately contained or 
containable by a researcher’s gaze (Legrand 2005: 717). As I added with 
                                                          
68 An example of great differences in implementation is the implementation of the Directive on Blue 
cards. For example, according to the latest statistics available, some 12.000 blue cards had been 
issued in Germany against 165 in Italy and 3 in Finland as of 2014. 
http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/bluecard_en Accessed 5 September 2017. 
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reference to Ruskola, scholars cannot but employ their own preconceptions 
about law when approaching other contexts and this should prompt them to 
self-reflect on the circumstances under which their investigations are carried 
out. As far as this work goes, my background is European, having studied 
Eurocentric curricula most of my life. A two-year period of research in 
Beijing helped to form my perspective. Sometimes, when studying or dealing 
with Chinese law, I found myself suspending judgments and treating the 
Chinese politico-legal context as a phenomenon that could not be fully 
grasped. At other times, being a passionate Sinophile, I found myself 
intellectually shielding “China” while being more critical of the European 
context. On other occasions, I have been defensive of the framework of the 
European context instead. In all, this work appreciates that a definitive and 
comprehensive grasp of either European or Chinese borders is ultimately 
impossible. For this reason, the goal of this work will be to employ the 
comparison with China to gain a fresh perspective on borders and their 
trend of securitisation in the EU context, the one that I know better. As 
mentioned in the opening of this chapter, the idea is that the best way to 
know the “true shape” of mount Lu is not remaining in its interior but 
exiting it, for distance enables to catch a better sight of its form. 
Conclusion  
Rebutting conventional views of borders as self-evident geographical 
lines, this chapter began by dispelling the notion that borders are fixed and 
natural entities. In its place, it advanced a working definition of borders as 
shifting legal processes governing migration, made of shifting conglomerates 
of laws, policies and measures which operate as obstacles, impediments or 
incentives to mobility across politico-legal spaces. This definition was largely 
indebted to Foucault’s insights on governmentality as well as those who 
have connected such insights with issues of borders and migration. Within 
the same Foucauldian framework, I defined the securitisation of migration 
as a restrictive and exclusionary practice primarily oriented towards the 
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management of the population - both local and migrant - which is 
observable over a certain timeframe within legislative measures, policies and 
official statements. Afterwards, the perspective of comparative migration 
law was individuated as the most apt viewpoint from which to investigate 
EU borders. I moved on to discuss the reasons for selecting China as a main 
term of comparison. After that, the chapter delved into the “how” of the 
comparison, drawing attention to the epistemological biases existing when 
dealing with non-Western legal contexts from a Western perspective. This 
led to a reflection on the limits of this thesis by considering the possible 
biases of its author.  
Carrying the argument of Chapter I forward, Chapter II begins this 
comparative task by looking at the recent history of the borders regulating 
internal and external migration in the EU. This will be followed by an 
examination of the legal categories and profiles available to migrant 
individuals in the EU. This detailed and descriptive analysis will allow me to 
individuate the main trends orienting migration management in the EU 
context. 
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CHAPTER II 
Shifting borders in the European Union: recent history, 
categories and trends 
 
Introduction 
Borders in the EU are not a subject to be dealt with in a linear 
manner. Over the last sixty years or so, since its 1951 inception as the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the shape and scope of what is 
today known as the European Union has transformed numerous times 
through processes of enlargement and integration among Member States. 
On the one hand, enlargements have expanded the territory of the 
European Union. On the other, EU integration has progressively 
minimised restrictions on movement among Member States. Currently, 
EU citizens can enjoy freedom of movement and establishment in any 
other Member State of the Union and their movement is described as 
mobility rather than migration. The notion of migration in contemporary 
Europe is instead related to non-EU citizens. As shall be seen in this 
chapter, the supposed “vanishing” of internal borders within the EU for 
the nationals of Member States has shifted the enforcement of borders to 
the Union’s perimeter, towards the nationals of Third Countries. This 
shift has entailed an increasing securitisation of non-EU migration, as 
was briefly introduced in the former chapter.  
According to the latest statistics available, in 2016 a total of 54.4 
million migrants resided in EU Member States: among these, an 
estimated 19.3 million people came from Third Countries while 
approximately 35.1 million people held citizenship of another EU 
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Member State.69 While the mobility of non-EU citizens is increasingly 
dealt with as a phenomenon that needs to be governed and restricted, the 
movement of EU citizens within the European space is instead 
encouraged and even necessary (although not sufficient) to enjoy full EU 
citizenship. The analysis in this chapter will draw on EU law70 as well as 
national legislation and policy documents, the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of 
Human Rights, the judgements of which are binding on all Member 
States. The narration will also rely upon socio-legal and migration studies 
as key sources to interpret the interaction between legislation and its 
practical implementation. This hybrid approach is made necessary by the 
very nature of human mobility, a phenomenon that - as posited in the 
previous chapter - is influenced by legal and policy frameworks but never 
fully determined by them, insofar as it always exceeds formal 
categorizations and mechanisms of control.  
The chapter begins with an outline on the recent history of the 
borders regulating the internal and external migration in the EU since its 
1951 inception as the European Coal and Steel Community. Section one 
will provide an overview of the evolution of free movement rights for 
EU Member State nationals within EU legislation. I will observe that 
although the principle of free movement of persons was historically one 
of the main goals of integration, at the outset the mobility of Member 
State nationals to other Member States was conceived merely as an 
economic occurrence – a corollary to the free movement of goods and 
capital. Although this account of EU’s internal borders will mainly focus 
                                                          
69Supra, footnote 6. 
70 EU-wide rules can be of two types: the first one is legislative acts, such as regulations and 
decisions, which are immediately applicable in all EU Member States and do not require amending 
national laws. The second and most common type within EU immigration framework are directives, 
which consist of rules that Member States have to integrate into their national legislation by a 
specific deadline. While the results to be attained as stated in the directives are binding, Member 
States can decide the form and methods to accomplish them. 
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on the shifts in legal norms and jurisprudence, I hold that the main 
constitutive force of the Union as a political space has been the actual 
movement of EU citizens within the Union, which established it as a 
political space and unmade the divisions demarcating EU territorial 
spaces (Tuitt 2010: 177). This consideration is illustrated by the most 
recent developments in EU jurisprudence, as the actual movement of EU 
citizens across internal borders has been indicated as the condition upon 
which full enjoyment of the additional rights derived from EU citizenship 
is granted. Even if internal borders have generally vanished for most EU 
citizens, I observe that important qualifications to the enjoyment of such 
additional rights still apply.  
The consideration of the history of the legislation constructing the EU 
external border in section two will testify how the progressive 
minimisation of internal borders in the EU was accompanied by a 
strengthening of its external borders towards Third Country Nationals. 
Section two will provide an historical overview of the laws and policies 
regulating the mobility of Third Country Nationals into the EU. This will 
be followed by an examination of the variety of the legal categories and 
profiles available to migrant individuals in the European Union. As the 
EU’s external borders currently constitute the greatest obstacle to human 
mobility in contemporary Europe, the chapter will dedicate a greater 
amount of space to them than to the EU’s internal borders. Since the 
implementation of the EU legal framework takes place at a national level, 
the chapter will then observe the EU border at close range by looking at 
the case of Italy. The chapter will provide an historical outline of Italy’s 
immigration legislation and, similarly to what was done in relation to the 
EU case, I will examine the main legal categories of migration for non-
EU citizens in the Italian context. The final section will reflect upon the 
main trends of migration management in contemporary EU. I will remark 
that despite the economic underpinnings of EU migration management, 
the nexus between migration and the economy is rarely articulated in 
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migration legislation and official language. Together with security, I will 
observe that humanitarian concerns have instead become a key 
overarching category in non-EU migration management.   
PART I.  HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL BORDERS OF THE 
EU 
1. Evolution of the notion of freedom of movement of EU citizens 
One of the most remarkable features of the EU politico-legal space 
has been its frequent variations of borders and the categories of 
populations newly included and excluded as a result of such changes. 
This section will provide an historical overview of the internal borders of 
the European Union since the establishment of the European Union. It 
will show that while the principle of free movement of persons has 
historically been one of the main goals of European integration since its 
origins, restrictions to mobility within the Union have not only been 
lifted, but also the internal mobility of nationals of Member States 
appears to have become the very condition of enjoyment of full EU 
citizenship rights. As will be seen, the affirmation of this principle, which 
has coincided with the ostensible erasure of internal borders of migration 
among EU countries, has been gradual. The section will conclude that 
while internal borders have generally vanished for EU citizens, some 
qualifications to such movement still apply.  
The principle of free movement of persons within the EU was laid 
down by the 1957 Treaty of Rome as one of the main goals of the 
integration of its members, the other two being free movement of goods 
and capital.71 Remarkably, the Treaty associated the notion of “person” 
with the figure of workers and producers: the persons exercising free 
movement pictured in the original Treaty were economically active 
                                                          
71 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), 25 March 1957, Art. 48. 
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individuals, whose mobility was functional to the construction of a single 
European market (Olsen 2006: 5-6 in Mantu 2011: 130). Apart from 
“economically irrelevant persons”, the notion of freedom of movement 
of persons enshrined in the founding Treaty of the then European 
Community further excluded Third Countries’ nationals72 (Mantu 2011: 
230). Despite the theoretical establishment of freedom of movement of 
Member States’ nationals in the Treaty, the practical implementation of 
this freedom for self-employed or waged workers from European 
Member States occurred very gradually.  At the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s a regime of free movement for European workers 
began to take shape through a number of regulations setting the 
conditions for the implementation of free movement of workers.73 These 
regulations were aimed at standardising matters such as the prohibition of 
nationality-based discrimination between workers of Member States, 
conditions of work, remuneration, dismissals and standards of social 
security. 74  Despite such regulatory framework has been amended and 
expanded in the 1990s,75 most of the key principles set at the time still 
apply to these days. The then Court of Justice of the European 
                                                          
72 In the rest of this work I shall use the term Third Country Nationals to indicate those individuals 
who do not have the nationality of an EU Member State. 
73 EU Council Regulation No. 1612/68 concerning the free movement of workers, 15 October 1968, 
OJ L 257/2; EU Council Directive 68/360 on the Abolition of Restrictions on Movement and 
Residence within the Community for Workers of Member States and Their Families, 15 October 
1968, OJ L 257/13; EU Council Regulation No. 1408/71 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving 
within the Community, 14 June 1971, OJ L149/2.  
74 According to Regulation No 1408/71 (see supra footnote 73) these are: equal treatment between 
national workers and workers from other Member States; a national exercising his or her right of 
work and establishment in another Member State is covered by the legislation of each relevant 
country; when he or she claims a benefit, previous periods of insurance, work or residence in other 
countries are taken into account if necessary; if he or she is entitled to a cash benefit from one 
country, this can be received even if he or she is living in a different country.   
75  EU Parliament and Council Regulation No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems, 29 April 2004, OJ L 200; EU Parliament and Council Regulation No 987/2009 laying down 
the procedure for implementing Regulation No. 883/2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems, 16 September 2009, OJ L284. 
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Communities (CJEC) - challenging administrative decisions at the 
national level – has had a crucial impact in implementing and widening 
the scope of free movement of workers within Member States.76 As a 
result, the freedom to migrate and work in another Member State began 
to be granted to economically active persons such as self-employed 
individuals and waged workers.  
Progressively, the judgments of the CJEC further extended the notion 
of protection of workers’ free movement rights to internal migrants with 
seasonal jobs, part-time employment or traineeship in Member States.77 
In 1990 a number of directives were adopted with the aim of granting 
residence rights to nationals of Member States other than workers: 
employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity,78 students79 and the unemployed, as well as their 
families.80 Nevertheless, such measures remained conditional upon the 
existence of sufficient financial means and a private health insurance for 
any of the aforesaid categories of individuals moving to other Member 
States. The activism of the Court of Justice and its expansive 
interpretation of the Treaty played a fundamental role in extending the 
                                                          
76 See for instance CJEU, C-15/69, Württembergische Milchverwertung-Südmilch AG v Salvatore 
Ugliola, 15 October 1969 where the Court ruled that the free movement of workers requires the 
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States regarding 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment; CJEU C-152/73, Giovanni 
Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, 12 February 1974, where it was established that the rules on 
equality of treatment within European law forbid open discrimination due to nationality as well as 
covert forms of discrimination which lead to the same outcomes. 
77 See for example CJEU Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Germany) 3 Jul 
1986, establishing the free movement of trainees; D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-53/81, 
23 March 1982, establishing the notion of an employed person with an income less than the 
minimum legal wage (part-time work). 
78 EU Council Directive 90/365 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons 
who have ceased their occupational activity, 28 June 1990, OJ L 180. 
79EU Council Directive 90/366 on the right of residence for students, 28 June 1990, OJ L180. 
80 EU Council Directive 90/364 on the right of residence, 28 June 1990, OJ L 180. 
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notion of free movement of economically active persons to other 
categories of nationals of Member States.81 
2. The advent of EU citizenship 
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht instituted freedom of movement and 
residence for all nationals of EU Member States in other Member States 
as the cornerstone of Union citizenship, entitling all citizens of EU 
Member States to freely move and work around the EU.  Providing a 
“brand new political and social meaning to the debate”, the Treaty 
represents a shift from a notion of freedom of movement originally 
conceived as a mere economic occurrence to one where mobility across 
the internal borders of European states for all categories of people 
became a distinctive attribute of EU citizenship as such (Carrera 2005: 
700-701).  As a result, the internal mobility of Member State nationals 
within the Union progressively became a fact of life. These developments 
were also advanced by the coming into effect of the Schengen area in 
1995 – implementing the 1985 Schengen Agreements - generating a 
common area without borders among the signatory Member States (UK, 
Ireland and Denmark originally opting out). 82  Since the 1995 
implementation of the Schengen agreements, border checks at the 
national borders internal to the Schengen area have thus been officially 
abolished.  
                                                          
81See for example CJEU Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 12 May 1998. The 
applicant was a Spanish national legally resident in Germany since the age of twelve to whom 
German authorities had refused to issue a residence permit and to give her a child-raising allowance 
on the grounds that she was not German and did not have a residence permit. The Court ruled that a 
national of a Member State could be included within the scope of citizenship provisions. The case 
became the first to explore the extent to which a non-economically active person can receive 
social benefits in another Member State. 
82 Currently, the UK and Ireland are still opting out of Schengen while Denmark is now part of the 
Schengen area. 
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While EU internal borders have been substantially lifted for most EU 
citizens, the internal borders of the Union still affect the mobility and 
freedom of establishment of another group of people: Third Country 
Nationals already in the EU. As just mentioned, the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty introduced EU citizenship and free movement for the nationals of 
Member States. The millions of Third Country Nationals residing in a 
Member State at the time, however, have been excluded from the 
process. 83  Similarly, even though the 1995 implementation of the 
Schengen agreements has inaugurated the beginning of an area of 
freedom and mobility automatically also allowing the mobility of Third 
Country Nationals within it, Third Country Nationals – regardless of 
whether they have long-term or permanent rights of residence in an EU 
country - do not enjoy any citizenship right across the European space. 
In other words, freedom of movement within the Schengen area is the 
only right they have acquired throughout the process of supposed 
removal of EU internal borders (which, as shall be seen later in this 
chapter, has entailed a general strengthening of the external borders).   
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States marked an ulterior phase of the European internal 
migration regime for EU citizens.84 The Directive advances the rights to 
entry, residence and equal treatment for EU citizens moving to another 
Member State. It further established the right of permanent residence to 
those EU citizens and their family members (EU or Third Country 
nationals) who have legally resided for a continuous period of five years 
                                                          
83 According to some, this has problematically created a new discrimination which did not previously 
exist in the EU space between EU citizens and Third Country Nationals as “second class citizens” 
(Balibar 2003: 44). 
84 European Parliament and EU Council Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 30 April 
2004 OJ L 158/77.  
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in the host Member State.85 For EU nationals who are not workers or 
self-employed, the right of residence remained contingent upon their 
having sufficient financial means not to become a burden on the host 
Member State’s social system.86 
3. Freedom of movement and restrictions to EU citizenship rights 
A critical exception to the right to work and establish in other 
Member States for EU citizens relates to EU enlargement. The majority 
of “new” Member States have faced an initial restriction included in 
Accession Agreements on their nationals’ access to the labour markets of 
most of the “old” Member States.87 Through the latter, the majority of 
“old” Member States instituted arrangements limiting the rights of 
workers and service providers from “new” Member States to work and 
reside within their territories for up to seven years from their accession.88 
The limitation for the nationals of most “new” Member States to reside 
and work within most of “old” Member States was justified as a measure 
to protect “old” Member States national labour markets. After the 2004 
enlargement, only Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom allowed the 
citizens of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia unrestricted access to their labour markets. After 
the 2007 enlargement, all the “old” Member States – except for Finland 
and Sweden - enacted restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. 
As Croatia joined the EU in 2013, its nationals are still subject to such 
restrictions in several Member States.89 For the nationals of these new 
Member States, internal borders continued to apply for some years and in 
some cases still persist. Although provisional, such restriction to freedom 
                                                          
85 Supra, Art. 16. 
86 Supra, Art.7. 
87 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Malta joined the EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013.  
88 For Bulgaria and Romania, the limitations ran from 2007 until 2014.  
89 The restrictions still apply in Austria, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and United Kingdom. 
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of movement for work and establishment relegated or still relegate the 
nationals of most of the “new” EU Member States to an ambiguous 
status of legal residents, but illegal workers (Kubal 2013: 556), which 
some have aptly described as one of “semi-citizenship” (Rigo 2007: 152).  
As regards free movement within the Union, Third Country Nationals 
already in EU Member States hold a similar, although permanent, 
ambiguous status. Although at a first glance the creation of an area of 
free movement has also brought about freedom of mobility for Third 
Countries Nationals, internal borders continue to apply to this category 
of persons. As a matter of fact, the entitlement to mobility within the 
Schengen area has not granted them any related rights to work or 
establishment. The situation of Third Country Nationals already in the 
EU was clarified by a 2010 Directive which stated that Third Country 
Nationals who hold a residence permit (or a long-term visa for more than 
3 months) issued by any EU Member State are allowed to move without 
restrictions to other countries of the Schengen zone for a period of up to 
3 months in any half year.90 If they exceed this timeframe, they should 
promptly be required to return to their “original” Member State.91 Longer 
presence in a country where one does not hold a residence permit will 
result in over-staying. This is the case of Third Country Nationals who 
for instance have residence documents in one EU Country but, being 
unable to find work there, work illegally in another EU Country living in 
a semi-legal limbo where they have to frequently travel back to their EU 
country “of origin” in order not to over-stay (Rytter 2012, Kubal 2013).  
4. A neo-nomadism of EU citizens? 
                                                          
90 EU Parliament and Council Regulation 265/2010 amending the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement and Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards movement of persons with a 
long-stay visa, 25 March 2010, OJ L85/1. 
91 Supra, p. 2 
 88 
 
While movement across Member States is not encouraged by EU law 
for Third Country Nationals, the opposite can be said for EU citizens. 
The nexus between exercise of freedom of movement within the territory 
of the Union and citizenship rights has been expanded in scope by recent 
rulings of the CJEU. These rulings have argued over matters traditionally 
under the realm of national sovereignty, such as that of granting or 
revoking citizenship92 or giving authorisation to reside and work on a 
territory.93 Not only the exercise of free movement and residence in other 
Member States is a defining feature of EU citizenship: in cases of family 
reunification with Third Country nationals, recent rulings have 
emphasised that the exercise of such right is the very condition upon 
which rights such as the authorisation to reside and work for Third 
Country family members of EU nationals can be granted. 94  In some 
cases, the EU framework provides EU citizens with extra rights that they 
would not have if they did not move across the internal borders. An 
example of this is family reunification with Third Country nationals: 
while in some EU countries such as the UK or Austria the national 
legislation makes reunification conditional to specific financial income 
                                                          
92 CJEU Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, 2 March 2010. Mr Rottmann was an 
Austrian national who, having acquired German nationality via naturalisation, had omitted to inform 
the German authorities that he was under judicial investigation in his country of origin. Once the 
German Court learnt about this, it invalidated Rottmann's naturalisation. However, pursuant to 
Austrian law, such naturalisation had already resulted in his loss of Austrian nationality. In this case, 
the CJEU ruled that the resulting situation of Mr Rottmann may only happen after applying a 
proportionality test to such a withdrawal. 
93 See for example CJEU Case C-34/09 - Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de l’Emploi, 8 
March 2011. In Zambrano, the CJEU ruled that the Colombian parents of two Belgian children born 
and raised in Belgium who had never exercised their rights of free movement to another Member 
State - could not be deprived of residence and work permits, as denying them would have entailed 
forcing EU citizens to leave the territory of the Union as a whole.  
94See for example CJEU Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci and Others. v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 
15 November 2011. Dereci is a joint case of five applicants, all of them Third Country nationals 
asking to reside in Austria with their Austrian family members, their family members not having 
exercised their free movement rights to another Member State. The Court ruled that an EU citizen 
who has the option to reside with his or her family member in another Member State does not satisfy 
the condition of deprivation of genuine enjoyment. 
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thresholds to be met, these thresholds do not apply to the nationals of 
other Member States in the UK or Austria, nor to the UK or Austrian 
citizens living in other Member States. In this way, the mobility of EU 
citizens across EU Member States, complementary to the erasure of 
internal borders, has been encouraged by the current legal framework, 
which appears to promote a sort of “neo-nomadism of EU citizens” 
(Rigo and Zagato 2012: 281). However, remarkably, these EU citizens on 
the move need to be either economically active or have sufficient 
financial means, as the Court has further specified.95 According to Rigo, 
this stance “brings back through the window what the progressive 
interpretation of the Treaties had thrown out the door”, namely the fact 
that only economically active individuals can enjoy full EU citizenship 
rights (Rigo 2015, my translation). By negating full citizenship rights to 
economically inactive citizens or citizens who do not exercise their right 
to free movement, the latest developments in the jurisprudence seem to 
suggest that the model recipient of EU citizenship rights is by default an 
economically active person on the move.  
As this brief historical-legal perspective has shown, internal borders of 
migration for the nationals of Member States have undergone significant 
shifts as EU integration has progressively removed barriers to freedom of 
movement, establishment, work, and enjoyment of welfare benefits 
across Member States. The principle of free movement of persons 
engraved in the Treaty of Rome has evolved from a black letter law 
provision to a common practice of free movement and establishment 
across the European space for EU Member State nationals. The right of 
                                                          
95 CJEU Case C-86/12, Adzo Domenyo Alokpa and Others v Ministre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de 
l'Immigration, 10 October 2013. Adzo Domenyo Alokpa was a Togolese national who sued 
Luxemburg for rejecting her application for a residence permit as a family member of a European 
Union citizen – her two young sons were French nationals via paternal bloodline – due to her lack of 
financial means to support herself. The Court in this case ruled that the two children could enjoy 
social assistance in France, implying that France had ultimate responsibility over her two 
(economically inactive) nationals.  
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free movement was originally introduced for economically active citizens 
of EU Member States, namely workers and the self-employed. It was 
expanded to other categories, such as students, family members, and 
retirees.  
Despite substantial achievements since the inception of the European 
Union, internal borders have not been erased at the same speed for many 
nationals of Member States of recent accession. More strikingly, Third 
Country Nationals already residing and working in the EU have been 
kept out of the process. This has given rise to statuses of semi-legality for 
Third Country Nationals working or overstaying in Member States other 
than the one from which they have a visa. I further noted that although 
internal borders have been generally erased, the latest judgements of the 
CJEU have specified that internal borders still exist for those EU citizens 
who fail to pass the financial means test. In other words, a system of 
stratified rights (Morris 2003) – as I put forward in Chapter I – appears 
to characterise the governance of EU citizens on the move.  As shall be 
seen in Section three, the economic means test is also a determining 
factor in the assessment of the desirability or dangerousness of non-EU 
nationals, the ones who are most affected by EU borders. But first, the 
next section will provide an historical overview of the legislation and 
policies constituting the EU border regulating the mobility of non-EU 
citizens into the Union.  
PART II. HISTORY OF THE EXTERNAL BORDERS OF THE 
EU 
5. From guest workers programmes to the goal of “zero” immigration 
Tracing a history of border controls restricting the movement of 
Third Country Nationals entering the EU is difficult for various reasons. 
First, due to its enlargements, the size and shape of the EU have 
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substantially changed over the last fifty years. Second, these enlargements 
have also changed the status of some of the residents in EU Member 
States. For instance, after EU enlargements, some individuals have 
moved from an irregular migrant status in an EU Member State, to EU 
citizens when their country of nationality joined the EU (Guild 2011: 
213). Third, before the common migration policy and the creation of the 
Schengen area, immigration into the European Union was a national 
issue, dealt with in different ways across European Member States. 
Maintaining the notion of EU external borders as a mutable variable, 
scholars often note that immigration into and within the EU by the 
nationals of non-EU Countries boomed in the wake of the Second World 
War, prompted by post war reconstruction labour demand, immigration 
from Eastern bloc countries and decolonisation (Papadopoulos 2012: 24). 
All the highly industrialised countries of North Western Europe put in 
place temporary labour recruitment schemes at some stage between 1945 
and 1973, although such schemes played a smaller role than spontaneous 
immigration of workers (Castles et al 2014: 104). The first wave of 
migration to Northern European countries such as Belgium, Germany 
and the UK mainly consisted of surplus workers from Mediterranean 
countries, parts of Eastern Europe. Subsequently, in the 1960s and 1970s 
workers from decolonised countries were encouraged by private 
employers and governments to deal with labour shortages and revive the 
war-ravaged economies of Western Europe (Messina 2007: 20-21). 
Labour migration thus became the main legal category of migration into 
North Western European countries. 
However, in 1973 the “oil price shock” and the fear of economic 
stagnation associated with it drove governments to strictly curb 
immigration of foreign workforces (Papadopoulos 2012: 24). An official 
halt on the employment of new workers and the introduction of 
voluntary repatriation schemes for foreign workers by various Northern 
European governments led to a progressive decline in the ratio of 
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migrant labourers in Member States’ workforces (Messina 2007: 25). As a 
result of the closure of guest worker programs in the 1970s, migration 
through the assertion of rights to asylum and family reunification became 
the main legal routes to enter Western Europe. This approach of closure 
was replicated at the European level and is reflected in various EU 
Commission policy documents from the 1970s to the late 1990s, 
promoting an official line advising against labour migration into the EU 
from non-OECD countries (Hansen 2016: 7).96  
6. External borders and the promotion of EU citizenship 
At times described as a process of erasure of national borders, EU 
integration appears to have strengthened and transferred borders to the 
perimeter of the Union. This trend has been described as the “EU 
borders’ paradox”, whereby the pursuit of an unrestricted free movement 
of persons within the EU has paradoxically produced measures 
reinforcing and multiplying external border controls (Mitsilegas 2009: 33). 
The increased coordination on the control of the movement of Third 
Countries Nationals at the external borders has run parallel to the 
constitution of EU citizenship. As Hansen and Hager have argued, the 
then official line of the Commission to achieve “zero” labour 
immigration from non-EU countries served the Commission to promote 
EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager 2012: 144). The very term 
“immigration” (as referred to non-EU migrants) appeared for the first 
time in a EU treaty precisely in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty instituting EU 
citizenship. The treaty further established a Third Pillar on Justice and 
Home Affairs aimed at improving cooperation on internal security 
among other issues. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 further promoted 
the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice, where free movement 
                                                          
96  See for example Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94) 23 final, 23 February 1994. 
 93 
 
would be guaranteed in conjunction with security measures pertaining to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and crime prevention.97  
Not only the emergence of an EU-wide migration policy towards non-
EU nationals has run parallel to the institution of EU citizenship: as 
scholars have argued, when looking at the legal reasoning behind it, the 
institute of EU citizenship is in fact constitutively built on the exclusion 
of Third Country Nationals (Lindahl 2009, Mitsilegas 2009, Rigo 2007).  
To put it with Hans Lindahl,  
[t]he so called area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
ambition is to give fully-fledged institutional form to a jus 
includendi et excludendi, a right to include and to exclude for the 
EU: a right to determine which aliens might enter, remain in 
or be expelled from the EU... Yet a closer consideration of 
the relevant provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and 
beyond, and of all earlier treaties leading back to, and 
including the Treaty of Rome, reveals a circularity that 
governs the purported jus includendi et excludendi to be 
excercised via the AFSJ: a right to inclusion and exclusion is 
held to be justified because the EU is the common place of 
its citizens; yet, to begin with, acts of inclusion (and attendant 
exclusion) give rise to European citizens and their allegedly 
common place (Lindhal 2009: 1).  
The definition of European citizenship and its space through acts of 
exclusion of non-EU citizens from the project uncritically framed the 
membership to the European polity as a sum of Member States 
memberships, and failed to take into account the claims of long-term 
resident Third Country nationals for inclusion (Kostakopoulou 2000: 
                                                          
97 Treaty of Amsterdam, 10 November 1997, OJ C 340, Title III A on visas, asylum, immigration and 
other policies related to free movement of persons. 
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510). The notion of exclusion of Third Country nationals has been 
further presented in official discourses as “security enhancing”: in other 
words, “the enforcement of the law against migrants is said to have been 
dictated by the need on the part of the Union to fulfil its obligations to 
Union citizens” (Ibid). 
7. The securitisation of non-EU migration 
The securitisation of migration consolidated the notion of European 
collective identity versus a “dangerous” non-EU migrant population, as 
the institution of free movement activated by the Schengen process 
prompted Member States to increasingly bring together issues of border 
control, migration, terrorism and so on under the umbrella of security 
(Bigo 1996: 112–145). According to Huysmans, these legal developments 
should be further seen as part of an overall spill-over in the European 
integration process, whereby the “radically speeding up of the 
institutionalization of the internal market” through the erasure of border 
controls had the “Europeanisation of the control of abusive use of free 
movement” as a political correlate (Huysmans 2006: 85). According to 
this view, the security policy which has developed to govern free 
movement in the EU has taken place both through border controls 
“aimed at externalizing excessive free movement” (Ibid: 101-2) as well as 
through biopolitical technologies internalizing threats to the European 
population (Ibid: 102). Examples of the latter include the introduction of 
European databases such as EURODAC,98  the Schengen Information 
                                                          
98EURODAC is a system set up in 2000 to assist European Member States in the identification of 
asylum applicants and persons who have already been apprehended in connection with an irregular 
crossing of an external border of the Union. EU Council Regulation 2725/2000 concerning the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the 
Dublin Convention, 11 December 2000, OJ L 316/1. 
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System 99  and the EU common Visa Information System 100  have been 
aimed at classifying Third Country migrants into categories to better 
prevent or restrict their mobility (Huysmans 2000 and 2006, Bigo 2000). 
While the movement of Third Country nationals has been increasingly 
perceived as a phenomenon that needs to be governed, the mobility of 
Member State nationals across borders is instead encouraged.  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, the increasing connection of 
migration law with the issue of criminality at both EU and national level 
could be seen as an advancement of the trend of securitisation of 
migration.101The increased use of substantive criminal law to control and 
punish migration law violations as well as in the practice of migrant 
surveillance and detention adopted in all EU Member States since the 
1990s would be evidence for it. Mechanisms of prevention and pre-
emption before migrants reach the EU borders would further be part of 
such securitisation of migration (Mitsilegas 2015: 2). For some, 
increasingly restrictive regulations towards migration from non-EU 
Countries would have also indirectly contributed to de-legitimise and 
securitise the presence of non-EU migrants in the EU (Huysmans 2006: 
64).   
It should be noted that all the legislative measures which will be 
considered below as part of the general trend of securitisation of non-EU 
migration make reference in their preambles to the EU’s fundamental 
                                                          
99 EU Council Decision on the development of the second-generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II), 6 December 2001, OJ L 328; Council Regulation 2424/2001 on the development of the 
second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 6 December 2001 OJ L 328. 
100The system exists for the exchange of visa data between Member States and carriers which 
consolidated the external borders of the EU as far as records on decisions on short-stay visa 
applications are concerned. EU Council Regulation 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information 
System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS 
Regulation), 9 July 2008, OJ L 218. 
101 As already specified in Chapter I, in this work I consider the notion of securitisation of migration 
as undistinguishable from the notion of “criminalization of migration”. 
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rights commitments (Guild 2010: 17). Clear references are normally made 
to the duties of Member States under the European Convention on 
Human Rights 102  and, in asylum matters, to the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention.103 However, the recognition of these commitments does not 
seem to influence in practice the increasing criminalisation of non-EU 
migration (Ibid).  
8. Strengthening the EU’s external borders 
Several measures at the EU level have pushed the criminalisation of 
non-EU migration agenda. In 2002, the Facilitation Directive introduced 
criminal sanctions for any EU citizen “assisting” an irregular migrant’s 
entry, transit and residence in the territory of a Member State if done for 
financial gain. 104  At the national level, such “offence of solidarity” is 
variably framed across different Member States. Some Member States 
sanction the facilitation of entry and stay with fines or custody, others 
with both. Some make exceptions for humanitarian assistance, while 
others do not.105 The 2004 establishment of the External Borders Agency 
(FRONTEX) is a further manifestation of the growing securitisation 
trend in EU migration policies. FRONTEX was created with the aim of 
coordinating joint operations by Member States at the EU external 
maritime, land and air borders of the Schengen area, covering around 
44,000 km of external maritime borders and nearly 9,000 km of terrestrial 
                                                          
102 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950. 
103 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
104 EU Council Directive 2002/90 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, 
28 November 2002, OJ 2002 L 328/17. Ireland and Denmark have opted out of this directive. 
105 Penalties differ greatly among Member States. The maximum fine for facilitating entry and stay is 
€78,000 in the Netherlands and up to €100,000 in Spain. In Greece, facilitation of entry prison terms 
can be up to 10 years while in the UK the law provides for a maximum of 14 years. Some Member 
States may sanction humanitarian assistance and consider it a means of facilitating the entry and 
residence of irregular migrants (e.g. Belgium). 
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borders.106 While this agency has not fully substituted Member States in 
the task of securing the external borders of the EU, its creation further 
represents a shift in the exercise of border controls, typically a national 
prerogative. Crucially, FRONTEX actions are not subject to the legal and 
political liability of national governments (Baldaccini 2010: 230).107 
 Together with the already mentioned introduction of restrictive visa 
regimes which can deter nationals from Third Countries to obtain a visa 
to the EU, the strengthening of the EU external borders has further been 
observed in their externalisation. An example of the latter has been the 
expansion of carriers’ obligations with the scope of preventing irregular 
migration (Ryan 2010: 22). Since 2004, carriers are required to 
communicate passengers’ data and financial penalties are imposed on 
carriers transporting into the territories of EU Countries non-EU 
nationals lacking the necessary admission documents.108 The 2005 EU 
Global Approach to Migration further played a significant role in the 
externalisation of EU borders through partnerships with non-EU 
Countries aimed at fighting irregular migration and improving links 
between migration and development.109 Under this approach, Member 
States, both at the EU and national level, have entered into mobility 
partnerships with a number of Third Countries, which have introduced 
frameworks of mutual offers of pledges on migration and asylum issues 
                                                          
106 EU Council Regulation 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 26 
October 2004, OJ L 349/1. 
107 While previously in FRONTEX publications no mention was made of human rights, protection of 
lives or asylum, since 2008 the agency has gradually adopted a marked language of human rights 
and humanitarian protection (Perkowski 2012: 26). 
108  EU Parliament and Council Directive 2004/82 on the obligation of carriers to communicate 
passenger data [2004] OJ L 261. 
109Commission Communication, Priority Actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First 
follow-up to Hampton Coutts, COM (2005) 621 final, November 30 2005. 
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(visa facilitation, return of irregular migrants through readmission 
agreements).110  
The external dimension of asylum and migration into the EU was also 
emphasised by the 2005 EU Justice and Home Affairs programme 
(“Hague programme”) encouraging the establishment of partnerships 
with countries and regions of transit and countries of origin of migrants 
and asylum seekers.111 Claiming that “insufficiently managed migration 
flows can result in humanitarian disasters”, and expressing “utmost 
concern about the human tragedies that take place in the Mediterranean 
as a result of attempts to enter the EU illegally” the programme called for 
an intensification of border management aimed at “preventing further 
loss of life.’ 112  According to Cuttitta, statements such as this one are 
exemplary of the beginning of a new process of association of migration 
management and humanitarian concerns, whereby the latter are employed 
to justify the intensification of the former (Cuttitta 2015: 133).  
9. Migrants’ detention and the privatisation of migration controls 
Another key migration management device has been the practice of 
administrative detention of irregular migrants which was introduced in 
the 1990s in all Member States, as will be exemplified by the Italian case. 
While Member States defend this measure as necessary to preserve the 
integrity of their borders and national security, an “official haziness” 
characterises national practices of immigration detention (Cornelisse 
                                                          
110Over the last few years, a number of EU Member States have concluded Mobility Partnerships 
and/or visa facilitation agreements and readmission agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cape Verde. Other endeavours at the EU level include the establishment in 
2008 of a Centre for Migration Management and Information (Centre d'Information et Gestion des 
Migrations, CIGEM) created through an agreement between the European Union and Mali. Similarly, 
the EU also instituted a National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) in 
Morocco for the management of European job offers. 
111 EU Council, Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European 
Union, 3 March 2005, OJ C 53/1. 
112 Supra, section 3, subsection 1 point 6. 1.  
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2010: 8). Detention of irregular migrants can take place on arrival for the 
purposes of processing asylum requests and detention for the purposes 
of removal (Guild 2006: 5 in Cornelisse 2010: 8). Migrant detention upon 
arrival is aimed at precluding Third Country Nationals’ illegal entry 
and/or at verifying their identity and lawfulness of entry. This type of 
detention can fluctuate between one day to weeks, months or years, only 
in some EU Member States the maximum length of such measure is 
regulated by law (Ibid: 10). Administrative detention has also become a 
common measure in processing asylum seekers’ applications. While the 
circumstances, maximum length and actual detention period differ 
extensively across Member States, minimum standards for the reception 
of asylum seekers were set at the EU level in 2003 and recast in 2005 and 
2013.113 According to the latest 2013 Directive, Member States may not 
carry out an interview in the asylum process in certain limited 
conditions. 114  Moreover, the right of asylum seekers to an effective 
remedy is acknowledged, together with time restrictions on applications 
to challenge asylum decisions, which are subject to reasonable time limits 
and other necessary procedures for the applicant to exercise the right to 
an effective remedy.115  Lastly, the detention of Third Country Nationals 
can be enforced as a consequence of an order of deportation or removal.  
In most Member States, whenever a Third Country National has been 
mandated to leave the national territory the possibility of administrative 
detention is contemplated by law (Ibid: 15). In 2008, the so called 
“Returns Directive” stipulated that detention with no reasonable 
                                                          
113 EU Council Directive 2003/9 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, 
27 January 2003 OJ L 31/18; Council Directive 2005/85 laying down minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, 1 December 2005, OJ L 
326/13; European Parliament and EU Council Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection (recast), 26 June 2013, OJ L 180/60. 
114  EU Parliament and Council Directive 2013/32 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast), 26 June 2013, OJ L 180/60, Art.14. 
115 Supra, Art.46. 
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prospect of removal is unlawful116 and that return decisions shall provide 
for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and 
30 days. 117  The Directive further established a maximum period of 
detention of an overall term of 18 months for a Third Country National 
who has been issued a removal order.118 Although setting maximum time 
limits for detention and establishing minimum standards of removal or 
processing of asylum applications might be seen as a step towards 
migrants’ protection, scholars noted that the Directive institutionalises 
detention as an ordinary means of enforcing removal of irregular 
migrants (Mitsilegas 2015: 93-97). This is in line with a semantic shift in 
the official language of EU legislation, within which after 2003 the term 
“irregular migrant” became a “common currency appearing again and 
again throughout documents, legislation and decisions” (Guild 2010: 17).  
In 2009 the so called Employers Directive, providing for minimum 
standards on sanctions and measures against employers in relation to 
illegally staying Third Country Nationals, added an extra layer to the 
control of “illegal immigration”.119 As in the case of Carriers’ sanctions, 
this legislation involved the private sector in migration control, 
traditionally a state activity, as part of a wide-ranging “privatisation of 
immigration control” within which private citizens are mobilised by the 
state to undertake tasks which would traditionally pertain to immigration 
control officers (Mitsilegas 2015: 23). While in the case of carriers the 
privatisation of immigration control pertained to the prevention of entry 
to the national territory, the introduction of criminal sanctions on 
employers extended the control inside the territory to cover both 
migrants who have illegally entered as well as over-stayers (Ibid: 54).  
                                                          
116 Supra, Art. 15 subsection 4. 
117 Supra, Art. 7 subsection 1. 
118 Supra, Art. 15 subsection 6. 
119EU Parliament and Council Directive 2009/52 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and 
measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, 18 June 2009, OJ L 168. 
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10. EU’s need for labour migration and growing securitisation 
In the domain of labour migration each EU Member State has 
exclusive jurisdiction over quotas of migrants allowed in the country for 
work purposes, final decisions on migrant applications, procedures on 
long-term visas and requirements to acquire residence and work permits. 
Yet, over the 2000s the EU has issued a number of directives in an 
attempt to regulate non-EU labour migration. These include legislation 
on highly skilled workers such as the Blue Card and Intra-Corporate 
Transferees Directives,120 as well as the isolated attempt to address low 
skilled workers through the Seasonal Workers Directive,121 which awaits 
implementation by all Member States. These legal developments have 
been coupled with a reverse of the policy goal of “zero” labour migration 
which previously characterised the line of EU government. As Hansen 
pointed out, this shift took place in the late 1990s, as the Commission 
began to issue statements positing that the “zero immigration” target 
mentioned in past documents “was never realistic and never really 
justified”, 122  and “no longer appropriate” 123  based on economic and 
demographic analyses (Commission documents quoted in Hansen 2016: 
7).  
This shift in stance toward labour migration by the Commission is 
further reflected in documents such as the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal 
                                                          
120 European Council Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 25 May 2009, OJ L 155/17 and European 
Parliament and EU Council Directive 2014/66 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals in the framework of an Intra Corporate Transfer, 15 May 2014, OJ L 157. 
121 EU Parliament and Council Directive 2014/36 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, 26 February 2014, OJ L 94/375. 
122 EU Commission “Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification”, 1 
December 1999, 638 final. 
123 EU Commission “On a Community Immigration Policy’, 22 November 2000, 757 final. 
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Migration124 and the Commission’s 2012 Ageing Report125, where it is 
cautioned that unless the EU succeeds to increase labour migration, the 
EU’s working age population will dramatically shrink with adverse 
consequences on its welfare systems (Hansen 2016: 6). Growth ten-plans 
such as Europe 2020126 have further stressed the link between economic 
growth and migration growth (Ibid). Following a twisted logic, the 
increased regulation and call for more labour migration by the 
Commission have been paired in official documents by pledges for 
harsher measures against irregular immigration. According to Hansen, 
this has been “a tactic for saving face … in the face of the broken 
promise for zero immigration” characterising EU policies in the 1990s 
(Hansen 2010: 95).127  
This ambivalent stance at the EU level is to be seen in conjunction 
with the fact that national laws of Member States provide little to no 
channels for labour migration into Member States and national 
governments have not yet take seriously the long-term policy advice of 
the Commission, perhaps also cognizant of the common reluctance of 
national publics to accept the notion of more openness towards more 
migration. As a result of this, for the time being the humanitarian 
category and the issue of security remain the predominant categories of 
management of EU migration. This is illustrated by the latest 2015 
European Agenda on Migration. 128  On the one hand, the Agenda 
prioritises a view of migration in the EU in terms of humanitarian 
                                                          
124 EU Commission “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”, 21 December 2005, 669 final. 
125 EU Commission “The 2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 27 EU 
Member States (2010–2060)”, European Economy 2/2012, DG Economic and Financial Affairs. 
126 EU Commission “EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, 2 March 
2010, 2020 final. 
127 Quoting the Commission’s opinion, Hansen reports how measures implementing “the forced 
return of illegal residents,” can “help to ensure public acceptance for more openness towards new 
legal immigrants against the background of more open admission policies particularly for labour 
migrants” (Hansen 2010: 95). 
128 EU Commission “A European Agenda on Migration”, 13 May 2015, 240 final. 
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emergency and as a security matter, having as its core objective to take 
immediate action against “[t]he plights of thousands of migrants putting 
their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean”. 129  On the other, it is 
nonetheless acknowledged towards the end of the document that a new 
policy on legal migration is needed and that crucially, “…without 
migration the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in 
the next decade” thus, “[m]igration will increasingly be an important way 
to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure 
sustainable growth of the EU economy”.130 Although the issue remains a 
statement of purpose which is underdeveloped compared to other 
matters, the Commission appears to be consistently calling attention 
upon this issue which as we have seen is becoming more and more 
urgent as Europe’s working age population declines. 
This brief historical overview has revealed that over the last fifty years 
or so the external borders of what is currently referred to as the 
European Union have significantly shifted through enlargements and EU 
integration. In the form of erasure of internal borders and the institution 
of the common market, EU integration further appears to have produced 
a strengthening of the EU’s external borders. This section has indeed 
illustrated a growing tendency of conceptualising migration, most 
specifically irregular migration, as a security matter in EU migration laws 
and policies. The next section carries the narration of borders forward by 
considering the different legal categories through which human mobility 
is framed by current legal frameworks on visas, residence, citizenship and 
asylum policies. In doing so, the rationales according to which the 
migrant population is divided into different statuses and degrees of legal 
affiliation in the EU will be made explicit and available for further 
discussion. 
                                                          
129 Supra, p. 2.  
130Supra, p.14. 
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PART III.  LEGAL CATEGORIES  
Different legal categories of mobility relate to different degrees of 
citizenship rights and to the different ways in which populations are 
divided and governed. While legal categories of migration are a key 
governmental tool which impact on reality, they should not be considered 
as reflections of reality. As already mentioned in Chapter I, legal 
categorisations and different types of visas work as “economic, political 
and cultural filters” (Gaibazzi 2014, unpaged) and determine extremely 
different experiences of EU borders, which I suggested we consider on 
the same spectrum of governmentality. After succinctly discussing the 
case of EU citizens, who generally enjoy freedom of movement and 
residence across the EU, most of this section will examine the legal 
categories through which the mobility of Third Country Nationals is 
restricted and framed. The overview of the legal framework on visas, 
residence, citizenship and asylum policies in the EU will highlight that 
while for EU citizens nationality of a Member State generally stands as 
one main encompassing legal category enabling mobility and freedom of 
establishment across the EU, current legal categories framing the mobility 
of Third Country Nationals into the EU are oriented by criteria of 
economic worth or need of humanitarian protection. While these two 
main principles orient the frameworks of legal mobility into the EU, I 
will further note that unauthorised mobility or economic migration 
disguised as asylum seeking is criminalised in the EU context.   
11. EU citizens 
In Part I, I illustrated how EU integration progressively established 
EU citizenship as a legal status dependent upon national citizenship of a 
Member State which grants additional rights to EU citizens, among the 
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most important are freedom of movement and establishment in any 
Member State. The reason why EU internal borders are seen as erased is 
because currently EU citizens are generally entitled to move to other 
Member States to seek employment and establish themselves. While 
originally these rights were granted only to full-time workers, 
progressively they were extended to other categories such as students, 
workers with seasonal jobs, part-time employees or trainees in Member 
States, employees and self-employed persons, the unemployed, as well as 
their families. However, important exceptions still apply. As already 
posited in Section one, the freedom of establishment for EU citizens in 
another Member State remains conditional upon a financial means test, as 
the above discussion of the CJEU judgements showed. Another 
exception to free movement rights is embodied by the category of posted 
workers, i.e. employees posted to carry out a service in another EU 
Member State on a temporary basis. Different from other EU workers 
who go to another Member State to seek employment, their temporary 
presence in the host Member State means these migrants tend not to 
integrate in local labour markets and may be characterised by lower levels 
of social protection in comparison to local workers. According to EU 
law, even though posted workers are employed by the sending company 
and thus subjected to the labour law of their Member State of origin, they 
qualify for some basic rights in force in the host Member State. 131  In 
practice, however, posted workers have often become a form of social 
dumping, leading to the exploitation of differences among labour rights 
standards across EU Countries.132  
As mentioned above, another provisional exception to the freedom of 
seeking work and establishment in any Member State pertained to the 
                                                          
131 European Parliament and Council Directive 96/71 the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services, 16 December 1996, OJ L 18/1. 
132 Most recently, the EU Commission has been exploring avenues for reform of the legal framework 
regulating posted work of EU citizens. 
 106 
 
nationals of “new” Member States as established by Accession 
Agreements, who are subjected to a nevertheless temporary, semi-
citizenship status. It can be argued that on the whole, while internal 
borders have been generally erased for EU migrants and the membership 
of a Member State stands as one main encompassing legal category of 
mobility, exceptions to this rule persist and include citizens who do not 
pass the financial means test, as well as posted workers and some citizens 
from Member States of latest accession.  
12. Non-EU citizens: short stays 
While with the establishment of the Schengen area legal categories of 
mobility for EU citizens have progressively converged into one, various 
types of legal access are available to the nationals of Third Countries into 
and within the EU. Access can be mapped out from the perspective of 
the duration of the stay. Although visa requirements vary in each EU 
Member State, for short stay purposes (less than three months, for 
tourism, leisure or business) the conditions for issuing short-stay visas are 
regulated by minimum common requirements within the Schengen area. 
The 2006 Schengen Borders Code establishes common rules on external 
border checks on persons and provides that short stays within the 
Schengen zone should not exceed three months.133 EU Countries’ short-
term visa requirements discriminate among nationalities as well as low-
income applicants (Guiraudon 2003:199). A 2001 Regulation stipulates 
lists of countries whose nationals do not need visas for short stay 
purposes (including North American countries, most South American 
countries, Australia and Japan) and a “black list” of countries whose 
                                                          
133 EU Council and EU Parliament Regulation No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), 15 March 2006, 
OJ L 105, Art. 5. However, in current EU practice, tourist visas granted to Third Country citizens are 
strictly given only for the amount of days that a Third Country National plans to be in the Schengen 
area, the evidence of which is provided by the applicant’s travel booking at the moment of the 
application. 
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nationals need such a visa (all African countries and the majority of Asian 
countries).134  
Moreover, demanding visa requirements may further prevent many 
categories of perspective applicants from obtaining a visa. The usual 
requirements for a short-term Schengen visa include a letter from the 
applicants’ employer, evidence of sufficient financial resources for the 
duration of the travel, bank statements for the last 3 to 6 months, health 
insurance, booking of return ticket and proof of accommodation. The 
impossibility of fulfilling some of these requirements may impede the 
mobility of Third Country Nationals before they physically approach the 
EU external border as a visa is the main condition required to get on a 
means of transport to the EU (Guild 2007: 51). For stays longer than 
three months, a long-stay visa or residence permit (or both) is required 
and its conditions are differently regulated by Member States’ national 
immigration law. However, a single residence permit and a single 
application procedure for issuing it exist at the EU level. 135  I now 
examine five main types of legal profiles connected with long stay: family 
member, worker, long-term resident, asylum seeker, irregular migrant.136  
13. Family members 
Third Country Nationals who are immediate family members of an 
EU Member State citizen have a right to family reunification.137 Nationals 
                                                          
134  EU Council Regulation 539/2001 listing the Third Countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from 
that requirement, 15 March 2001, OJ L 081, p.1.  
135 EU Council and Parliament Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single 
permit for third country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a 
common set of rights for third country workers legally residing in a Member State, 13 December 
2011, OJ L 343/1, Art.4, 6. 
136See EU portal, http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/tab2.do?subSec=11&language=7$en Accessed 25 
April 2014. 
137 EU Council Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, 2 September 2003, OJ L 251/12, 
Art.4. 
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of Third Countries who hold a residence permit valid for at least one year 
in a Member State and who have the option of long-term residence can 
apply for family reunification.138 However, in several EU Countries, a 
permit granted on the basis of family reunification may not allow its 
holder to work (i.e. Belgium, Spain). As already mentioned, nationals of 
Third Countries who are long-term residents of a Member State are 
entitled to free movement to other EU Member States within the 
Schengen Area for a period of up to three months in any six-month 
period. 139  Such movement does not involve the right to long-term 
residence or work. After this period Third Country Nationals are required 
to return to the territory of their Member State of origin immediately.140 
On the contrary, Third Country family members of an EU citizen who 
moves to another Member State have the right to migrate with 
him/her. 141  The CJEU has further specified that this right is not 
conditional on the legality of entry or residence of the Third Country 
family member at the time of marriage.142 In addition, when residing in an 
EU Member State other than their spouse’s for a continuous period of 
five years, the right of permanent residence is extended to family 
members of EU Member State nationals.143  
14. Workers 
                                                          
138Ibid, Art.3. 
139EU Parliament and Council Regulation 265/2010 amending the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement and Regulation no. 562/2006 as regards movement of persons with a long-
stay visa, 31 March 2010 OJ L 85, Art.1. 
140 EU Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, 16 December 2008, OJ L 398/98, Art. 6 
subsection 2. 
141EU Parliament and Council Directive 2004/58/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 29 April 2004, 
OJ L 229/35, Art. 3 subsection 1. 
142 ECJ Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform ECR I-6241. 
143 EU Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 30 April 2004 OJ L 
158/77, Art. 16. 
 109 
 
The entry into any EU State for non-EU citizens with the purpose of 
residence is normally dependent on the existence of a residence permit 
for work purposes in all EU countries’ national legal frameworks. This 
permit rests on the backing of a future employer in all EU countries’ 
national legislation (Faure Atger 2011: 158). In most EU national 
immigration frameworks employers are the ones required to initiate the 
administrative procedures and usually their intercession is needed before 
a prospective labour migrant can apply for a visa. Accordingly, not only 
the employer is invested by the state with the power of undertaking 
checks over access to EU Member States’ territory, the law also places 
the employer in a controlling relationship in respect to his/her Third 
Country employee, as the validity of the residence permit of this 
employee is reliant upon the continuity of his/her labour contract (Ibid). 
This process further implies that a prospective labour migrant should 
have found employment before entering the EU, and very few 
individuals manage to enter the EU through this category, as will be seen 
in the Italian case. 
EU law intervenes in several ways within national frameworks of non-
EU labourers’ recruitment. For example, in all EU Member States the 
salary offered to a Third Country national should be at least the 
minimum of the national standard for that occupation. The latter 
principle is a positive governmental action to promote the welfare of 
migrant workers. At the same time, EU law endorses the principle of 
community preference, according to which before admitting a Third 
Country worker, Member States must prove that vacancies cannot be 
filled by national or EU workers.144 In some EU countries employers 
                                                          
144 The principle of "community preference" states that: "Member States will consider requests for 
admission to their territories for the purpose of employment only where vacancies in a Member State 
cannot be filled by national and Community manpower or by non-Community manpower resident on 
a permanent basis in that Member State and already forming part of that Member State's regular 
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have to undertake this assessment of the market themselves and 
demonstrate that the vacancy cannot be occupied by any national or EU 
country worker (e.g. in the UK), while in others the encumbrance of 
proof is on the state (e.g. Germany). EU borders further filter Third 
Country Nationals according to their qualifications and skills.  
The Blue Card Directive has introduced a two-year work permit 
(“Blue card”) for high-skilled workers who are nationals of Third 
Countries. Attached to it is a series of additional rights such as family 
reunification and freedom of movement within the EU.145 In order to be 
granted a blue card, a Third Country National needs to have an 
employment contract or job offer of at least one year in any EU Member 
State. After two years of employment, the blue card can be renewed if the 
contract subsists. After three months of unemployment the card shall be 
cancelled. The holder of a blue card is entitled to equal treatment to 
nationals regarding: working conditions, freedom of association, 
education, training and recognition of qualifications, access to social 
security and pensions, access to goods and services made available to the 
public, information and counselling services. 146  Remarkably, the 
implementation of this EU-wide scheme in its first two years has been 
highly sporadic as only 16,000 blue cards were issued, 13,000 of which in 
Germany.147  
The favourable conditions for border crossing and residence in the 
EU granted to high-skilled labour migrants do not apply to low-skilled 
prospective migrant workers, who are generally precluded by national 
                                                                                                                                               
labour market", Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration [COM (2004)] 
811, 11 January 2005. 
145 EU Council Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 25 May 2009, OJ L 155/17, Art. 15,18-19. 
146 EU Council Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 25 May 2009, OJ L 155/17, Art.14. 
147 Supra, footnote 68.  
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legislation through the criteria of skills fulfilment mentioned above: 
labour market test (fall within the needed quotas), wage (admitting only 
those paid over a certain wage). A 2014 Directive on Seasonal Workers 
has been adopted to tackle the issue,148 the impact of which remains to be 
seen. 149  As legal routes into European countries are only available to 
affluent or hyper-skilled individuals, most prospective migrants are left 
with the only option of irregular routes and irregular work. The absence 
of legal routes to enter the EU for most non-EU migrant workers 
provides EU national labour markets with readily exploitable and cheap 
labour. The latter has become “a structural necessity” for Member States, 
which has been produced by the neoliberal shift within the EU’s social 
relations and political economies that have taken place in the last decades 
(Hansen 2010: 90). In spite of the Commission statements in favour of 
more labour migration mentioned above, the logic emerging from the 
existing EU legal framework on external borders is that high-skilled or 
well-off migrants are desirable and do not represent a threat to EU 
national societies or economies. On the contrary, although equally 
important and contributing to host economies, poor or low-skilled 
migrants are depicted as highly undesirable and profiled as high-risk 
applicants (Guild 2011: 217-218).  
Third Country Nationals’ social rights such as access to healthcare, 
social security and education are managed at a national level within the 
EU and differ in each Member State. In most Member States welfare 
benefits are related to legal employment or residence, the length of the 
residence, contributions paid or nationality of the individual. Short-term 
visa holders are not entitled to welfare benefits and, as already 
mentioned, normally need to show evidence of health care insurance 
when applying for visas. In almost all Member States the nationals of 
                                                          
148Supra, footnote 121.   
149 At the time of writing, it has not been implemented into national legislation by most EU Member 
States.  
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Third Countries with long term legal residence are entitled to social 
security benefits and social assistance (Groenendijk et al. 2000: 105). In 
some Member States nationals of Third Countries in irregular situations 
have the right to free primary and secondary healthcare (Belgium, Italy, 
France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK),150 as well as free education for 
their children (e.g. Belgium, Italy, France, Netherlands, Ireland, UK, 
Spain).  
15. Long term residents and citizenship acquisition 
EU legislation entitles Third Country Nationals conceived as long 
term residents to obtain long term residence after five years, conditional 
upon EU Member States’ integration requirements and a term of living 
lawfully and continuously in a Member State.151Although not regulated at 
the EU level, a number of European countries implement investor 
residence programs granting permanent residence and even citizenship 
for migrants investing in government-approved real estate, government 
bonds or national economic funds. Upon conditions of meeting a 
minimum investment threshold, 152  permanent residency by investment 
may be obtained (Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal, Cyprus and the United 
Kingdom), 153  and in some countries even citizenship (Malta, Cyprus, 
Bulgaria).154 Permanent residence and citizenship by investment are a key 
                                                          
150 See http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/healthcare-entitlements Accessed 19 
May 2016 
151 EU Council Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents, 25 November 2003, OJ L 16/44, Art. 4. 
152 The threshold can range from a minimum of 300,000 Euros for Hungarian residency to a 
minimum of 2 billion Pound Sterling for British residency. See 
https://www.artoncapital.com/residency-by-investment/ Accessed 20 February 2016 
153 See https://www.artoncapital.com/residency-by-investment/ Accessed 20 February 2017 
154In 2014 the Maltese government introduced a scheme granting Maltese citizenship to purchasers 
of real estate for €650,000. This case provoked controversies at the EU level as according to this 
scheme, applicants do not have to reside in Malta to obtain it and can obtain citizenship after only six 
months of “due diligence”. EU institutions attacked the Malta passport scheme, EU Observer.com, 
16 January 2014 http://euobserver.com/justice/122744 Accessed 16 January 2014. 
 113 
 
example of how Member States openly capitalize on migration by trading 
off citizenship rights in exchange for migrant investors’ capital.  
Traditional routes to citizenship acquisition instead take longer 
periods of time and vary greatly across the EU. To be precise, there exist 
28 different ways of defining citizenship, of acquiring and losing it in the 
EU (Mantu 2011: 232). The majority of Member States allows double 
nationality.155 With the exception of France, which grants nationality on 
the basis of jus soli. Among EU countries’ national laws, the most 
common way to gain citizenship at birth is through family relations with a 
national (jus sanguinis). In several EU Member States the line between jus 
soli and jus sanguinis is currently blurred as the law requires at least one of 
the parents to be a legal permanent resident of the territory of the state in 
question at the child’s birth. Citizenship of an EU Member State can be 
further obtained through marriage combined with some years of 
residence in the country. Finally, citizenship can be acquired through 
naturalisation, which requires a number of years of continuous legal 
residence in an EU Member State, normally combined with other 
conditions, such as knowledge of the national language. 156  Sometimes 
substantive citizenship criteria and tests are also needed to acquire long-
term resident status, such as in the Netherlands and in the United 
Kingdom (Ibid: 137).  
16. Asylum seekers 
As already mentioned, a key category through which the mobility of 
Third Country Nationals across the external borders of the EU is framed 
is that of the asylum seeker. Since 1997, the reception of asylum seekers 
is regulated by the Dublin system, which establishes that Third Country 
                                                          
155  Exception made for Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania and 
Slovakia who only allow one nationality. 
156 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles Accessed 15 June 2014. 
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Nationals fleeing from prosecution entering the territory of the Union 
without a valid visa must apply for asylum in the first EU Member State 
reached and should be returned to it for their asylum claims should they 
travel to another EU Member State. 157  The Dublin system limits the 
number of claims for asylum that an individual can make to one Member 
State and sets up a system to allocate the responsibility for asylum 
applicants among Member States. In 2003, this system was amended and 
incorporated within EU legislation with the Dublin Regulation, which 
was last revised in 2013.158 Double applications are tracked through the 
cross checking of the EURODAC system, which registers fingerprints 
and other data of asylum applicants when they first arrive in an EU 
Member State.159  
In prescribing that asylum seekers entering the territory of the Union 
without a valid visa ought to apply for asylum in the first EU country 
they reach and should be returned there should they move on, the system 
de facto rules where an asylum seeker/refugee should claim asylum and, 
if international protection is granted, where she ought to live and work. 
This injunction makes EU internal borders extremely significant for 
                                                          
157 Signed in 1990, the Dublin Convention came into force in 1997 with the aim of harmonising 
European policies on asylum, to grant refugees adequate protection in accordance with the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol. The Dublin Convention came into force in 
1997 for twelve signing countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), and later on for others 
(Austria, Sweden, Finland). See Convention determining the State responsible for examining 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, 18 
August 1997, OJ No. C 254/1. 
158EU Parliament and Council Regulation 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), 29 
June 2013, OJ L180/31. 
159 EURODAC is a database system set up in 2000 to assist European Member States in the 
identification of asylum applicants and persons who have already been apprehended in connection 
with an irregular crossing of an external border of the Union. See EU Council Regulation 2725/2000 
concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention, 11 December 2000, OJ L 316/1. 
 115 
 
asylum seekers and refugees because Member States are characterised by 
very different levels of reception capacities and protection for asylum 
seekers as well as different acceptance rates of refugee status. For 
example, in 2014 Sweden accepted 76.6% of all asylum requests while 
Hungary granted refugee status only to 9.4% of the total percentage of its 
asylum seekers.160 This system has also been complicated by the fact that 
countries such as the UK, Ireland and Denmark have different 
arrangements under which they can opportunistically select the legislation 
they want to be bound by (El-Enany 2017b). The first country of arrival 
rule has notably ended up concentrating the vast number of asylum 
seekers in the processing centres of those EU Member States easily 
reachable by sea or land, such as Greece and Italy. It has further created a 
paradoxical situation. On the one hand, asylum seekers arriving at the 
borders who would want to reach Northern European countries are 
unable to do so; on the other, Southern countries are forced to register 
and host asylum seekers even when they do not necessarily have the 
economic capacity to do so. As a result, many migrants who reach the 
borders of Southern Europe try and escape fingerprinting procedures and 
reach their preferred country of destination, often with the collusion of 
Southern Member States. In 2015, this practice prompted the re-
establishment of borders controls and the construction of fences along 
the internal borders of several EU Countries despite the Schengen 
Agreement, as a response by some Member States to what was described 
as a “migrant crisis” in the EU space.161  
                                                          
160 Daily chart: Europe’s migrant acceptance rates, The Economist, 1 September 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/daily-chart Accessed 30 May 2016 
161 These developments, revamping the protracted dispute between Southern EU Countries (who 
push to abolish the first-country of arrival rule) and Northern EU Countries (generally against radical 
changes to this system) have recently prompted the EU Commission to formulate proposals to 
reform the system. See Migrant crisis: European Commission proposes asylum reforms, BBC, 6 
April 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35974982 Accessed 30 May 2016 
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The imbalance in the Dublin system and its potential human rights 
violations has been highlighted in some recent judgments by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)162 and the CJEU. In MSS v 
Belgium and Greece, the ECHR ruled that the removal of an asylum seeker 
from Belgium to Greece under the Dublin system had resulted in a 
violation of a number of basic human rights by Belgium and Greece.163 
This principle was further reiterated by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in the NS judgment where it was held that an asylum 
seeker cannot be returned to a country where there is a serious risk that 
her rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will be violated 
due to systematic deficiencies in the asylum system. 164  Mitsilegas has 
posited that rulings such as MSS and NS by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union have 
provided important limitations to the relentless criminalisation of 
migration in the EU (Mitsilegas 2015: 109-110). For Mitsilegas, these 
cases highlight the “transformative power of the European judiciary” in 
the upholding of the human rights of migrants and their de-
criminalisation (Ibid: 110). Nevertheless, an investigation by Dembour of 
the human rights of migrants at the European Court of Human Rights in 
less known decisions, including inadmissibility decisions and rulings of 
non-violation reveals instead how heavily migrants remain discriminated 
                                                          
162  The European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) was instituted in 1959 by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It has jurisdiction on all 47 Members of the Council of Europe. 
163 ECHR, App. No. 30696/09, MSS v Belgium and Greece [2011]. MSS was an Afghan asylum 
seeker who first arrived in Greece but claimed asylum in Belgium. He was thus returned to Greece 
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. Once in Greece, the applicant was initially detained in degrading 
conditions. He was then released, while waiting for the decision on his application, and left homeless, 
not permitted to work and without access to financial resources. For the first time, the Court held that 
Member States failure to meet basic socio-economic needs constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR. The Court also importantly stated that Member States can be held accountable for returning 
asylum seekers to face situations that result in a violation of Article 3.  
164 CJEU, C-411/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and CJEU C-493/10, M.E. 
and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 21 
December 2011. The cases deal with Afghan asylum seekers’ refusal to comply with the decision by 
UK authorities to be returned to Greece pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. 
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against on the grounds of their nationality in ECHR judgements 
(Dembour 2015). For Dembour, the problem of discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, which shows a bias in favour of the state rather 
than migrants, remains at the core of ECHR migrant case law (Ibid: 
505).165  
Current media and political debates at the national and EU level often 
turn on the question of whether asylum seekers are truly asylum seekers 
or economic migrants in disguise. As I already noted in Chapter I, insofar 
as legal categories are simplifications of the social reality and used 
instrumentally by both governments and migrants, distinctions between 
‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘migrant’ are by definition malleable and 
subject to interpretation. In the current EU context, they are also at risk 
of supporting the idea “that some migrants are worthy of humanisation, 
while others are not” (El-Enany 2017: 2).  
The distinction between bogus and “true” refugee has been 
increasingly related to a rhetoric of humanitarian assistance to those in 
need (Walters 2011: 146). Humanitarian concerns are problematic 
because they turn migrants into objects of compassion and thus inferior 
subjects (Cuttitta 2015: 132). This phenomenon possibly enforces 
mechanisms based on the asymmetry between saviours on the one hand 
and victims on the other, denying agency and equal status to the 
victims. 166  While humanitarian assistance is given to victims, “bogus” 
asylum seekers or economic migrants are criminalised and viewed as 
opportunistic and undesirable individuals. This phenomenon is 
                                                          
165 Dembour assesses migrants’ rulings at ECHR having the Inter - American Court of Human Rights 
as counterpoint. Showing a markedly “pro-migrant” approach, the joint consideration of migrant 
jurisprudence of the Inter - American Court of Human Rights demonstrates that a pro-state bias is 
not a necessary feature of all human rights courts (Ibid: 7). 
166  The saviours/victims asymmetry dangerously evokes old colonial patterns, whereby 
“magnanimous” Europeans – whose ancestor once migrated to countries of the global South to 
colonise and loot their lands - welcome victimised, inferior people in their countries as an act of good 
will. 
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intertwined with the securitisation of borders: for humanitarian concerns 
also increasingly mingle with borders’ reinforcement in the name of 
protection of human rights of migrants from their smugglers (Ibid). The 
paradoxical outcome of this binary is that border management has often 
resulted in depriving migrants of their very lives (Ibid).  
More generally, humanitarian concerns obfuscate the fact that 
humanitarian “emergences” are but a product of legal and policy 
frameworks which do not foresee legal channels for economic migration 
(unless it entails big investments or skills which cannot be found among 
EU citizens). As any legal access to economic migration has been closed, 
migrants are left with the only possibility of presenting themselves as 
asylum seekers. In other words, humanitarian protection is turned by this 
lack of access into a straightjacket which at the same time deprives them 
of freedom of movement. Third Country Nationals can only be 
considered as legitimate individuals at the price of presenting themselves 
as victims, or be criminalised as irregulars (Ricciardi 2017, unpaged). This 
consideration brings us to the last category within which the mobility of 
Third Country migrants to the EU is framed: the irregular migrant.  
17. Irregular migrants  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, the notion of irregular migrant is a 
legal category insofar as all definitions of it are commonly defined against 
the benchmark of migration law. The benchmark may change in time and 
space. It was noted earlier in this chapter how progressive enlargements 
have changed the status of some of the residents in EU Member States 
from an irregular migrant status to EU citizens. Moreover, Third Country 
Nationals could be legally residing in an EU Member State but may be 
illegally working in another. The impossibility of identifying an objective 
and fixed category of irregular migration is also evident in the recurrence 
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of amnesties regularising illegal migrants in many EU Countries.167 As will 
be seen from a close inspection of the Italian case, despite their allegedly 
exceptional character, amnesties have been a regular tool of migration 
policy in Southern European countries (Colombo 2012: 353). Despite not 
having resorted as often to this measure, over the same timeframe 
Central and Northern European Countries such as the UK and Sweden 
have regularised comparable numbers of irregular migrants through 
asylum policies (Ibid).  
Not only is the notion of illegal migration subject to a timeframe 
which may shift in content following policy and legal changes, but the 
notion of legal/illegal migration is also subject to a limited time-frame for 
individuals, as can be observed in the case of visa over-stayers. 
Remarkably, while policy-makers at the national and European level 
habitually focus on illegal border crossings, 75% of unlawful migration 
flows in the EU consist of people entering legally and overstaying their 
visas (Bigo 2011: 300). The connection between illegal migration and 
illegal border crossing is easier to mobilise public opinion around and 
draws on traditionally territorial notions of borders which are deeply 
engraved in national collective imaginations. As noted in Chapter I, the 
notion of “illegal” migration has been key to the process of securitisation 
of migration which has characterised the EU over the last decades. From 
a situation of administrative noncompliance, irregular migration has been 
gradually transformed by political discourse and legal frameworks into a 
criminal act in the law of many Member States (e.g. Italy), sanctioned 
with detention for the purposes of removal, as mentioned above. Despite 
the stated commitment to the international human rights legal order, the 
securitisation of migration promoted in EU law contradicts this. As some 
have noted, most recently the management of migrant illegality has 
                                                          
167 The introduction of occasional amnesties regularising illegal migrants has characterised the 
migration policies of the majority of European countries and especially Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) since the 1970s. 
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become a productive business for Member States, employing hundreds of 
thousands of workers to implement measures such as preventive 
operations, search and rescue operations, processing centres, and 
detention centres (Andersson 2014: 274).  
This section has discussed the main categories through which the 
mobility of the population is framed into different segments in 
contemporary Europe. Even though it is often suggested that external 
borders have been strengthened for all non-EU citizens, this section 
highlighted how border controls and legal categories of migration differ 
according to a number of criteria. It could be posited that the criteria 
according to which these lines are drawn are however rather 
straightforward: they include nationality of provenance, blood ties and 
most importantly, economic worth. The latter does not only define a 
migrant’s desirability but also, the availability of economic resources is 
the basis on which segments of the non-EU population are considered 
dangerous or desirable. As observed at the beginning of the section, the 
existence of sufficient economic resources remain in place also as the 
ultimate test for economically inactive EU citizens. The category of 
“illegal migration” was further discussed as a key category in the current 
processes of securitisation of migration. In order to buttress my analysis 
with more detail of how this securitisation has taken place, the next 
section examines this processes in one national case, Italy.  
 
PART IV.  EU BORDERS CLOSE UP: ITALY 
18. Historical outline 
Owing to its peninsular “gate-keeper” position sharing sea borders 
with Third Countries, Italy is a particularly interesting viewpoint from 
which to analyse the management of the external EU borders. This 
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section will offer an historical outline of Italy’s immigration legislation. It 
will then analyse the main legal categories of migration for non-EU 
citizens in the Italian context. As the large presence of generations of 
Italians in the Americas, Australia and other European countries testifies, 
Italy has traditionally been a country of emigration. However, over the 
last thirty years Italy has become a migrant-receiving country and is 
currently among the top-three Member States with the largest number of 
immigrants. 168  Given the small presence of foreigners residing and 
working in Italy, until the 1980s Italy did not have any specific 
immigration legal framework and immigration matters were regulated by 
a 1931 decree on public security.169 In such circumstances, most issues 
regarding foreigners’ residence and employment were under the 
administrative discretion of ministerial memoranda. A 1977 ruling by 
Italy’s Constitutional Court first pronounced the obsolescence of the 
established practice of handling immigration and advocated for the 
development of a comprehensive legal framework regulating the entry 
and residence of foreigners in Italy.170 In the 1970s, out of a population 
of over 50 million, foreign citizens were still less than 300,000, one-third 
of whom were nationals from other European Economic Community 
(EEC) countries. In the 1980s the presence of foreigners increased, 
reaching 450,000 regular migrants in 1986. 171 
                                                          
168 As of 2013 there were 4.6 million immigrants regularly residing in Italy, making out 7.4% of Italy’s 
population. One in three immigrants in Italy was a national of another EU Member State 
(Caritas/Migrantes 2013: 9).  
169 Regio Decreto (Royal decree) n. 773, 18 June 1931, Art. 142-152. 
170 Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court), ruling n. 46, 20 January 1977. 
171  Caritas and Migrantes, XXIII Rapporto Immigrazione 2013: Tra crisi e diritti umani  (XXIII 
Immigration report: amid crisis and human rights), p. 16 
http://www.caritas.it/caritasitaliana/allegati/3960/SintesiRapportoImmigrazione.pdf Accessed 25 April 
2015 
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The so called “Foschi law” introduced an immigration legislative 
framework for the first time in Italian history in 1987. 172  The law 
envisaged that the entry of foreigners for work purposes ought to go 
through monthly surveys, verifying beforehand the shortage of Italian 
workers who could occupy that post.173 However, this mechanism being 
too complex was never properly implemented. The law also approved the 
first of many amnesties (sanatorie) for migrant workers irregularly residing 
in the country, giving them the possibility of coming forward and 
obtaining legal status.174 The migration legal framework shifted again in 
1990 with the “Martelli law”175 which addressed the lack of regulations on 
entry and residence of nationals from outside the EEC (“extra-
communitarian” citizens), which had been left out in the Foschi law. In 
those years, the denomination of “extra-communitarian” (extracomunitari) 
began to be used in legislation and mass media language to define non-
EU countries’ migrants.176 The Martelli law introduced measures to deal 
with refugees and asylum seekers, provisions regulating the entry and 
residence of Third Country Nationals and residence permits.177 The law 
endorsed another amnesty for those foreigners who could demonstrate 
their presence in Italy by 1990, irrespective of their work status.178 The 
                                                          
172 Norme in Materia di Collocamento e di Trattamento dei Lavoratori Extracomunitari Immigrati e 
Contro le Immigrazioni Clandestine (Regulations on Placement and Treatment of non-EU immigrant 
Workers and Against Irregular Migration), Law n. 943 of 12 January  1987. The law was named after 
Franco Foschi, the member of Parliament who worked towards this law’s endorsement. 
173 Supra, Art.5-7.  
174Supra, Art.16-19.  
175 Norme Urgenti in Materia di Asilo Politico, di Ingresso e Soggiorno dei Cittadini Extracomunitari e 
di Regolarizzazione dei Cittadini Extracomunitari ed Apolidi già Presenti nel Territorio dello Stato 
(Urgent Provisions regarding Political Asylum, Entry and Residence of Extra-communitarian Citizens 
and Stateless Already Present on State’s Territory) Law No.39, 28 February 1990. The law is 
commonly identified after the name of the Deputy Prime Minister who pushed for its promulgation, 
Claudio Martelli. 
176 This denomination generally indicates non-EU migrants from developing countries rather than 
extra-communitarians from developed countries such as Switzerland or the United States and often 
retains a negative connotation in the Italian language. 
177 Supra, footnote 175, Art.1, 4. 
178 Supra, Art.9. 
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law further instituted the practice of yearly planning of migratory flows 
through ministerial decrees (decreti flussi), aimed at meeting Italy’s labour 
demand. 179  Finally, the Martelli law introduced for the first time the 
notion of detention and pecuniary sanctions for irregular migrants in 
blackletter law.180 As of 1991 an estimated 47% of the total number of 
foreign nationals in Italy did not hold regular status. 181  After a 1995 
legislative decree implemented another regularization of irregular 
migrants already working in the country, 182  in 1998 the “Turco-
Napolitano law” substantially extended the governmental reach of Italy’s 
borders towards Third Country Nationals.183 In the same year, the total 
number of international migrants in the country had reached one 
million.184 
The Turco-Napolitano law made the entry of Third Country Nationals 
conditional upon the existence of an employer sponsoring Third Country 
migrants for the entire duration of his or her residence. Its governmental 
purpose was to achieve an equilibrium between migratory flows and the 
variable needs of the job market. Similarly to the previous laws, it 
reiterated the notion of migration as a phenomenon which needs to be 
governed through planning. This law provided for a triennial planning of 
migratory flows, although applied by annual decrees, to be issued by the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers.185 This law further introduced the 
practice of administrative detention for irregular migrants by instituting 
                                                          
179 Supra, Art.2 subsections 2-3. 
180Supra, Art.7. 
181 Fondazione ISMU - Istituto per lo Studio della Multietnicità (ISMU Foundation - Institute for 
Multietnic studies) http://www.ismu.org/irregolari-presenze/ Accessed 12 December 2014. 
182 Decreto Legge (Legislative decree) n. 489, 18 November 1995. 
183Norme in Materia di Collocamento e di Trattamento dei Lavoratori Extracomunitari Immigrati e 
Contro le Immigrazioni Clandestine (Provisions Concerning Immigration and the Condition of Third 
Country Nationals) Law n. 40, 12 March 1998. The law is named after the then Minister for Social 
Affairs, Livia Turco and the then Home Secretary, Giorgio Napolitano. 
184 Supra, footnote 171, p.20. 
185 Supra,footnote 183, Art.3. 
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“centres for temporary stay” (centri di permanenza temporanea) for the 
detention of irregular migrants facing removal. 186  Procedures for the 
deportation of illegal immigrants were also implemented. A few months 
after its enactment, the Turco-Napolitano law was merged with previous 
relevant legislation into an Immigration Act incorporating all the existing 
legislation on the subject of immigration.187  
The legal framework of Italy’s borders was amended once again in 
2002 by the “Bossi-Fini law”188 which represents a clear shift towards a 
criminalisation of migration. The law removed the employer sponsoring 
system introduced in 1998 and prescribed the conditionality of the entry 
of Third Country Nationals for work purposes on the existence of a 
“residence contract” (contratto di soggiorno), signed between an employer (a 
firm or a family) and the migrant worker.189 In addition the law stipulated 
more severe measures to tackle irregular migration: for example, it made 
those who did not comply with an expulsion order liable to detention 
(this was set aside by the jurisprudence of the CJEU in 2011).190 The law 
also established a 60-day maximum length for administrative detention 
and detention between six months and a year or deportation in case of 
failure to comply with police orders.191 Remarkably, at the same time the 
law included another amnesty for irregular immigrants already in Italy, 
                                                          
186 Supra, Art.12. 
187  Testo Unico delle Disposizioni Concernenti la Disciplina dell’immigrazione e Norme Sulla 
Condizione Dello Straniero (Consolidated Immigration Act regarding the Field of Immigration and 
Provisions on Foreigners’ Condition), Legislative Decree n. 286, 18 August 1998. 
188  Modifica alla normativa in materia di immigrazione e di asilo (Changes to the Provisions 
Pertaining to Immigration and Asylum), Law n. 199, 26 August 2002. The law was named after 
Umberto Bossi, then Minister for Institutional Reforms and Devolution and Gianfranco Fini, the then 
Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. 
189Supra, Art.5. This rule does not apply to highly-skilled workers, entitled to entry independently 
from migration flows quotas. 
190Case C61/11 PPU Hassen El Dridi alias Soufi Karim (2011) ECR I-03015, ruled that this article 
violates the European Parliament and EU Council Directive 2008/115/ on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals OJ L 398/98. This 
instance has been substituted by a similar law but is now punished with pecuniary sanctions. 
191 Supra, footnote 188, Art.5 subsection 4. 
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allowing those who had worked and lived in Italy for at least three 
months to be regularised.192 The criminalisation of migration in Italy’s 
legal framework was furthered by the so called 2008 “Security Package” 
(Pacchetto Sicurezza).193 The latter transformed Third Countries Nationals’ 
illegal entry and/or illegal residence within Italian territory into an 
aggravating circumstance for criminal offences.194 In doing so, the law 
turned the illegal presence of foreigners on Italian territory – an 
administrative condition determined by law – into a criminal offence.195 
The same law extended the maximum period of detention of irregular 
migrants from one to six months.196 
In the same years the government signed an Italy-Libya Friendship 
Pact to curb boat migration.197 This initiated a push-back policy which 
entailed the interception of boat migrants on the high seas, considered 
outside the national territory, and their push back before they reached 
Italy’s territorial waters. This situation was denounced by the landmark 
Hirsi v. Italy ruling198 of the European Court of Human Rights. Despite 
the predominantly territorial interpretation of national sovereignty set out 
in previous ECHR case law, the ruling in Hirsi acknowledges that in 
                                                          
192 Supra, Art.33. 
193 Disposizioni in Materia di Sicurezza Pubblica (Provisions on the Subject of Public Security), Law 
n. 94, 24 July 2008. 
194Supra, Art. 1 subsection 1 f). 
195 Supra, Art.4 subsection 48. 
196Supra, Art.15 subsection 5. 
197 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya, 2 March 2009. 
198 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09) ECHR, 23 February 2012 
Hirsi and the other 23 applicants were among a group of 200 Eritrean and Somali migrants who, 
having tried to sail from Libya to Italy, were intercepted by the Italian authorities on the high seas off 
the island of Lampedusa and immediately returned to Libya under the framework of the 
abovementioned Pact. Given the political situation in their countries of origin, the applicants would 
have been entitled to apply for political asylum. In fact some of them already enjoyed the status of 
political refugee. However, the applicants submitted that they were sent back to Libya by the Italian 
authorities without the possibility of exercising this right. While the exercise of the right of seeking 
asylum is imperative on Italian territories, the applicants also alleged that they could not exercise this 
right as they were intercepted on the high seas and rejected without any identification. 
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exceptional circumstances such as interceptions of boat migrants on the 
high seas, Italy’s actions produced effects outside of its territorial borders 
which constituted an exercise of sovereign jurisdiction.199 Interestingly, 
while at the time of the events the Italian government claimed success 
over reducing the number of boat migrants landing on Italian coasts, the 
numbers of irregular migrants in the country had in fact risen (as the 
majority of them did not enter the country by boat, but rather became 
irregular upon expiration of a visa).200  
Following the ruling in Hirsi and other tragic events, such as the 
drowning of 662 boat migrants off the coasts of Lampedusa on October 
2013, the policy was suspended and Italy adopted a stance of search and 
rescue operations in border controls in the following years. The launch of 
“Mare Nostrum”, a large-scale search and rescue humanitarian operation 
fully managed by the Italian navy marked the beginning of a distinctly 
humanitarian approach to border management.201This approach is further 
reflected in a change of register in borders management, whereby boat 
migrants are no longer “intercepted” but instead “rescued” (Cuttitta 
2014: 26). This compassionate and allegedly more humane approach is 
observable in the case of the aforementioned migrant shipwreck in 
Lampedusa. On such occasion, the Italian government declared a 
national day of mourning, and the then Prime Minister Letta stated that 
                                                          
199 This notion was also acknowledged by the ECHR in the judgement of Al-Skeini and others v. the 
United Kingdom (Application no. 55721/07), 7 July 2011.  
200 Paleologo, V. “Diritti sotto sequestro – Prima e dopo la sentenza sul caso Hirsi ed altri” (Rights 
under seizure- Before and after the Hirsi Case) 27 Febbraio 2012, progetto Melting Pot Europa, 
http://www.meltingpot.org/Diritti-sotto-sequestro-Prima-e-dopo-la-sentenza-sul-caso.html Accessed 
20 July 2013. 
201Within one year, as of October 2014, Mare Nostrum had saved 100,250 people and as a result 
Italy’s work was praised as “heroic” by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).The policy 
framework of Italy’s sea borders however changed again in November 2014 when Mare Nostrum 
was substituted by FRONTEX operation Triton, with a budget of one third of the latter and a smaller 
range of operations. 
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the victims of the tragedy would from now on be Italian citizens.202 While 
on the surface such gestures might appear to re-evaluate migrants and 
their lives, they are oblivious of the fact that migrants’ lives are at risk 
precisely due to the restrictive border policies which continue to threaten 
their very lives. Paradoxically, the human life of boat migrants in valued 
only “after it has been devaluated by restrictive border policies”, in other 
words, while boat migrants earn compassion when they lose or risk their 
lives, they are instead investigated for illegal immigration when they make 
it to mainland Italy (Cuttitta 2015: 130).  
Despite the overall tendency to securitise migration, the government’s 
position towards irregular migration has gone through periods of opening 
and closure.  In 2011, a legislative decree implementing two EU 
directives further extended the maximum detention period for irregular 
migrants from six months to 18.203 This maximum period of detention 
was decreased to three months in 2014.204 The aggravating circumstance 
of irregular immigration introduced in 2009 was reverted from a criminal 
offence to an administrative offence in 2014.205 In 2013, due to repeated 
amnesties and EU enlargements transforming the status of many 
irregulars into legal residents, the percentage of irregular Third Country 
Nationals in Italy accounted for 6 percent of the total migrant 
population.206 While the securitisation of migration can be described as an 
                                                          
202 “Ecatombe a Lampedusa “(Catastrophe in Lampedusa) 4 October 2013, Quotidiano net 
http://qn.quotidiano.net/cronaca/2013/10/04/960216-lampedusa-migranti-barcone-morti.shtml 
Accessed 1 July 2017 
203 Disposizioni urgenti per il completamento dell'attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE sulla libera 
circolazione dei cittadini comunitari e per il recepimento della direttiva 2008/115/CE sul rimpatrio dei 
cittadini di Paesi terzi irregolari (Urgent provisions implementing directive 2004/38/EC on the free 
movement of EU citizens and directive 2008/115/EC on the return of irregular third-country nationals), 
23 June 2011, Decree No. 89/2011, Art.3. 
204 Law n. 161, 25 November 2014. 
205 Law n. 67, 2 May 2014. 
206Supra, footnote 181. 
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overall general tendency in Italian law in the long term, more lenient or 
stricter policies also occur in cycles.  
19. Legal categories of migration 
Italian law governs its non-EU migrant population through a variety 
of legal categories. For stays longer than three months, non-EU nationals 
need to apply for a residence permit within eight days of arrival.207 The 
length of the residence permit is the same as the long term visa: up to 
nine months for seasonal work, one year for attending a course of study 
or professional training and up to two years for work. As far as labour 
migration is concerned, as already mentioned, employers are required to 
initiate the procedure and apply to a Single Desk for Immigration (sportello 
unico per l’immigrazione) upon provision of various evidence.208 In case the 
employer already knows the employee and quotas are available, the 
request is transmitted to the consulate of the foreign country. In case the 
employer does not personally know the prospective employee, he/she 
shall draw out of a list of possible available candidates who would have 
applied to work in Italy at the Italian consulate of their home country. As 
scholars have observed, the extremely limited programmed quotas and 
the extensive use of amnesties in the country have de-voided such system 
of any meaning, for it is in fact easier to enter Italy on a tourist visa, find 
a job and expect to be regularised through an amnesty (Colombo 2012: 
836-842). Another instrument entitling long-term residents to legally 
reside and work in Italy is the so called “resident card for foreign 
citizens” (carta di soggiorno per cittadini stranieri). This type of permit has an 
open-ended term and can be requested by a non-EU citizen who has 
legally resided in Italy for at least five years, provided he/she meets a 
certain minimum annual income threshold. 209  Since 2011, in order to 
                                                          
207Supra, footnote 187, Art.5. 
208 Supra, Art.14.  
209 Supra, Art.9. 
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apply for this permit an Italian language test is also required.210 The 2012 
overdue implementation of the 2009 EU Blue card directive on high-
skilled workers has introduced blue cards in Italy, entitling highly skilled 
migrants to preferential treatment and additional rights.211 According to 
the latest available data, as of 2014 only 165 blue cards had been issued.212 
At the highest end of the governmentality spectrum of legal categories 
of belonging is the acquisition of citizenship. Italy recognises the right to 
dual citizenship. Citizenship can be acquired by iure sanguinis, passed on 
from parent to child without limitation of generation213 or by iure soli, by 
individuals born on Italian soil who claim Italian citizenship after 
continuous legal residence in Italy up to legal age, and upon declaration 
of their desire to acquire it. 214  Citizenship can also be obtained by 
marriage to an Italian citizen: after two years of legal residence in Italy or 
three years after marriage in case of residence abroad. 215  Italian 
citizenship can further be acquired through naturalisation: after three 
years of legal residence in Italy for the descendants of former Italian 
citizens and foreigners born on Italian soil; after four years for citizens of 
an EU country; after 10 years for Third Country Nationals. 216 
Remarkably, the Italian Constitution entitles all Third Country Nationals, 
regardless of their legal status, to the right to basic healthcare 217  and 
                                                          
210 Decreto del Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Contributo per il Rilascio ed il Rinnovo del 
Permesso di Soggiorno (Decree of Economy and Finance Minister) n.304 December 31, 2011.  
211Decreto Legislativo sulle condizioni di ingresso e soggiorno di cittadini di Paesi terzi che intendano 
svolgere lavori altamente qualificati. Attuazione della direttiva 2009/50 (Law Decree on the 
conditions of entry and residence for highly skilled Third Countries citizens implementing directive 
2009/50) n. 108, July 24, 2012. 
212Supra, footnote 68. 
213 Nuove Norme in Materia di Cittadinanza (New Norms on the Subject of Citizenship) Law n. 91, 15 
February 1992, Art. 1. 
214 Supra, Art.4. 
215 Supra, Art.5. 
216Supra, Art.9. 
217Supra, Art. 32. 
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education if they are of minor age. 218  Nevertheless, access to social 
benefits is only granted to foreigners who are in possession of a residence 
permit for one year or more.219  
20. Irregular migration 
While irregular migration has been a widespread phenomenon which 
has traditionally been dealt with through amnesties, a more recent 
governmental modality of dealing with irregular migrants has been 
administrative detention. Detention of migrants can take place upon 
irregular entry in the form of pre-admittance detention with the purpose 
of carrying out identity verification, implementation of readmission 
agreements and medical assistance.220 Administrative detention has been 
in place since 2004 to allow for the processing of asylum requests.221 A 
maximum detention period of 20 days for identity verification and of 35 
days for all other circumstances (after which the asylum seeker is given a 
residence permit of three months) is provided for. 222  For irregular 
migrants subject to a removal order which cannot be promptly carried 
out, identification and removal centres have been in operation since 
1998. 223  The main distinction among these three modes of detention 
modalities is that in the cases of pre-admittance detention and asylum 
seekers detention, detainees are allowed to walk out and leave the 
                                                          
218Supra, Art. 34. 
219Supra, footnote 187, Art.41. 
220Law n.563/1995, 30 December 1995. 
221Regolamento relativo alle procedure per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato (Regulation on 
the procedures to obtain refugee status) Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica (Presidential 
decree) 16 September 2004, n. 303 
222 Attuazione della direttiva 2005/85/CE recante norme minime per le procedure applicate negli Stati 
membri ai fini del riconoscimento e della revoca dello status di rifugiato (Implementing directive 
2005/85/CE laying down minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status) Decreto Legislativo (Legislative decree) n.25, 28 January 2008, Art.20 
subsection 3. 
223Supra footnote 183, Art. 12. 
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detention facilities, which are normally managed by public or private 
entities such as charities.  
Detention centres for the purposes of removal are normally managed 
by police and function very much as prisons. It is remarkable to observe 
that while in the 1990s detention measures used to be seen as exceptional 
within Italy’s constitutional framework, such measures have now turned 
into an ordinary, rather than an exceptional measure against what are 
deemed to be socially dangerous individuals (Campesi 2013: 31). In 2001, 
a decision of Italy’s highest Court confirmed the interpretation that 
irregular migrants’ administrative detention is in accordance with the 
Italian Constitution. 224  Somewhat paradoxically, the inevitability of 
administrative detention is periodically revamped by what the 
government and media see as emergencies provoked by boat migrants’ 
landings on Italy’s coasts (Ibid: 32). Within national popular imagination, 
a landmark event marking the beginning of an era of emergencies was the 
1991 landing of a vessel carrying 12,000 Albanians to Bari’s harbour 
which were transferred and detained in Bari stadium before being 
repatriated. Most recently, the so called “North Africa emergency” 
prompted by an increase in migratory flows to Italy following the Arab 
uprisings led the government to declare a state of emergency which lasted 
for almost two years.225  
When detention for the purposes of removal was introduced in 1998, 
seven detention centres were created, providing for the custody of about 
1.000 detainees overall (Colombo 2012: 3303-3314). As of 2014, 13 
                                                          
224 Corte Costituzionale (Constitutional Court) Ruling n.105, 2001.  
225  Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri - Dichiarazione dello Stato di emergenza 
Dichiarazione dello stato di emergenza umanitaria nel territorio del Nord Africa per consentire un 
efficace contrasto all’eccezionale afflusso di cittadini extracomunitari nel territorio nazionale (Prime 
Ministerial Decree – Declaration of a state of humanitarian emergency within North African territories 
authorising an effective counter-response to the exceptional afflux of extracommunitarian citizens 
into national territory) 7 April 2011. The decree was extended on 6 October 2011 until 31 December 
2012.  
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detention and removal centres existed across the Italian peninsula, 
although only five of them were functioning. In 1998 the maximum 
period of detention in migrant detention and removal centres was fixed 
to one month. This period was gradually raised through subsequent 
changes to the legal framework. In 2011, the implementation of the 
Returns Directive in 2011 elevated the maximum detention period from 
six to 18 months. 226  In 2014, the maximum period of detention was 
reduced from 18 to three months.227 Remarkably, estimates show that 
small numbers of those who are detained within such facilities are in fact 
repatriated. In 1998, 57% of detained irregular migrants were removed. 
Since then the repatriation percentage of the number of detainees has 
remained generally low: 30% in 2001 and 38% in 2009 (Colombo 2012: 
3661-3668). In 2013, only 48% of the total of migrant detainees had been 
repatriated. 228  The incapacity of the Italian authorities to proceed to 
removal is due to various reasons ranging from expiration of maximum 
detention terms to the lack of judicial endorsement from Third Countries 
(Ibid: 3925-3932).  
While these low repatriation statistics reveal that the Italian state 
effectively removes very few reported illegal immigrants, this practice is 
still key in reassuring the national public for it spectacularises Italy’s 
power to detain and expel irregular migrants and thus becomes “a 
tangible proof” that the state can protect its own citizens from those who 
are not authorised to live among them (Sciurba 2009: 115). The low 
numbers of actual removals has further prompted scholars to hypothesise 
                                                          
226 Disposizioni urgenti per il completamento dell'attuazione della direttiva 2004/38/CE sulla libera 
circolazione dei cittadini comunitari e per il recepimento della direttiva 2008/115/CE sul rimpatrio dei 
cittadini di Paesi terzi irregolari (Urgent provisions implementing directive 2004/38/EC on the free 
movement of EU citizens and directive 2008/115/EC on the return of irregular third-country nationals), 
23 June 2011, Decree No. 89/2011, Art.3. 
227 Law n. 161, 30 October 2014, Art.3 subsection e). 
228 Centri di identificazione ed espulsione: i dati nazionali del 2013 (Identification and removal 
centres: 2013 data), MEDU http://www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/centri-di-identificazione-ed-
espulsione-dati-nazionali/ Accessed 12 December 2014. 
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that migrant detention centres are not aimed at merely excluding irregular 
migrants, but rather, at creating a system which controls the speed of 
their mobility rather than blocking it (Mezzadra 2006: 109-110). The 
filtering would be functional to meet the demands of Italy’s labour 
market in a timely manner. This is a labour market that is based on an 
informal economy largely fuelled by irregular migrant labour (Ibid).  
21. Humanitarian concerns and borders’ reinforcement  
As already mentioned, due to the Dublin system’s first country of 
asylum rule, asylum seekers reaching the Italian coasts are required to 
apply for asylum in Italy and during the application process are 
considered illegal in other EU Countries. 229  Over the last years, the 
reception of asylum seekers and the processing of their applications has 
grown into a complex system which employs hundreds of thousands of 
employees from cooperatives, NGOs and government departments. 
Once migrants’ fingerprints are taken and their application lodged, they 
enter a prolonged condition of legality while they wait for their asylum 
decision, which can take up to two years.230 This temporary condition of 
legality might end with the rejection of the application or continue for 
years in cases of appeal or granting of other types of temporary 
protection. In 2015 for example, 58 percent of applicants were rejected, 5 
percent were granted asylum, 14 percent were granted subsidiary 
protection. The majority of those who were granted legal status (22 
                                                          
229 Interviewees from a reception centre in Bologna reported for example the case of a man who 
went to Norway to apply for asylum and was detained and repatriated to Italy as many as 6 times. 
He was considered a criminal in Norway, and an asylum seeker in Italy.  
230 Attuazione della direttiva 2013/33/EU recante norme relative all'accoglienza dei richiedenti 
protezione internazionale, nonche' della direttiva 2013/32/UE, recante procedure comuni ai fini del 
riconoscimento e della revoca dello status di protezione internazionale. (Implementation of 
2013/33/UE directive laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection and directive 2013/32/UE on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection) 18 August 2015, Decree n. 142, Art. 22. 
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percent) were entitled to a two-year maximum period of humanitarian 
protection, after which they would lose their legal status.231  
Commenting on Italy’s most recent humanitarian turn in border 
management towards an ostensibly more humane border management 
aimed at rescuing boat migrants rather than returning them, Cuttitta 
noted that on the one hand, humanitarian concerns render borders more 
traversable insofar as presence in the EU may be granted on the basis of 
the right to asylum and the right to family reunification (Cuttitta 2015: 
131). On the other hand, the same humanitarian concerns are employed 
in borders’ reinforcement, for example in order to protect the human 
rights of migrants from smugglers or from dangerous trips: in this way 
humanitarian and security concerns problematically intertwine, as shall be 
further seen in Chapter IV.  
This excursus has shown how Italy’s migration management, which 
has been traditionally characterised by a frequent use of amnesties and 
regularisation programmes to manage migration, has moved towards a 
securitisation of migration over the last decades. As the statistics of 
detention and removal in Italy further illustrated, the state is however 
only apparently inflexible and fully able to control its borders. The 
section also showed how similar to the EU level, legal categories of 
mobility in the Italian context are fundamentally embedded in an 
economic rationale which categorises migrants as dangerous on the basis 
of their economic worth. Finally, the observation of Italy’s migration 
management at sea emphasised the relatively new and central role of 
                                                          
231 While international protection (political asylum) lasts for 5 years and is renewable, a 5-year 
renewable “subsidiary protection” can also be granted to somebody who does not meet the 
requirements to be recognised as a refugee, but would be at risk of serious injury if returned to the 
country of origin. Currently, the most commonly granted type of protection in the Italian case is 
however humanitarian protection”, a temporary legal status granted whenever the threshold of 
international protection requirements is not fully met, valid for two years. 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/riepilogo_dati_2015_2
016_0.pdf  Accessed 25 January 2017 
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humanitarian concerns in border management. The next section shall 
discuss these ambiguous interconnections as well as other trends in EU 
migration management. 
 
PART V. TRENDS OF EU MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 
This chapter’s outline of the recent history of EU borders and the 
examination of the legal categories enacting them at the EU and national 
level highlights a specific trajectory of migration management in the EU, 
one that combines economic underpinnings in migration management 
with humanitarian and security discourses. These last sections examine 
the main features of current EU migration management and reflect upon 
their mutual connections.  
22. Increasing securitisation of non-EU migration 
This chapter’s historical outline of the legislation and policies 
constituting borders in the EU pointed towards a trajectory of a growing 
securitisation of non-EU migration, which coincided with the process of 
EU integration. The Foucault-inspired definition of securitisation 
adopted in Chapter I, connecting migration management to a broader 
politics of insecurity involving both local and migrant populations 
became useful in the evaluation of the recent history of non-EU 
migration management. The chapter observed how the increasing 
conceptualisation of entry and movement of non-EU citizens in the 
Union as a security issue has coincided to the minimisation of internal 
borders within the Union. Examples for such process included: the 
creation of the Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs in the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Amsterdam 
Treaty; the institution of the Schengen Information System, EURODAC, 
FRONTEX; the institutionalisation of administrative detention for 
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irregular migrants, sanctions for carriers and employers dealing with 
irregular migrants and so on.  
It is important to stress that these measures have not been simply 
tools to control the movement of non-EU migrants but, as posited in 
Chapter I, they have shaped the way in which the mobility of Third 
Country nationals is currently conceived in the EU, that is, predominantly 
a security issue. I also noted how this process of securitisation of 
migration has concurred in the very definition of EU citizenship, as 
constitutively built on the exclusion of Third Country Nationals. The 
framing of certain categories of the latter as “dangerous” has further 
enabled the EU government to pose itself as a guardian of EU citizens’ 
security. In Chapter I, the Hobbesian link between citizens’ protection 
and political legitimation was reframed through the notion of a “politics 
of insecurity” revolving around the dangers of migration employed by 
governments to increase their ability to control their population (Bigo 
2002, Huysmans 2006). 
As further mentioned above, the institution of an internal security 
sphere tackling non-EU migration has further been read as the result of a 
spill-over of the EU internal market in the European integration process 
(Huysmans 2006). The Foucauldian interpretation of neoliberalism put 
forward in Chapter I explains here how on the one hand, the neoliberal 
rationale behind the erasure of border controls in the Union can call for 
as little government intervention as possible in order to maximise profits. 
On the other hand, the maximisation of profits relies upon the constant 
possibility of government intervention to keep the negative effects of 
excessive freedom under control (Ibid: 94). In this respect, security 
policy, understood as “political and administrative practices that address 
excesses (e.g. a sudden inflow of very large numbers of immigrants) 
endangering the orderly conduct of freedom”, is key (Ibid).  
Consequently, the transformation of the EU external borders into filters 
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of dangerous free movement and the creation of technologies aimed at 
monitoring this dangerous excess of freedom within the population (i.e., 
Schengen Information System, EURODAC) is to be read in tandem with 
the pursuit of neoliberal economic growth orienting governmental 
decisions in the EU.  
23. The economic underpinnings of EU migration management  
This chapter further revealed that although the nexus between 
migration and its economic uses is ambiguously articulated in legislation 
and official language, EU migration management has nonetheless deep 
economic underpinnings. The chapter started by remarking how the 
mobility of EU citizens was at its beginnings conceived as a function of 
the construction of a single European market. I further indicated that the 
financial means test for EU citizens internally migrating is a remnant of 
this underlying economic rationale. The latter heavily impacts on the 
categorisation of the mobility of non-EU nationals and their 
dangerousness. The consideration of legal categories in Part III illustrated 
how the label of “threat” to the internal security, welfare or cultural 
identity of Member States does not equally applies to all non-EU citizens: 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of non-EU citizens are largely 
drawn along the lines of an economic rationale, which is inscribed in the 
logic of global neoliberalism.  
Perhaps the clearest example of this economic orientation was the 
fast-track permanent residence status granted by many Member States to 
non-EU investors based on their economic worth. As this chapter 
illustrated, economic growth nevertheless remains a mostly unspoken 
policy goal of migration management of non-EU citizens.  In spite of 
that, this chapter showed how an economic rationale pervades legal 
categories of mobility and intersects with security issues. As currently 
legal routes into European countries are only available to affluent, hyper-
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skilled individuals and family members, most non-EU migrants are left 
with the only option of irregular routes. While legal recognition is granted 
to asylum seekers who are lucky enough to make it into the EU space, 
most non-EU migrants are left with the only option of irregular routes 
and irregular work and are criminalised. The logic emerging from the 
current legal framework is that hyper-skilled or well-off migrants do not 
represent a threat to EU national societies or economies, while other 
migrants who do not possess the skills or capital in demand are highly 
undesirable and threatening for EU societies.  
Notwithstanding this depiction, all national markets in Member States 
continue to profit from inexpensive and readily exploitable irregular 
migrant labour. The latter has turned into a structural necessity for 
Member States as a result of the neoliberal shift within social relations 
and political economies over the last thirty years or so. Whether the 
absence of legal labour migration channels is the result of a hidden 
economic agenda or of the lack of acceptance of migrant populations by 
national public opinions within Member States, the abovementioned pro-
legal labour migration approach that the Commission adopted since the 
early 2000s reflects the reality of the EU economic situation: millions of 
non-EU workers are and will be increasingly needed to sustain the EU’s 
current levels of welfare, given the shrinking working-age population in 
Member States.  
The case of border management in the Italian case further shed light 
on another perhaps less intuitive economic dimension of migration 
management. As mentioned earlier, the reception of asylum seekers has 
grown into a complex line of business which employs hundreds of 
thousands of employees from cooperatives, NGOs and government 
departments. The economically productive nature of border controls and 
the management of irregular migration, consisting of preventive 
operations, search and rescue operations, processing centres, detention 
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centres and so on, has been grasped through the notion of an “illegality 
industry”, precisely to foreground the economic profitability of the EU 
external border controls (Andersson 2014: 15).  
All the above were examples of how EU and national governments 
capitalise on migration, and use migration management as a tool for 
boosting the local political economy. Despite such pursuit of economic 
growth orients the management of migration in the EU, this chapter 
showed that the nexus between migration and the economy is rarely 
articulated in migration legislation and official language. Together with 
security, I observed that humanitarian concerns have instead become a 
key overarching category in non-EU migration management: together 
with family reunification, the humanitarian route has become the main 
way of being acknowledged legal status in the EU for most non-EU 
population since the 1990s.232 The use of political asylum as the main 
channel to legal migration status in contemporary Europe is problematic 
as it possibly occludes the economic character of migration policies 
behind ostensibly neutral humanitarian reasons. This issue will be further 
elaborated on in Chapter IV in the light of the comparison with the 
Chinese case. 
 
Conclusion 
Moving from an outline on the recent history of the borders 
regulating migration in the EU since its beginnings, I showed how from 
being an economic occurrence - a corollary to the free movement of 
                                                          
232 The use of political asylum as an alternative tool to migration management is not new. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the past Northern EU countries conceded high quotas of asylum 
but this was combined with very restrictive immigration policies. On the contrary, Southern EU 
Countries were traditionally very restrictive with the acknowledgment of asylum protection, but often 
regularised migrant workers through regularisation programs and amnesties. 
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goods and capital - free movement for EU Member State nationals to 
other Member States gradually expanded to categories of economically 
inactive citizens and became the very condition upon which full 
enjoyment of the additional rights derived from EU citizenship is 
enjoyed. I further illustrated that the progressive erasure of internal 
borders in the EU happened at the price of a substantial strengthening of 
the EU’s external borders in relation to Third Country Nationals. While 
the movement of EU citizens within the European space is encouraged, 
the movement of Third Country Nationals is criminalised. The 
securitisation of their mobility into the EU was shown both in an 
historical perspective as well as in the consideration of the various legal 
categories and profiles available to migrant individuals. The chapter 
further highlighted the predominant economic rationale underpinning 
current legal categorisations. According to the latter, low waged migrants 
are considered dangerous for the host society, while hyper-skilled or 
investor migrants are welcomed through easier and even at times fast-
track permanent residence statuses. As most legal avenues for labour 
migration into the EU have been erased, currently the principal legal way 
of entry for most migrants is connected to family reunification and high 
skilled migration. At the same time, those who manage to enter 
irregularly are presented with the only option of asking for humanitarian 
protection. The alternative is to be persecuted as illegal migrants 
threatening the security of EU societies.  
When looking at this context alone, these trends might strike one as 
unavoidable outcomes of a specific trajectory. As I suggested in Chapter 
I, a vision from another place might rebut this view and offer fresh 
perspectives. The next chapter thus moves to the discussion of the 
Chinese case. In the latter, the issue of migration, both internal and 
international, has undergone a somewhat contrary trajectory of de-
securitisation over the last decades and has been characterised by an open 
pursuit of economic growth. 
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CHAPTER III 
Shifting borders of mobility in China: recent history, 
categories and trends 
 
Introduction 
 “Too many people, too little land” (di shao ren duo), is an expression often 
evoked in China, the country with the largest population on the globe, which 
accounts for one sixth of the whole world’s and double the size of that of 
the European Union. The Chinese nation is also no typical nation state.233 
Differently from the relatively recent territorial configurations of the EU or 
its Member States, 234 before becoming a nation state China has been an 
empire administratively covering nearly the same territory for millennia. For 
matters of space and scope this chapter will nevertheless limit itself to an 
account of borders in China since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. As anticipated in the introduction to this work 
and in Chapter I, in spite of growing numbers of migrants, the issue of 
migration in China underwent a relative de-securitisation over the last 
decades. This trend strikes as opposite to the growing securitisation of non-
EU migration which has typified EU migration management over the last 
decades. The detailed account of the laws, policies and measures operating 
as obstacles or incentives to human mobility in the Chinese context will 
                                                          
233 This assumes the ideal-type nation state is the European nation state, which have imposed 
themselves on the rest of the world as the primary politico-legal units of the modern international 
state system (Torpey 2000: 2-3). 
234Although Europe as a geopolitical centre has existed for centuries, the European Union as a 
united politico-legal entity is of recent formation. As seen in Chapter II, its shape has further varied 
over last decades. It could further be argued that even taken individually, the oldest European state 
in its existing territorial configuration dates back to two centuries ago or so. 
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function as a counterpoint to the account of borders in the EU presented in 
Chapter II.  
The management of China’s gargantuan population in the recent past has 
been characterised by a strict control of its internal mobility from poor rural 
areas to comparatively better-off urban centres through the hukou system. 
During Maoism, the restriction of internal migration was facilitated by 
China’s planned economy system. Such control was in turn instrumental to 
the functioning of the command economy, forcing peasants in rural areas – 
which accounted for 80 percent of the population - to extract the raw 
materials and staples needed to develop the industry in urban centres.  
Over the last three decades or so, China’s gradual transition to a socialist 
market economy has prompted a liberalisation of these borders. The 
transition to a socialist market economy has led the Chinese government to 
similarly liberalise its international borders, previously open only to a few 
sympathisers of the communist regime and restricted to Chinese citizens 
seeking to exit the country.235 Although over the last decades international 
migration has risen exponentially compared to Mao’s era, it remains 
insignificant in size compared to internal migration. This is also why it will 
remain somewhat secondary in this chapter’s account of China’s migration 
management, which has internal borders as its top priority. The account of 
China’s migration regime provided in this chapter will offer an alternative 
view to what was presented in Chapter II and shall exemplify how different 
migration regimes may present diverse priorities and configurations. This 
chapter’s analysis will progressively reveal how with its open, at times 
ruthless, pursuit of neoliberal economic growth as its main policy goal, 
China’s migration regime uniquely exposes to how the EU migration regime 
                                                          
235 This restriction also characterised in XVII and XIII century Europe, where states emigration was 
limited and even banned following a mercantilist logic which equalled the loss of subjects with a loss 
of economic and military power for the state (Green and Weil 2007 in Castles et al. 2013: 297). 
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is for the most part ambiguous regarding the connection between migration 
and its economic role, its uses or benefits. 
In order to better understand the legal and policy framework of 
migration management in China, the chapter will begin with a brief 
introduction to the Chinese legal tradition and China’s legal system’s current 
characteristics. Part Two will then provide a general overview of China’s 
internal borders as demarcated by the hukou system. Since 1958, this system 
has enforced what has been defined an “invisible wall” between China’s 
urban and rural areas (Chan 1994). The hukou has further been described as 
the “number one document in China” for its power to preside over many 
facets of life, if not the destiny of the majority of the Chinese population 
(Chan 2009: 198).  By regulating and determining the life chances of Chinese 
citizens along the urban-rural distinction, the hukou system has further 
shaped the status and rights of Chinese citizens and has created a second 
class of citizens (Chan 1994: 135; Solinger 1999: 7; Wang 2005: xii; 
Buckingham and Chan 2008: 582). I will show that from an initial 
conception of rural to urban migration as a phenomenon which had to be 
severely restricted, after Deng Xiaoping’s launch of the Open Up and 
Reform Policy in 1978 the legislation has gradually shifted to an attitude of 
allowing such internal mobility.  As shall be seen, despite a general de-
securitisation of internal migration and the recent reforms of the hukou 
system at various levels, legal affiliation and welfare rights in China’s largest 
cities remain a prerogative of the wealthy and high-skilled few.  
In Part Three I will consider somewhat more concisely the history of 
China’s external border regime in relation to Chinese and foreign nationals. 
Since the first decades of the PRC until the late 1970s, the emigration of 
Chinese nationals was restricted and considered treacherous to the socialist 
state. Ever since China’s economic reforms in the 1980s, external borders 
have been dramatically de-securitised in relation to Chinese citizens, to the 
extent that at present the emigration of Chinese nationals is celebrated as a 
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patriotic gesture contributing to the country’s economic development. I will 
show that China’s external borders have undergone a similar opening up in 
relation to foreign nationals from a period where immigration was a seen as 
a high security matter and only political sympathisers were allowed into the 
country, to one where foreign nationals are for the most part perceived as an 
economic opportunity and their number in the country has increased 
dramatically.  
Reflecting the same structure adopted in Chapter II to examine the EU 
migration regime, Part Four examines the array of legal profiles bestowed 
upon individuals on the move by different legal categories. I will note that 
most of China’s internal migrants are still referred to as a “floating 
population” (liudong renkou), residing in cities without a permanent legal 
status either as temporary hukou holders or as irregular “floaters”. I will note 
that nevertheless, differently from the EU context, irregular status - possibly 
characterising most of China’s floating population - does not have criminal 
repercussions on the lives of internal migrants as it did in the past and is 
merely perceived as an administrative incompliance. Among the main 
categories of hukou conversion, a procedure for which the majority of rural 
migrants do not qualify, I will refer to state employees, investors, talents and 
highly educated or skilled migrants and remark the economic rationale 
underlying most of these categories.  
I will then consider how legal categories of mobility across international 
borders - including overseas Chinese, naturalised citizens, foreign workers, 
family members, irregular foreign migrants – are similarly oriented by an 
open pursuit of economic growth as the main policy goal of migration 
management. Part Five further surveys the case of China’s internal borders 
by examining closely the case of Beijing, the city with the most restrictive 
legislation on internal borders in the country. I will reveal that even in the 
city with the strictest hukou legislation in China, the implementation of hukou 
regulations is sporadic and ad-hoc. Part Six will discuss the main features of 
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China’s contemporary borders. It will posit that the prioritisation of 
economic growth as China’s leading policy goal in the reform era has not 
only led to a de-securitisation of borders but also to an open articulation of 
the relationship between economy and migration management in law and 
official language.   
PART I. LAW IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT 
As pointed out in Chapter I, comparative analyses expose the different 
shapes law assumes in different contexts. The more diverse the contexts in 
comparison, the more rewarding the outcome. China’s legal system stands as 
different from Western legal systems due to its historical origins and some 
of its current characteristics. This first part briefly discusses the main legal 
theories in traditional China, from which the legal system of the People’s 
Republic has sprouted. I will then account with a bit more detail the most 
recent history of China’s legal system, from Mao’s era to the present time. 
The final sections discuss the main characteristics of China’s current legal 
system in terms of conceptions of law, its relation with policies and human 
rights issues. The clarification of these themes will be crucial to better 
contextualise the comparison with the management of migration in China 
examined in the rest of this chapter.  
1. China’s traditional legal culture in the imperial era 
Many fundamental concepts of China’s traditional legal culture date as 
early as the Zhou dynasty (1027-770 BC). One of the principal ideas is that 
the ruler rules by virtue of mandate of Heaven, and society is governed in 
accordance with li, which translates as propriety, rituals and moral standards. 
Western scholars have often drawn equivalents with the concept of natural 
law in early modern West with li. In contrast to that, fa indicates 
approximately what in a Western context coincides with laws, but in the 
narrower connotation of criminal sanctions. These two concepts have often 
been played against each other throughout China’s intellectual history. On 
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the one hand, Confucius (551–479 BC) and his followers endorsed a 
government by li: they believed society could naturally be regulated by moral 
standards and generally did not need punishment. The way li applied 
depended on one’s position within society and family; the Confucian ideal of 
society was a hierarchical one, characterized by a paternalistic vision of the 
ruler and a very strong sense of family as the main unit of society.236 The 
government of the state was not any different from ruling over a family: in 
both cases harmony was achieved through the observance of li. The 
conceptual fusion of family and state realm elevated moral cultivation to the 
rank of state law (Chen 2008: 12). Confucianists believed in the possibility of 
educating human beings and deemed education, rather than punishment, to 
be the key to maintaining social order. In this context, law applied only to 
those who had crossed the boundaries of civilized conduct, and was 
generally considered a primitive stage of humankind, prior to that of a 
voluntary observation of morals. 
The other leading cultural reference in China’s legal tradition is legalism, a 
school of thought which developed during the Warring States period (475-
221 BC). On the opposite side of Confucianism, legalists conceived the man 
as immoral by nature: hence, they advocated a strict reliance on law and 
punishments as the government’s main instrument to achieve political order. 
The harmony of the social order was reached by notably cruel punishments 
which in legalists’ mind functioned as a deterrent against committing crimes. 
237 While the legalist school had its highest influence during Qin dynasty 
(221-207 BC), succeeding dynasties kept the legal system created under the 
                                                          
236 According to Confucius, five fundamental relations existed in human interaction: the relationship 
of ruler and minister; father and son; husband and wife; elder and younger brother; friend and friend. 
While three of these already pertain to the realm of the family, the remaining two referred to the 
same family logic: a ruler was conceived as a father to its minister and the hierarchy between 
brothers would apply to friendly relationships (Chen 2008:12). 
237 Depending on the gravity of crimes, the punishment could range from tattooing, beating with 
sticks, amputation of various parts of the body to death by strangulation or death by slicing (Chen 
2004: 16-17). 
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Qin while reforming some of its crueller features, in favour of rule based on 
Confucian values of ethical and moral persuasion. The influence of 
Confucianism on the administration of law, peaked during the Tang Dynasty 
(618-907 AC) with the Tang Code, which merged both Confucian and 
legalist principles in the law.238 Within this system, moral teaching remained 
the most important means of social control in imperial China: law was 
considered “secondary and supplementary to morality”, written codes were 
mainly related to criminal matters, while civil disputes were normally 
determined through mediation led by leaders or elders (Chen 2004: 15). The 
legal system was primarily aimed at handling criminal cases and law was 
“indisputably a tool to serve the interests of the state” (Peerenboom 2002: 
41). Even though the terms and details of the categories of legislation 
changed from dynasty to dynasty, for about two millennia imperial China 
was characterized by a stable system of codes which were kept up to date 
and enacted through sub-statutes, edicts, or were decreed by the emperor 
himself (Ibid: 36).  
This situation changed in the late Qing period (XIX-XX century), in 
which the inability of the imperial dynastic system to maintain power both 
internally and externally prompted demands for reformation. The 
humiliating defeats of the Qing Dynasty by the British and Japanese 
empires239 shattered the millennia-long assumption of the superiority of the 
Chinese civilization and shook the confidence of both rulers and subjects 
(Ibid: 43). As a response to the crisis and to consolidate power, the Qing 
government introduced a range of new measures to reform China’s legal 
                                                          
238 From a legalist perspective, the Code contained a very detailed matching of instances of crimes 
and punishments so that justice would be administered equally, and so that justice officers would be 
mere executors of the emperor’s will. The Tang Code nonetheless considered the family and clans 
as the essential units of society; accordingly, it gave the highest importance to clans and family 
heads, according to the Confucian tradition. 
239China was defeated by Great Britain in the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium 
War (1856–1860), both involving disputes over British trade in China and Chinese sovereignty. The 
wars forcibly curtailed China's isolation from the rest of the world and weakened the Qing Dynasty. 
China also lost control over Korea to Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). 
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system drawing on the experiences of Western legal systems. At the 
beginning of the 1900s, the first constitution was drafted, modelled on 
German and Japanese statutes. The courts were also modernized and efforts 
towards a professionalization of the judges and a bar were pursued (Huang 
2001 in Peerenboom 2002:43). The aim of the Qing government was to use 
Western knowledge and technology but maintain Chinese identity. Legal 
reforms were conceived as a tool to achieve the emperor’s aims and the 
emperor remained the source of laws. 240  The slogan at the time was 
“Chinese learning as the body, Western learning as a means” (zhongxueweiti, 
xixueweiyong). Nevertheless, as the legal reform process mainly entailed 
changes in black letter law, it soon fell apart as irreconcilable with the 
existing social structure (Wang and Zhang 1999: 8). After the 1911 
deposition of the last Qing emperor, the Nationalist government guided by 
Sun Yatsen continued to pursue legal reforms and drafted a number of new 
laws drawing on Western codes. Nevertheless, legal reforms during the 
Republic period (1911-1949) did not establish themselves durably due to the 
recurrent economic and political crises as well as the government’s lack of 
political and military control over the country. 
2. Law in the socialist State 
The influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology is crucial to understand how 
China has managed the mobility of populations across its internal and 
external borders, especially during the first decades of life of the PRC. 
Remarkably, the influence of a Marxist-Leninist approach to history in legal 
thinking has survived up to today and the majority of legal history textbooks 
published in China still adopt this approach.241 In the first years of life of the 
                                                          
240 Hence, despite a new generation of legal scholars increasingly promoting individual civil rights, to 
this day many scholars and legal practitioners associate the notion of law with the power of the 
strongest, even when law promotes collective aims. 
241 The latter divides human history in five stages: primitive society, slave society, feudal society and 
capitalist society. The fifth stage of society is a socialist society, where the private property of means 
of production has been eradicated and the communist party leads the nation towards the 
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PRC, various laws were promulgated and ideologically supported by the 
concept of socialist legality, which at that time was being promoted by Stalin 
in the Soviet Union. The latter posited that, differently from capitalist 
societies, the laws enacted under socialist systems are a most advanced form 
of law, needed by the state to eradicate all capitalist remnants (Lo 
1997:470).242 The new government enacted various Organic Laws setting the 
structure of the state laws and in 1954 it promulgated a Chinese 
Constitution. However, as Mao’s theory of law was deeply entangled with 
ideology and politics, law soon acquired “a class nature” connotation: 
instead of prescribing abstract and universal norms, legal provisions were 
mostly adopted to endorse the accomplishment of political objectives or to 
officially enunciate political principles (Sapio 2010: 34). Conceived as an 
instrument for the Party to promote class struggle, laws were enforced 
through political campaigns and mass movements rather than through 
formal judicial institutions (Lo 1997: 473-474).  An example is the launch of 
an “Anti-Rightist Campaign”,243 where many jurists, lawyers and judges were 
purged. Along the same lines, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Supervision were abolished in 1959.244  
This period was characterised by law which did not exist as a domain 
separated from the political sphere and mostly stemmed from political 
                                                                                                                                               
achievement of a communist society (where the antagonism between classes will be completely 
abolished and state apparatus will become superfluous). 
242 Vyshinsky’s theory of law, supported by Stalin after 1936, posits that law has a positive value of 
social regulation in the socialist transition. Such perspective opposed the position theorised by 
Pashukanis, who argued for a “commodity exchange” theory of law. According to the latter, law and 
socialism were incompatible: since a commodity economy system was the condition for law, law 
would have disappeared as the commodity economy withered away (Lo 1997: 470). 
243 The “Anti-Rightist Campaign” originated in the 1956 Party policy of encouraging intellectuals to 
voice their opinion (“letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools contend”). However the 
policy resulted in harsh criticism of the Party’s performance and policies and led the government to 
remove those critical of the government actions.  
244 中华人民共和国第二节人民代表大会第一吹全会关于撤销司法部, 监察部的决定 (First Plenary 
Session of the Second National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China decision on 
suppressing the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Supervision) 28 April 1959. 人民日报(People’s 
Daily), 29 April 1959.  
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campaigns (Dutton 2009: 30). The legal framework at the time was to be 
found within “editorials from the official voice of the Communist Party, The 
People’s Daily, speeches from Party leadership and the necessities and 
consequences of mass campaigns” (Ibid).  Party policies were enacted as law 
- as an instrument for class struggle - or alternatively outdid laws 
(Peerenboom 2002: 46-47). Policy decisions were often passed through 
administrative orders rather than laws and had mandatory force on local 
governments and enterprises (Wang and Mo 1999: 2).  
The legal scene further deteriorated with the Cultural Revolution, during 
which one of the targets of the red guards was the dismantlement of the 
bourgeois legal system.245 As a consequence, law schools were shut down, 
professionals of the legal realm prosecuted or forced to change profession; 
procuratorates were officially removed in 1968 and only reinstated in 1978 
(Chen 2004: 32). When not eradicated, the courts connived with police 
organs, under military rule. Decisions on criminal cases were normally 
subject to the authorisation of the local party committee (Ibid: 33). 
Arguably, between 1966 and 1976 the impact of laws on the social sphere 
was irrelevant. While the chaos of the Cultural Revolution came to an end in 
1969, mass campaigns and social chaos continued until Mao’s death in 
1976. 246  Dutton describes the political setting under Maoism as a 
revolutionary type of governmentality, whereby “the mentality of 
government defined life itself” and produced a new kind of political subject, 
one which was directly deployed against the enemies of the government at 
all levels (Dutton 2009: 35). This process gave rise to the internalisation of 
                                                          
245 Although the reasons leading to the Cultural Revolution are still unclear, scholars agree that it 
originated from the struggle between Mao and a more reformist faction among high ranks of the 
Party. Chairman Mao mobilised masses of red guards across the country, mostly composed by 
students and youths. What followed was a period of social chaos, which many Chinese define today 
as a period of civil war and anarchy in society (Chen 2004: 30-31).  
246 For this reason, many scholars conventionally mark the Cultural Revolution period as a decade 
(1966-1976). The change in the balance of powers within the Party’s internal politics in favour of the 
pragmatist faction is embodied by the prosecution of the Gang of Four a month after Mao’s death in 
1976. 
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political commitment by political subjects, which “demanded and produced 
a homologization of all facets of life” (Ibid).  
Over the last three decades, China has undertaken what is possibly the 
fastest development of a legal system in world history (Chen 2012: 13). The 
affirmation of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 as China’s new leader represents a 
crucial step towards the construction of a legal system. After a decade of 
social chaos, Deng’s conception of law was oriented towards practical goals. 
While proclaiming his allegiance to ideology,247 Deng nonetheless asserted 
the essential role of law to maintain social order within a socialist society.248 
For the first time, the legal system was proclaimed by Party leadership to be 
essential for socialist modernisation. A stable legal system was seen as 
fundamental to maintaining a social order conducive to the economic 
modernisation envisioned by the Open up and Reform Policy (Chen 2008: 
51). The legal reforms gradually began in the 1980s. Instead of following an 
ideal model, reforms were adopted through an approach of “crossing the 
river by groping for stones” (mozhe shitou guohe) and proceeded through a 
series of exploratory stages and pilot projects. On the one hand, between 
1949 and 1978 the government’s focal point was class struggle and power 
consolidation. Within this context, law was seen as an instrument for the 
State to eradicate capitalist antagonistic forces (Yu 1989: 40). On the other 
hand, in Deng’s era the instrumentalist function of law shifted from serving 
class struggle to serving the goal of economic development (Ibid: 42). This 
notion was illustrated by Deng’s “Two-Hands’ policy” which stated that on 
the one hand, economic development must be pursued while on the other, 
the legal system must be reinforced (Ibid). While Deng’s approach to law 
substantially differed from that promoted during Mao’s era, it should be 
                                                          
247 Deng insisted on “four cardinal principles”: the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
Leadership of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.  
248 Deng promoted legal reforms through five slogans: first “there must be laws for people to follow”, 
second “those laws must be observed”, third “law breakers must be dealt with accordingly”, fourth 
“law enforcement must be strict” and fifth, “everyone is equal before the law” (Lo 1992:649-65). 
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stressed that the pursuit of a legal system remained for Chairman Deng a 
tool rather than an end in itself (Chen 2008: 53). More specifically, law 
became a tool to guarantee the social conditions for market economy to 
function as post-1978 China’s government as political organisation shifted 
from “an era of political distinction” between ideological friends and 
enemies249 into one of “economic distinctions … a social dynamic based on 
profit and loss” (Dutton 2005: 19).  The regulatory role which the legal 
system assumed in the reform era is a very good illustration of the 
Foucauldian critique of the neoliberal economy considered in Chapter I, 
Section seven, as an artificial system which produces the desired effects only 
under certain conditions which are not naturally there but rather, 
constructed and maintained by governments. 
In 1982, a new constitution was drafted250  as part of a new wave of 
economic and legal reforms pursued throughout the 1980s.  Even though 
Tiananmen events in 1989 decelerated the pace of reforms, the latter 
resumed following Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern trip, which gave new 
impetus to their pursuit.251 In 1996, Party Secretary-General Jiang Zemin 
introduced as a new policy principle the slogan “ruling the country in 
accordance with the law and establishing a socialist rule-of-law state” (yifa 
zhiguo, jianshe shehui zhuyi fazhiguo). The notion of a country ruled according to 
law was later integrated into the amendments to the Chinese constitution in 
                                                          
249 Dutton interprets the recent political history of China (pre- and post-revolutionary) through 
concepts borrowed from Western theory, by combining Hannah Arendt’s remarks on politics as 
commitment and Carl Schmitt’s insights on politics or “the political” as constitutively determined by a 
friend/enemy divide (Dutton 2005: 9-12). In his account, political passions and commitment were at 
the basis of both the revolutionary movement - which resulted in the 1949’s revolution and 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China – as well as political life during Mao’s leadership 
(Ibid: 11). In this context, the friend/enemy distinction which characterised Party politics since 1927 
became a way of thinking for the whole nation during Maoism (Ibid). This conception progressively 
washed-out after 1978, replaced by a way of thinking and a policy-making based on profit and loss 
rather than on ideology (Ibid). 
250 The Chinese Constitution is not directly justiciable in China and no Constitutional Court exists. 
251 The speech which Deng gave during his visit to the Southern cities of Shenzhen and Zhuhai in 
1992 was perceived as a sea-change ideological step towards reform and economic openness. 
 153 
 
1999.252 Throughout the 1990s, law-makers largely drew on experiences and 
models in Western countries in the effort to establish a socialist rule-of-law 
state. The growth of China’s legal corpus is a tangible fact: in 1978 only 63 
laws and judicial interpretations existed in total. Impressively, as of August 
2011, China had enacted, in addition to its Constitution, 240 laws, 706 
administrative regulations, and over 8,600 sets of local regulations.253 Despite 
the growth of China’s legal corpus, Western scholars have questioned the 
progress of legal reforms. According to some, since the late 2000s there has 
been a “turn against law” in China, mostly visible in the judicial realm, where 
the government is increasingly demanding judges 254  to drop their 
commitment to the systematic application of laws in order to pursue the 
Party’s goals (Minzner 2011: 939, Minzner 2015).  Other scholars have 
rebutted this, arguing that these developments in the judicial system are not 
enough to validate the “turn against law” hypothesis, and that this thesis is 
“biased towards liberalism and liberal legality” (Peerenboom 2014: 210).255 
Others have rejected the notion of a turn against the law by stressing that 
China has been relentlessly prolific in enacting new  legislation and 
amending old ones - in all areas of law – and has increasingly made efforts to 
implement such legislation (Chen 2012: 18, Chen 2016). The next sections 
explore in more detail some of the main characteristics of China’s 
contemporary legal system which relate to the legislation of China’s internal 
and external borders.   
                                                          
252 中华人民共和国宪法  (1999 年修正最新版)  [Chinese constitution (1999 Amended version), 
Second Plenary Session of National People Congress, Art. 5.  
253 中国特色社会主义法律体系 (Improvement of the Socialist Legal System with Chinese 
Characteristics) White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China, 27 October 2011, subsection 1.  
254 While Chinese courts exercise their judicial power independently from administrative organs, 
public organisations and so on, the Chinese Constitution posits the leadership of the Party as 
central. Moreover, most judges are Party members. As a result, the courts are not independent from 
the Party and their main duty is to carry forward the Party’s goals.  
255 In other words, the assessment of the existence of a turn against law in China would be implicitly 
based on the idea that over the 1980s and 1990s China’s legal reforms were following the trajectory 
of European and American systems. 
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3. Administrative structure and characteristics of the legal system  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, an important feature of China’s legal 
framework is the multi-level hierarchical administration which characterises 
the distribution of power between China’s centralised government and local 
areas. The highest level of governance is the central government, from 
which follows the provincial level, which consists of 33 provincial level 
regions which include 22 provinces, four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Chongqing), five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Guangxi, Ningxia), two special administrative regions (Hong Kong 
and Macau).256 Below the provincial level - directly addressed by the central 
government in law-making – lie in order of importance the prefectural level, 
the county level and at the bottom of the ladder the township and towns’ 
level. The laws, policies and official documents promulgated by the central 
government act as guidelines which local governments at various levels 
implement according to local conditions.  
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s highest legislative 
power. However, since this organ meets in plenary session only once a year, 
the majority of laws are promulgated by its Standing Committee. Below the 
legislation enacted by the NPC, executive bodies led by China’s State 
Council are also entitled to enact administrative decisions, measures, 
opinions, regulations and so on. The directives issued by the State Council 
are more authoritative and effective than those promulgated by other 
executive bodies (i.e. ministries). People’s Congresses at the provincial and 
municipal level may further promulgate local regulations and decisions, and 
the same applies to executive bodies at the provincial and municipal level.  
In case of conflict of laws, laws and regulations at the national level 
prevail over local regulations and legislative bodies prevail over executive 
                                                          
256 The PRC also claims the province of Taiwan as the 34th region of China. However, Taiwan has a 
separate legal system and does not follow the lead of the PRC’s central government. 
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bodies at the same level. Nevertheless, as shall be seen in the case of hukou 
reforms, national legislation has often been overlooked in the case of pilot 
projects and legal reforms, which were first experimented with at the local 
level and then - when successful - extended to the rest of the country 
through national legislation. This is a particularity of the Chinese legal 
system which strikes as different from Western legal systems. Moreover, 
contrarily to Western states’ judicial systems - where a lot of the work of 
courts consists in the interpretation of statutes - in socialist civil law China 
the interpretation of laws and regulations remains a task reserved to the 
organs (legislatures, ministries, commissions, local government and their 
various bodies) which promulgated them. For this reason, this chapter will 
mainly deal with legislation and policies rather than with case law.257  
Another peculiarity of the Chinese system is that national legislation 
normally sets minimum standards and leaves local governments leeway to 
implement such standards through local legislation which suits best the local 
circumstances. 258  Partly due to this reason, China’s primary legislation is 
often broad and vague.259 This characteristic enables governments at various 
local levels to suitably interpret national law according to the local 
circumstances and the fast-changing conditions of the policies in effect. As a 
result, the enactment of secondary and tertiary legislation has a key role in 
the implementation of primary legislation (Otto 2000: 222).  As some 
scholars noted, although China is a unitary and not a federal state according 
to the Chinese Constitution, in actual fact the politico-legal relationship 
between central and sub-national governments bears a resemblance to 
                                                          
257 The only body entitled to engage in judicial interpretation with normative effect is the Supreme 
People’s Court, China’s highest court. 
258 To be sure, the same rationale guides the legal instrument of directives in the EU, which require 
Member States to achieve specific results through national legislation and leaving Member States 
leeway on how to achieve such results. 
259 This is particularly the case of legislative instruments such as opinions, which identify certain 
goals of reform but are mainly programmatic and need further legislation at national or local levels to 
be put into effect. 
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practices of federalism (Potter 2011: 14). This loose yet centralised 
relationship between centre and periphery is a legacy of imperial China and 
has been key in the government of and cohesion of such a vast political unit 
for millennia.  
4. Legal instrumentalism and rule of law in China 
A feature of the Chinese legal system which has somewhat endured since 
the Maoist period in the management of China’s internal borders is the 
supremacy of policies over laws. Despite the commitment to the 
construction of a legal system after 1978, some legislation – including the 
one regulating China’s borders - ought to be considered as a consolidated 
version of policies, which is enacted “when the time is ripe” (Keller 2000: 
222). The supremacy of policies over laws in the context of the 
implementation of China’s internal borders will be observed later when 
discussing the case of the promotion of economic development, as the 
government’s main policy priority after 1978. While at times the policy of 
promoting economic development has effected the advancement of 
legislation regulating the economy, in other circumstances the pursuit of this 
same policy goal has instead entailed the non-enforcement of the existing 
legal framework. For example, despite the 1958 Household Registrations law 
forbidding Chinese citizens from moving without permission across China’s 
internal borders, since the 1980s rural migrants have been able to travel to 
the cities as a result of the new policy to prioritise economic growth.  
What can be noted here is a general attitude considering law as a tool for 
the government to achieve other ends rather than an end in itself. Scholars 
have described this phenomenon as legal instrumentalism (Yu 1989).  As I 
have noted elsewhere, the enforcement of China’s internal borders is a 
typical case of legal instrumentalism (Fu and Pasquali 2015). As previously 
discussed, this instrumentalist conception of law can also be found in late 
imperial China, when the emperor conceived of the introduction of Western 
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law as a means of restoring social order and China’s sovereignty. This 
instrumentalist conception has somewhat endured during Maoism, when law 
became a means to pursue class struggle. After 1978, the leadership began to 
consider law as “a better tool than policy, capable of securing and 
institutionalising ad hoc policies in a more universal manner” and creating 
the conditions for stability and social order required to develop the economy 
(Chen 2008: 53). The persistence of legal instrumentalism in certain domains 
of law thus generates a legal theory conundrum. In the case of the hukou 
system legislation, the unresolved theoretical dispute among legal scholars 
has been whether the current hukou system is currently under an inborn 
“illegal” destiny or whether it has assumed a “market-demand” justification 
(Lu 2009: 133).  
The tendency of policies to override laws in the Chinese context relates 
to a classic debate among (Western) scholars of Chinese law is whether law 
in China should simply be seen as a tool for the Party-state to impose its 
policies or whether China could be conceived as a rule of law system. For 
Lubman, the Chinese legal system is not built to contain the power of the 
Party-state but it is rather a tool for the latter to control China’s people 
(Lubman 2000). While acknowledging the tremendous changes that China’s 
legal system has undergone, Lubman rejects the notion that China has a legal 
system due to the lack of coherence he perceives in its current institutions. 
Stressing the instrumentalism of law and the supremacy of policy over law in 
China, he sees an “inescapable contradiction between the avowed goal of 
attaining rule of law and the ideological limits” of the one-Party government: 
the Chinese Communist Party’s priority of maintaining stability would 
equate to party control and legal developments would serve the purpose of 
an instrumental law (Ibid 2000: 7).   
Peerenboom has offered a more optimistic view based on what he terms 
“thin theory” of the rule of law, as opposed to “thick theories” of the rule of 
law (Peerenboom 2002). Thick theories relate law to specific forms of 
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economic, social and political standards such as specific economic systems 
(i.e. capitalism or central planning) forms of government (i.e. electoral 
democracies or one-party systems) and notions of rights (liberal, 
communitarian, “Asian values” among others) (Ibid: 3).260 On the contrary, 
thin theories embrace “the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of law” 
and more broadly refer to a system of laws that are “general, public, 
prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and 
enforced”(Ibid: 3). Peerenboom’s analysis of legal reforms in China further 
distinguishes between rule of law and rule by law: the latter being legal 
systems within which the law is only or predominantly a tool of the state, 
while the former refers to legal systems within which laws impose 
meaningful limits on state actors (Ibid: 83).261 In his analysis, although “the 
footprint of the system’s instrumental rule-by-law heritage” is still present, 
there is substantial evidence of a shift from a rule by law system towards “a 
system that complies with the basic elements of a thin rule of law”(Ibid: 
558).  
As the previous section illustrated, within the span of few decades China 
shifted “from a state with hardly any law” at the end of the Cultural 
Revolution to what was officially proclaimed in a 2011 White Paper as a 
“socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics” - with substantial legal 
institutions, comprising “law-making authorities and courts at national, 
provincial and local levels, large numbers of judges, procurators, lawyers, 
                                                          
260Peerenboom observes that for instance, the liberal-democratic thick version of rule of law is 
characterised by free market capitalism, multi-party democracy and an interpretation of human rights 
that prioritises civil and political rights "over economic, social, cultural, and collective or group rights" 
(Ibid: 3). In the Chinese case, a state socialism thick version of rule of law is defined by a socialist 
form of economy –one in which state ownership has a greater role than in market economies-, a 
non-democratic system in which the CCP has a prominent role and an understanding of rights which 
highlights social stability, collective over individual rights and subsistence as the main right instead of 
civil or political rights (Ibid). 
261 This distinction is very valuable as it allows us to avoid the trap of what was described in Chapter 
I as legal orientalism which in this specific case would lead Western scholars to assess China's legal 
system based on their thick conception of liberal-democratic rule of law.   
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legal aid workers, law schools, government organs charged with promoting 
legal knowledge among members of the public, etc.” (Chen 2012: 12). 
Whether one decides to consider China as a “thin” socialist rule of law 
system, which as such functions within the limits set by the Party-state, or to 
stick to Western-like definitions of rule of law and thus consider China as a 
rule by law system, it is important to stress that in liberal democracies the 
rule of law also functions within the limits set by the democratically elected 
governments. An example comprises the extra-legal security measures 
enacted at border zones or in places outside state jurisdiction, such as 
Guantanamo Bay prison in the case of the United States. The limits are 
related to what is considered a major threat for the stability of the politico-
legal unit in question. Next section tackles another somewhat related issue: 
human rights in the Chinese context. 
5. Human rights in the Chinese context 
China’s pledge to uphold international human rights laws often sees 
China at the centre of international criticisms. Although the country is 
signatory of several human rights treaties, the Chinese government 
promotes a specific interpretation of human rights that questions the 
universal validity of some of these rights and exposes the different purposes 
that rights are supposed to achieve (Peereboom 2002: 533-4). The position 
of the Chinese government is that international human rights and the 
capacity of the international community to make claims based on such rights 
are limited by national sovereignty and that other states should not employ 
human rights as a pretext to intervene in its internal affairs (Ibid: 534). As 
China’s authoritarian politico-legal system is based on non-liberal values, 
there is an inherent conflict between such a system and the international 
regime of human rights, which is instead built upon a liberal framework (Ahl 
2015: 639).  
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According to Marxist-Leninist ideology, due to the State’s monopoly over 
law and the instrumental character of it, human rights are neither innate nor 
inalienable but rather, they stem from and are granted by the government 
(Chen 2005: 169, 172). Moreover, human rights are contingent and depend 
on the level of economic development of the politico-legal unit in question 
(Ibid). Such interpretation leads to the subordination political and civil rights 
to economic development, and to a prioritisation of subsistence and self-
determination as the basic rights upon which all other rights hinge on (Ahl 
2015: 643). Although socialist ideology is no longer a defining element of 
China’s political organisation, as Bjorn Ahl pointed out, the party-state 
remains ordered according to the Leninist notion of socialist party 
dictatorship, which revolves around the hierarchy of the party organs, to 
which “all areas of administration, police, judiciary, military, economy, and 
society” are subordinated (Ibid: 643).262 This structure results in substantial 
restrictions on several civil and political rights, such as on freedom of 
speech,263 as well in the denial of other fundamental rights - such as the right 
to life, the right to a fair trial, the prohibition of unlawful detention and 
torture - to those perceived as a threat the system’s social stability, most 
notably political dissidents and human rights lawyers (Ibid).  
At the same time, China partakes in the international human rights 
regime, is member of several human rights treaties and increasingly engages 
in international human rights’ dialogues. Remarkably, in 1998 China joined 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,264 although it 
has not ratified it yet. In 2009, the government issued its first national 
                                                          
262 The Party system has monopoly over admission to senior leadership positions in the government 
and in society; the system of internal discipline control gives party members immunity from the 
jurisdictional organs and a capillary monitoring and manipulation of media silences the opposition 
(Ibid). 
263 These restrictions are seen as vital for the survival of the single-party system, to maintain social 
stability by preventing criticism of the political system itself. 
264  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. 
 161 
 
Human Rights Plan (2009-2010), where for the first time the issue of human 
rights protection in China in was explicitly addressed in the legislation.265 
The release of this plan, which has been followed by two others,266 shows 
the increasing influence of the language of human rights in the Chinese 
context, regardless of whether this document is to be interpreted as an effort 
to silence internal and international criticisms or an actual step to improve 
human rights protection. Another interesting tool in this respect is China’s 
annual issuing of a Human Rights Record of the United States, in reply to 
US State Department’s Human Rights Report, to compensate human rights 
criticisms normally addressed against China.267  
As this section has illustrated, China is not rejecting human rights in toto 
as international media or NGOs would often have it. Human rights are 
increasingly part of China’s official language, in spite of the government’s 
different interpretation of how rights should be prioritised and implemented 
in practice and how other states and human rights organisations may 
overreach on national sovereignty to rectify their alleged violations. 
Acknowledging the Chinese policy does not mean of course that all 
violations of human rights by the Chinese government can be justified. As 
will emerge from this chapter, the issue of human rights in China’s migration 
management is almost inexistent. Moreover, a striking difference from the 
                                                          
265 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2009–2010) http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2009-
04/13/content_1284128.htm   Accessed 17 August 2017.  
266 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2012-2015) and Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020).  
267 State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, Human Rights Record of the 
United States in 2016, 9 March 2017. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/09/c_136115481.htm Accessed 16 August 2017. 
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EU context is that China’s migration regime China lacks a system of 
international protection for asylum seekers and refugees.268  
This introductory part showed how moving from a system with hardly 
any law at the end of the Cultural Revolution, over the last few decades 
China has built a legal system with substantial legal institutions which in 
many respects differs from Western legal systems in terms of conceptions of 
law, its relation with policies and interpretations of human rights. Now that 
the main features of the Chinese legal system relevant to this thesis have 
been clarified, we can move on to the analysis of China’s internal and 
external borders. 
 
PART II. HISTORY OF CHINA’S INTERNAL BORDERS  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, currently the phenomenon of rural to 
urban migration in China encompasses as many as 260 million internal 
migrants and exceeds the total of the whole world's international migration 
combined. These impressive numbers are a recent outcome of a progressive 
liberalisation of the hukou system, which until the 1970s locked Chinese 
citizens in their location of hukou registration. Crucial shifts have happened 
in the management of mobility across China’s internal borders over the last 
fifty years or so. This section will provide an historical overview of how 
China’s internal borders have evolved since their establishment in the 1950s. 
It will account for the transition from an initial conception of rural to urban 
migration as a phenomenon which had to be severely restricted through 
policies and legislation, to a gradual but steady de-securitisation of internal 
migration since the launch of the 1978 Open Up and Reform Policy. I will 
remark how China’s government economic-oriented approach to internal 
                                                          
268 This feature could not be farther from what observed in the European context, where human 
rights discourses are instead omnipresent and a common bargaining chip in migration management.  
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migration has most recently led to the acknowledgement, in legislation and 
official documents, of the key role of internal migrants’ labour in China’s 
economic miracle and the promotion of their rights and well-being. Despite 
such changes and the most recent hukou reforms which have enabled hukou 
conversions in small and medium urban centres, I will conclude that welfare 
rights in China’s largest cities, the most popular destination for internal 
migrants, remain the prerogative of local hukou holders and of the wealthy 
and high-skilled few.  
6. (Re)establishment of the hukou system  
While the organisation of the population according to hukou registration 
dates back to more than two millennia ago,269 the hukou system established 
by the PRC government in the 1950s has been characterised by a degree of 
enforcement, rigidity and totality which is unprecedented in China’s history 
(Wang 2005: 58). In the first years of the PRC, freedom of residence for all 
Chinese citizens was practiced and recognized in the law, within documents 
such as the 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference270 and the 1954 Chinese Constitution.271 However, 
in the 1950s, increasing numbers of rural migrants moving to the cities 
started to alarm the authorities, fearful of mass migration and political 
instability. As a consequence, the first regulations on the household 
                                                          
269 China also took inspiration from the Soviet Union’s system of internal passports (propiska system) 
to establish its hukou system in the 1950 (Dutton 1992:207). However, the hukou system is among 
the oldest Chinese political institutions: almost all imperial dynasties since the Qin (3rd century BC) 
as well as the Republic of China (1912-49) implemented variants of this system, which was originally 
set up for the purpose of taxation and social control (See Wang 2005: 32-43 and Dutton 1992: 189-
91). 
270中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领 (Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference) 9 September 1949, at the First Plenary Session of The Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference. 
271 中华人民共和国宪法 (People’s Republic of China Constitution) 20 September 1954, The First 
Session of The National People’s Congress, Art. 90. 
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registration system were introduced in 1951.272 Although at this stage strict 
checks on population movements were not fully implemented, in 1955, 
immediately before the process of collectivization, an Instruction on the 
Establishment of a Household Registration System further required local 
governments to implement a permanent hukou system. 273  At around the 
same time, the policy of state monopoly on the purchase and selling of 
grains, guaranteeing food rations to urban residents, was launched. Through 
this arrangement, the hukou system assimilated “a role of resource allocation, 
opportunity prioritizing and differential treatment by location” (Wang 2005: 
45).  
China’s current hukou system was finally established in 1958 by the 
Household Registration Administrative Regulations.274 Still in force today, 
such regulations provided every PRC citizen with a household registration 
(hukou dengji) by birth and prohibited citizens from permanently moving 
from rural areas to urban areas unless formally varying their household 
registration. In order to register elsewhere, the applicant needed to produce 
an employment certificate issued by an urban labour department, or a letter 
or offer from a higher education institution, or documentation proving 
permission to move issued by an urban household.275 Temporary movement, 
which could not exceed three months, also required an official 
authorisation.276  
The hukou registration consisted of two parts: the first is the place of 
registration, based on an individual’s presumed regular residence. This in 
turn fell into two categories: urban centres or rural settlements. The second 
                                                          
272城市户口管理暂行条例 (Provisional Regulations on the Governance of Urban Populations) 16 July 
1951, Ministry of Public Security. 
273关于建立经常户口登记制度的指示 (Instruction on the Establishment of a Household Registration 
System), 22 June 1955, State Council. 
274中华人民共和国户口登记条例 (Instruction on the Establishment of a Household Registration 
System) 9 January 1958, National People’s Congress  
275Supra, Art. 10 
276Supra, Art. 16 
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part is hukou classification, which is referred to as either agricultural (nongye) 
or non-agricultural (feinongye) hukou, determining a person’s entitlement to an 
array of rights for activities in a specified place.277 At the time when the 
hukou was established, the system allowed the government to control and 
restrict the relocation and employment of the rural population in urban areas 
and became a key instrument of the command economy. The establishment 
of the hukou system transformed China into a dual rural-urban society. The 
efficacy of China’s internal borders relied on two other administrative 
systems, to which different employment schemes, social welfare systems and 
public service supplies were allocated: the commune system in the 
countryside and the work unit system (danwei) in the cities.278  
In rural areas, the collectivisation of agriculture went on to be organised 
by way of tying rural workers to land. In order to collect food rations from 
their harvest, workers had to attend work in the production teams to which 
they were assigned. In the event of absence, not only would they not receive 
their food rationing, but their absence would have repercussions on an 
individual’s whole family earnings and food rations (Whyte and Parish 1984: 
85, 87, 105). In parallel, work units in urban areas provided workers with 
lifetime employment, food rations, housing and welfare services, the so 
called “iron rice bowl” (tie fanwan). This urban-rural divide of the population 
was instrumental to the achievement of the targets of China’s 
industrialisation. The immobility of the peasants was functional to extract 
and accumulate the natural resources needed to develop the urban areas of a 
predominantly rural economy. The structure was combined with a system of 
household residency controls by local police and neighbourhood 
committees, so that illegal migrants to urban areas would not only be unable 
to work, but also be deprived of permanent residence and the right to 
                                                          
277 The weak legal basis of such an all-encompassing institution has been remarked on by some 
scholars: the legal grounds of the hukou system is to this day a regulation passed by NPC Standing 
Committee and not by the National People’s Congress in plenary session (Josephs 2011: 298). 
278 For a comprehensive account of the danwei system see Bray 2005. 
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receive food (Walder 1986: 37-8). As a result of this, the hukou system 
developed into a system of resource allocation which institutionally excluded 
rural residents from the benefits available to urban citizens (Wang 2005: 45).  
The way in which this system combined migration controls with the 
denial of nourishment and welfare to sanction mobile individuals without 
authorisation is an exemplary illustration of the Foucauldian notion of 
biopolitics mentioned in Chapter I. In the twenty years which followed the 
establishment of the hukou system, rural-urban migration was by and large 
eradicated from the Chinese socio-political space.279  
During the Cultural Revolution period, the breakdown of the central 
authority eased China’s internal borders between rural and urban areas. In 
the 1970s, following an anti-urban revolutionary ideology, millions of cadres, 
teachers and students were sent to the countryside on a rotating basis; the 
revolutionary chaos enabled illegal rural migrants to move to the cities and 
be employed by urban enterprises on temporary contracts, meaning these 
migrants had to return to the villages when their jobs came to an end (Davin 
1999: 13). Remarkably, the new 1975 Constitution removed the right to 
freedom of establishment for Chinese citizens.280 As a result of tight mobility 
controls between the 1950s and 1979, the amount of population de facto 
residing in a location different from their de jure residence (where they were 
“supposed” to be) was extremely small. In the early 1980s it was only 0.6 per 
cent of the total population (Chan 2009: 201).  The state control over the 
allocation of resources in both rural and urban areas guaranteed the fixity of 
China’s population to its assigned urban or rural areas. As already 
mentioned, this organisation of the population, impacting on the physical 
                                                          
279 Despite scholarly description of the period between 1949 until 1978 as “static decades”, migration 
within China continued during this time. The reason why it is often not considered as such is that it 
was mainly involuntary, mandated by state planning for a host of reasons (Lary 1999: 31). Moreover, 
even though movement from rural areas to the cities was strictly prohibited, movement between 
different rural areas or from “a higher to a lower city” was tolerated (Ibid: 42-3). 
280 To these days, this right is still absent from the Chinese Constitution. 
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needs of the population in a bio-political fashion, was instrumental to the 
achievement of the targets of China’s industrialisation during the planned 
economy system. While this policy successfully managed to prevent the 
overpopulation of cities and served the purposes of planned-economy 
industrialisation, it locked rural residents in the countryside. By regulating 
and determining the life chances of Chinese citizens along the urban and 
rural distinction, the hukou system instituted a first-class citizenship for 
urban hukou holders and second-class citizenship for rural hukou holders 
(Chan 1994: 135; Solinger 1999: 7; Wang 2005: xii; Chan and Buckingham 
2008: 582).  
7. “Letting migrants move” 
A new migration wave started in the 1980s following the Open Up and 
Reform Policy. At its beginnings, internal mobility in China took off mainly 
in relation to state pilot projects. The most common example is the creation 
of Special Economic Zones where the violation of some nationwide laws 
was exceptionally allowed so as to experiment with capitalist market 
economy.281 Such experimenting, combined with the 1978–82 agricultural 
reforms, enabled many rural workers to migrate to the cities in search of 
work, and cities to accept them on the condition that they would provide for 
their own daily food staples.282 Rural mobility to the cities supplied the newly 
built industrial areas with a cheap and flexible labour force.  
                                                          
281关于授权深圳市人大及人大常委及深圳市人民政府分别制定法规与规章在深圳经济特区实施的决定 
(Decision on Authorising the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, its Standing Committee and 
the Shenzhen Municipal Government to Enact Regulations and Rules which are to be implemented 
in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone ) 1 July 1992, Standing Committee of National People’s 
Congress; 立法法 (Law on Legislation) 1 July 2000, National People’s Congress, Art. 63 -65. 
282 In 1982, the establishment of the “family responsibility system” made rural families responsible for 
individual pieces of land and allowed them to trade the surplus left over after paying the grain tax on 
the open market. This reform made agricultural production more effective and generated a surplus of 
workers in the countryside (Zhang 2013a: 146). 
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In 1984 the practice of mobility of rural hukou holders migrating to the 
cities for work was recognised in the law through the category of hukou with 
self-supplied food grain (zilikouliang hukou), enabling rural residents to move 
to urban areas upon condition that they could provide for their own food 
rations.283 In 1985, the government further issued Provisional Regulations 
which officially allowed migration to small cities and introduced a temporary 
urban-resident permit (zanzhuzheng) for those temporarily moving to cities 
for business or employment purposes.284 Remarkably, the preamble of such 
Regulations begins with the consideration that, as the country has embarked 
on a new path of economic reforms and internal migration has developed, 
temporary residence permits will better “suit the needs of the new model of 
development”. In the same year, ID cards for Chinese citizens were 
introduced, allowing citizens to be individually identifiable instead of having 
to rely on their collective hukou registration. In doing so, this new measure 
implicitly entitled Chinese citizens to more autonomy to move.285  
The transition from planned economy to a socialist market economy 
made the systematic control of human mobility across China’s internal 
borders financially onerous and hardly viable for the government, which 
could not rely anymore on the distribution of staple food and job 
opportunities, which now circulated freely on the market, to deter internal 
movement. Yet, restriction was now achieved through policies encouraging 
rural hukou holders to “leave the land but not the village” (litu bu lixiang) and 
“enter the factory but not the city” (jinchang bu jincheng). The steady supply of 
cheap rural labour in the city was seen as temporary and easily dischargeable 
in times of economic contraction. As Xu argues, rural migrant labour 
                                                          
283关于农民进入集镇落户问题的通知 (Notification on the Question of Peasants Entering Towns) 13 
October 1984, State Council. 
284公安部关于城镇暂住人口管理的暂行规定(Provisional Regulations on the Management of the 
Population Living Temporarily in Cities and Towns) 13 July 1985,  Ministry of Public Security.  
285中华人民共和国居民身份证条例 (Regulations on Resident Identity Card in the People’s Republic 
of China) 6 September 1985, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Art. 6. 
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became a “living policy instrument” to achieve China’s GDP growth and 
improve the living conditions of the national population as a whole (Xu 
2009: 40). Deng Xiaoping’s policy slogan orienting the management of 
migration was that “everything should be centred on economic 
development” (yiqie yi jingji wei zhong).  At this stage, migration from rural 
areas to the urban centres was simultaneously allowed for economic reasons 
yet still considered a security issue. For example, the practice of random 
police checks of residential permits and the detention and repatriation of 
undocumented migrants, which had been a major instrument for controlling 
rural-to-urban migration during Maoism, was consolidated into law by a 
1982 Regulation.286 Mobility from rural to urban areas did not normally entail 
any permanent hukou relocation due to the extremely low rural-to-urban 
hukou relocation (nongzhuanfei) quota set by the central government (0.15 
percent of the total population in the cities per annum, later increased to 0.2 
percent in the mid-1980s) (Wang 2005: 50). At this stage, the state 
simultaneously profited from and controlled internal mobility. This strategy 
resulted in a mode of governmentality that was directed at ‘making the cities 
live’ and develop economically but only letting migrants ‘move’ (Xu 2009: 
42).  
During the reform era, occasionally the government reversed the general 
tendency of relaxing the hukou system. For instance, at the end of the 1980s, 
urban employment outside of state planning was reduced and unauthorised 
changes from rural to urban hukou were prohibited (Ibid: 52).  In spite of 
occasional restrictions, the trend of liberalising China’s internal borders 
continued steadily as China’s rural hukou holders kept moving to urban areas 
where their labour was in high demand. Wang has argued that especially 
after 1978, the legal measures enacted by the government have in fact been 
rectifications by the Chinese government “to recognise and accommodate 
the spontaneous bending of the hukou system by millions of citizens in the 
                                                          
286城市流浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法(Regulations on Vagrants and Beggars management in cities) 12 
May 1982, State Council. 
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form of floating population and unauthorised internal migration” (Wang 
2005: 49).  
8. From “blocking” to “channelling” migration 
The year 1994 marked a policy shift with the Ministry of Labour issuing 
Temporary Regulations which for the first time acknowledged migration as a 
legitimate activity and shifted from a policy of “blocking” migration to a 
strategy of “channelling” the movement in an orderly way in the official 
language (Xiang 2007: 5). The regulations envisaged the institution of a 
number of permits, such as temporary residence permits (zanzhuzheng) and 
occupation permits (liudong jiuyezheng).287 Although the original reason for the 
institution of residence and work permits was to better control migrant 
flows and preserve social stability, the management of migration created a 
whole “economy of migrants” (mingong jingli) for local governments and 
bureaus, (Xu 2009: 47-8) which began to capitalise on migration in various 
ways. On the one hand, the levies paid by migrants for these permits were 
seen by local city governments as a return for their additional work of 
migration management (Ibid: 6). On the other hand, rural migrants were de 
facto turned into a source of profit for local urban authorities (Solinger 
1999: 86-91). It was also very easy for the latter to get rid of migrants as 
whenever they wished to decrease the number of rural migrants, they could 
stop dispensing the permits and by doing so, bluntly make the migrants 
“illegal” to be put in detention and deported (Xiang 2007: 6).  Further, the 
management of migration by local governments should be seen in the 
context of a fiscal and administrative devolution of powers to local 
governments which began in the 1990s (and to this day is at the origin of the 
great diversity of local regulations governing China’s internal borders).  
                                                          
287农村劳动力跨省流动就业管理暂行规定(Temporary Regulations for Inter-Provincial Migration of 
Rural Labourers) 17 November 1994, Ministry of Labour (now invalid). 
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Apart from profiting from levies on work and other types of temporary 
permits for internal migrants, in the early 1990s, faced with income scarcity 
and granted greater autonomy in fiscal policy, many local governments 
started to sell city hukou as a way of accumulating funds to develop 
infrastructures (Wang 1997: 160). This bluntly profit-oriented approach to 
migration management by local governments did not end with the central 
government’s prohibition of direct sale of hukou.  The central government 
approach was itself very ambiguous and continued to be caught between 
two conflicting factors: increasing cheap labour demand in urban areas and 
limited welfare and facilities in big cities (He 2003: 183).  
Although direct sale of hukou was banned, the indirect sale and purchase 
of hukou continued under the practice of granting blue seal hukou (lanyin 
hukou), introduced in the early 1990s by large cities such as Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou. 288  As the local regulations stated, this legal 
instruments were introduced to better suit “the needs of a construction of a 
socialist market economy” and advance economic and social progress. 289 
Blue seal hukou regulations are characterized by different local criteria for 
hukou acquisition through real estate purchase or investment and exist only 
at the level of local (provincial or metropolitan) policies. This type of hukou 
entitle their holders to a host of welfare benefits in the place of destination 
and can be obtained by making a big investment or a purchase of residential 
property which meet certain criteria. Additionally, the blue booklet is 
convertible to a permanent local hukou after some years of regular residence. 
                                                          
288 In other cities (i.e. Wenzhou in Zhejiang province) a similar type of hukou is granted to purchasers 
of property through a Green card hukou. 
289 See for example the currently effective 上海市人民政府关于修改〈上海市蓝印户口管理暂行规定〉
的 决 定  (Shanghai Government regulation amending the “Provisional Regulations on the 
management of Shanghai blue chop hukou”) 26 October 1998, Shanghai Government, Art.1; 广州市
蓝印户口管理规定 (Regulations on the management of Guangzhou blue chop hukou), 1 October 
1999, Guangzhou Government, Art.1.  
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It appears that in the case of blue seal hukou, there is a trade-off of skills 
or investment in exchange for residence and welfare rights. Commenting on 
legal reforms in Shenzhen, some have described the relation between the 
government and the people in the case of blue seal hukou as one of sale and 
purchase: on the one hand, the facilitation of inflow of talents and investors 
is aimed at an increase of production capability for Shenzhen; on the other 
hand, blue seal hukou obtained through house purchase are bluntly aimed at 
increasing sales in the real-estate market (Wang 2012: 164-5).  In 2001, the 
set migration quotas for rural-to-urban hukou relocation (nongzhuanfei) in 
small cities and towns were substituted with entry conditions decided by 
local governments (Wang 2005: 112).  Until that time, the management of 
China’s internal borders had ambivalently considered migration as a security 
phenomenon to be kept under administrative control and an economic 
resource. Motives for control ranged from ‘limited urban infrastructure’, 
‘disorder’, ‘difficulty in social identification’, to ‘protecting the employment 
of laid off workers’ in the cities (Wang 2010 in Zhang 2013b: 169).  
The most important policy shift towards a de-securitisation of internal 
migration in official language happened in late 2002 at the Sixteenth 
National Congress of the CCP (Zhang 2013b: 169). At the latter, the new 
leadership led by Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao drew attention on 
“disadvantaged groups” (ruoshi qunti), of whom rural migrants are a major 
share, and promoted the notion of “putting people in the centre” 
(yirenweiben) and constructing a “well-off” (xiaokang) and “harmonious 
society” (hexie shehui).290 In January 2003, the State Council issued another 
key document on internal migrants291 which for the first time stressed the 
positive economic effects of rural to urban migration for both rural migrants 
                                                          
290中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会 (Sixteenth Congress of Chinese Communist Party), September 
2002. 
291 As already mentioned, State Council directives are more authoritative and effective than any law 
or rule issued by ministries.  
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and the economic and social prosperity of Chinese cities.292 Together with 
the statement of the 2002 CCP Congress, this document testifies a shift in 
the official language on migration which is more remarkable than those of 
1984 and 1994. Not only since for the first time the positive effects of 
migration were acknowledged, but also because it placed migrants “at the 
centre” (Xiang 2007: 6). It marked the beginning of a shift from conceiving 
of the mobility of rural migrants as a mere instrument to achieve GDP 
growth to an approach aimed at serving migrants and protecting their rights, 
lives and wellbeing. This governmental move should be seen as part of a 
broader strategy to attain “overall state strength, national rejuvenation and 
happiness of the people” (Xu 2009: 40).  
A further step in the direction of achieving an harmonious society was 
the 2003 abolition of detention and repatriation measures for internal 
migrants caught without papers following the outcry over the Sun Zhigang 
case (Ibid). Sun Zhigang was a university graduate who had migrated to 
Guangzhou for employment and was waiting to receive his temporary job 
permit. However, caught without a valid permit by the police, Sun was put 
into a detention facility and was found beaten to death there three days 
later. 293  Following the public upheaval of this case, the State Council 
repealed the 1982 legislation prescribing detention measures for illegal 
migrants, which currently only applies to beggars and vagrants.294  
                                                          
292国务院办公厅关于做好农民进城务工就业管理和服务工作的通知(Notification on Improving the 
Work of Managing and Providing Services to Peasants Who Move to Cities for Work) 12 April 2003, 
State Council, subsection 1.   
293 The Sun Zhigang case represents a landmark case in China’s judicial history more in general, 
triggering debates over the question of the constitutionality of the Custody and Repatriation 
regulations, as well as the proportionality and reviewability of administrative punishments. 孙志刚刑
事 案 件  (Sun Zhigang Criminal Case), 9 June 2003,Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court 
http://www.gzcourt.org.cn/ Accessed 25 May 2013.  
294城市生活无着的流浪乞讨人员救助管理办法 (Regulations on Relief and Management of Vagrants 
and Beggars in Cities) 20 June 2003, State Council.  
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In 2006, some Opinions stated that the problems facing rural migrants 
working in cities and making an important contribution to the country’s 
modernisation had to be resolved through rights’ awareness promotion, 
training and employment.295 In a similar vein, the promulgation of a new 
Labour Contract law in 2008296 was aimed at promoting the practice of giving 
migrant workers written contracts and strengthening their labour protections 
(Ibid: 51).297 It could be argued that while the principle “economic growth 
first” had in the past entailed local governments’ capitalisation on migration 
and work and residence permits, in the 2000s the open pursuit of the same 
principle led the government to finally acknowledge the economic 
contribution that rural to urban migration had made to China’s economic 
miracle. This move towards a promotion of the well-being of rural migrants 
should also be seen in the context of the government’s pursuit of legitimacy 
through the promotion of a harmonious society.  
At the same time, economic performance remains the very foundation of 
the national objective of an “harmonious existence” and currently 
constitutes the basis of the CCP’s legitimacy. Again in 2006, another 
discriminatory use of the hukou system was mitigated. Until then, insurance 
compensation policies based their compensation on the different hukou type 
of client: individuals suffering the same injury or death were treated 
differently, for example, in case of death, the family of a rural hukou victim 
was compensated between half to one-third of that of an urban hukou victim 
(Wang 2010: 92-93). Following widespread public criticism of this flagrant 
discrimination, in 2006 the government this practice was amended so that all 
                                                          
295国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见 (国发 [2006]5 号 ) (Several Opinions on Solving the 
Problems facing Peasant Migrants) Document No. 5, 31 January 2006, State Council, preamble.  
296中华人民共和国劳动合同法 (Labour Contract Law of the People's Republic of China), 1 January 
2008, Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No.65. 
297 The 2008 Labour Contract Law was issued after a 1994 Labour Law failed to improve the 
employment conditions of migrants, especially the lack of stipulation of labour contracts.  
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victims of airline-related or government-caused unjust injuries or deaths 
would be awarded the same sums (Ibid: 93).298  
9. Hukou reforms and enduring institutional exclusion in China’s 
megacities 
In 2010, the gradual establishment of a residence permit system across 
the country was set as a target for the future.299 In 2011, a Notice re-stated the 
need for equal rights and interests between local urban residents and rural 
populations registered as permanent in cities and towns. 300  In parallel, a 
series of pilot projects across the country experimented with reforms of the 
hukou system at a local level. These included the erasure of the distinction 
between urban and rural status within the same municipality,301 the granting 
of 10 years’ residential cards conferring urban benefits and welfare,302 and 
the total abolition of the distinction.303 After this experimentation, a 2014 
                                                          
298 However, the implementation of this system at the local level might still preserve discrimination. 
For instance, in order to receive the same compensation as urban residents, rural victims of traffic 
accidents in Shenzhen must have lived in Shenzhen for at least one year and have “a stable income” 
at the time of the accident (Wang 2010: 93). 
299国务院批转发展改革委关于 2010 年深化经济体制改革重点工作意见的通知(Opinions about 2010 
Deepening of the economic system reform: main working point) 27 May 2010, State Council.  
300国务院办公厅关于积极稳妥推进户籍管理制度改革的通知(Notification on Actively and Steadily 
Promoting the Reform of the Household Registration System) 26 February 2011, State Council.  
301 See for example Chengdu and Chongqing 中共成都市委成都市人民政府关于全域成都城乡统一户
籍实现居民自由迁徙的意见 (Opinion on a unified hukou registration system for the whole Chengdu 
municipality carrying out residents’ freedom to migrate) 9 November 2010, Chengdu CPC Central 
Committee and Chengdu Municipal Government; 重庆市人民政府关于统筹城乡户籍制度改革的意见 
(Opinion on reforming the hukou system as a whole in urban rural areas) 29 July 2010, Chongqing 
Municipal Government. 
302 See for example Shenzhen 深圳市居住证暂行办法 (Interim Measures of Residential Cards in 
Shenzhen) 20 May 2008, Shenzhen Municipal Government. 
303 See for example Fujian Shandong and Liaoning provinces 福建省人民政府批转省公安厅关于户籍
管理制度改革意见的通知(Notification on the Opinion submitted by the Municipal Public Security 
Bureau regarding the Administration of Hukou System Reform) 25 December 2001, Fujian Municipal 
government; 山东省人民政府办公厅转发省公安厅关于进一步深化户籍管理制度改革的意见的通知 
(Notification on transmitting the Public Security Bureau Opinion regarding a further deepening of 
hukou system reform) 12 August 2004, Shandong Municipal Government; 辽宁省深化户籍管理制度
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Opinion set nationwide standards for a hukou reform to be implemented by 
provincial governments according to their local circumstances and size. The 
Opinion mandates local governments to eliminate the distinction between 
rural and non-rural hukou type304 and prescribes a unitary system of residence 
permits for non-local hukou in large cities.305 It further introduces the full 
release of hukou restrictions in small towns and cities and a relaxation of the 
conditions in medium sized cities (500,000 to one million inhabitants) and in 
large cities (1-3 million inhabitants).  
Significantly, the Opinion maintains strict control over the migrant 
population of megacities (with more than 5 million inhabitants, de facto the 
wealthiest cities in China). The latter are urged to curb migration through 
points systems granting urban-welfare privileges strictly to the highly 
educated and the wealthy few.306 This restriction reflects the governmental 
will to control the pace of urbanisation in big cities to avoid social 
instability, 307 selecting desirable migrants once again according to their 
economic worth. As of May 2016, as many as 29 provincial level regions had 
relaxed restrictions on hukou with different modalities, according to their size 
and local circumstances.308 Meanwhile, the 2014 Opinion’s erasure of the legal 
distinction between rural and urban migrants is to be conceived as both a 
substantive progress and a semantic reform whose impact remains to be 
seen. 
                                                                                                                                               
改革若干 规定(A number of Regulations deepening the reform of the Administration of hukou system) 
20 April 2009, Liaoning Municipal Government. 
304关于进一步推进户 籍 制 度 改 革 的 意 见 (Opinion on Promoting the Advancement of the Reform 
of the Hukou System) 30 July 2014, State Council, subsection 9. 
305 Supra, subsection 10. 
306 Supra, subsection 7. 
307 Megalophobia: China’s biggest cities are afraid of growing bigger. They should not be. The 
Economist, 30 April 2016 http://www.economist.com/news/china/21697871-chinas-biggest-cities-are-
afraid-growing-bigger-they-should-not-be-megalophobia Accessed 1 May 2016 
308 29 省份出台户籍改革方案 部分地区放宽落户条件 (29 provinces officially launch household 
registration reform plans, some localities relax restrictions on the requirements to settle hukou), 
Xinhua, 29 April 2016 http://news.xinhuanet.com/city/2016-04/29/c_128943564.htm  Accessed 29 
April 2016 
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The improvement of the welfare of rural hukou holders has been pursued. 
In 2002, a rural health insurance programme was created to partially bridge 
the gap in welfare benefits between rural and urban hukou. 309  The 
programme envisaged protection in old age and sickness for rural hukou 
holders. In 2007, the minimum living standard guarantee (dibao), previously a 
prerogative of the urban hukou holder, was extended to the rural poor.310  
This was followed by the introduction of a rural pension system in 2009.311 
The 2010 Social Insurance Law312 importantly extended coverage of key urban 
welfare benefits (protection in old age, illness, work injury, unemployment 
and maternity leave) to all rural migrant with labour contracts working in 
cities. Yet, statistics show that the implementation of this scheme remains 
patchy.313 Low numbers are due to a host of reasons which range from rural 
migrants’ lack of a labour contract to local governments’ lack of financial 
capacities to fund such programmes or fear of upsetting local industries, to 
the lack of portability of such funds between jurisdictions for migrants.314 
Legislation and policy documents by the central government have 
                                                          
309 关于进一步加强农村卫生工作的决定 (Decisions on the strengthening of the rural health system) 
29 October 2002, State Council.  
310  国务院关于在全国建立农村最低生活保障制度的通知  (Notification of the State Council on 
Establishing the Rural Minimum Living Standard Security System across the Country）, 11 July 
2007, State Council. 
311 国务院关于建立统一的城乡居民基本养老保险制度的意见 (Opinions of the State Council on 
Establishing a Unified Basic Pension Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents), 21 February 
2014, State Council. 
State Council.  
312 中华人民共和国社会保险法 (Social Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China), 28 October 
2010,  Standing Committee of National People's Congress. 
313 As of 2016, the extra urban benefits prescribed by the 2016 Law have not been extended to most 
migrant workers. According to ILO statistics, only 30 per cent or rural migrants were covered by 
insurance for employment injury, and below 20 per cent for old-age pensions and health. See 
“Extending social protection to rural migrants”, ILO, September 2016 
http://www.socialprotection.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=53859 
Accessed 20 December 2016 
314 The lack of transferability of social contributions is perhaps the major disincentive for migrant 
workers to join the social security system, resulting in less cash-in-hand and limited benefits only 
accessible on the site. http://www.chinoiresie.info/migrant-labour-and-the-sustainability-of-chinas-
welfare-system/  Accessed 8 June 2017 
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nonetheless been steadily promoting the inclusion of rural migrant workers 
into the urban social security system. In 2013, a government policy set the 
target of a gradual merging of the urban and rural residents’ health insurance 
system. In 2014 the pension insurance systems for urban and rural residents 
were unified.315  
Despite all these positive changes, the institutional exclusion of millions 
of internal migrants working in China’s megacities endures. A particularly 
pressing issue is the lack of access to free education for migrant children in 
large cities. A report estimated that as many as 61 million children (one fifth 
of all children in China)316 are forced by this system to grow up in rural areas 
while their parents work in urban areas. Prompted by growing public 
concern, the government has recently promulgated a directive restating the 
laws against children’s abandonment and prompting local authorities to 
protect left-behind children.317 These legal measures however fail to address 
the core of the matter, that is, the impossibility for the children of rural 
migrant workers to access free education in the cities.  
Over the years, the concern with rural migrants’ well-being has been 
further combined in media and official discourse with their portrayal as 
vulnerable individuals doomed to poor living and working conditions. This 
phenomenon has also led many stakeholders, such as the Party, intellectuals, 
domestic and international NGOs, to speak out on behalf of rural migrants 
(Xu 2009: 53-4).318 This discourse is part of a broader narrative according to 
which rural migrants and peasants have a low individual quality (suzhi) and 
                                                          
315国务院关于建立统一的城乡居民基本养老保险制度的意见 (Decision on developing a unified 
pension system for all urban and rural residents), 21 April 2014, State Council.  
316  Counting the cost of China’s left-behind children. BBC News, 12 April 2016 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35994481 Accessed 25 May 2016 
317 加强农村留守儿童关爱保护工作的意见 (Opinions on strengthening the work showing concern for 
the protection of rural left-behind children) 14 February 2016, State Council. 
318 As remarked on in relation to the case of refugees in the European context, any categorisation of 
migrant individuals as vulnerable or victims is problematic as it deprives such individuals of political 
and legal agency.  
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are in need of improvement. 319  From this perspective, the government 
would bear the responsibility of “turning migrants outwardly but also 
inwardly into ‘urbanites’” (Ibid: 56). The distinction between individuals 
with low quality and those with high quality has a key function in regulating 
the conduct of rural migrants within current processes of citizenship by 
contributing to “understandings of the responsibilities, obligations, claims, 
and rights that connect members of society to the state” (Jacka 2009: 534). 
According to Yan, the improvement of rural migrants’ low quality by way of 
being urbanised, better instructed, and more trained for the market is 
functional for the government to maintain control over what would 
otherwise be a free labour market potentially disruptive for the social order 
(Hairong 2003: 510).  
It should be further emphasised that while the protection of rights and 
welfare of rural migrants has become a key concern in the official language, 
the implementation of such progressive legislation has been very uneven. 
Gallagher has advanced the hypothesis that in the field of labour law, the 
“suboptimal” implementation of migrant workers’ legal protections is a 
deliberate governmental choice to maximise both political and market 
demands (Gallagher 2016: 8).  In other words, the state would have 
delegated the implementation of new rights protections to workers 
themselves. Through the media and propaganda, the state promotes 
awareness of labour rights in order to trigger bottom-up legal mobilisation 
(Ibid).  
Studies examining the understanding of law among migrant workers have 
further questioned the notion that the strengthening of the rule of law 
                                                          
319 Suzhi is a fundamental keyword of contemporary Chinese popular and official discourses. The 
word refers to "the innate and nurtured physical, psychological, intellectual, moral, and ideological 
qualities of human bodies and their conduct" (Jacka 2009: 534). It is currently referred to as a 
measure for the "quality" of individuals and divides individuals into those with low suzhi and those 
with high suzhi. The discourse around this word has been fundamental in post-socialist modes of 
governmentality in China. 
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necessarily improves the legal status of rural migrant workers in China’s 
megacities (He et al. 2012: 36-7). In the place of a national system dividing 
the city from countryside, the de-securitisation of China’s internal borders 
appears to be headed towards a scenario of free movement combined with a 
net of localised internal borders separating regions and urban areas by 
producing locally determined “entry conditions” for rural migrants (Wang 
2010: 97). As Wang has argued, 
Instead of a national Great Wall dividing city from 
countryside, the hukou system has evolved into many legal 
walls separating regions and cities by creating locally 
determined “entry conditions” for migrants. The various 
“hukou for money and talent” schemes addressed the 
mobility needs for the rich and well placed, while presiding 
over large rural–urban and regional gaps in a China with new 
internal brain and capital drains. (…) The hukou system, far 
from being abolished, is being commercialised, localised and 
differentiated. It continues to function as a multitude of 
floodgates while developing new flood-discharging channels 
with spontaneous cracks and leaks. Without some tectonic 
shift of political power, the system is likely to remain a major 
source of both control and conflict in the PRC (Wang 2010: 
97).  
Over the last fifty years or so China’s internal borders as demarcated by 
the hukou system have undergone a process of de-securitisation. From an 
initial conception of rural to urban migration as a phenomenon which had 
to be severely restricted to serve the development of the socialist nation, 
since the 1980s policies and legislation have gradually shifted to an attitude 
of allowing internal mobility, which has been key in feeding the 
development of China’s urban centres with cheap labour. As illustrated 
throughout this section, the relaxation of China’s internal borders entertains 
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a close relationship with the government’s pursuit of economic growth 
under the new conditions of market economy after 1978. The latter 
prompted millions of rural hukou holders to vote with their feet by leaving 
the countryside to pursue better life opportunities in cities. At the outset of 
China’s transition to market economy such mobility was ambivalently 
sanctioned and allowed at the same time to suit the economies of China’s 
cities. This governmental approach was centred on maximising economic 
development of the country as a whole at the expense of migrant workers’ 
exploitation based on their unequal status. I observed how since then, the 
official language on rural migrants has evolved into an acknowledgement of 
migrant workers’ key contribution to China’s economic development and 
into an attitude of promotion of rights and well-being. I also showed that 
this new governmental approach is not without contradictions and 
ambiguities. The most striking one is that while currently China’s internal 
borders allow Chinese citizens to move and establish in a preferred location, 
and their role and economic contribution is acknowledged in official 
documents, the borders demarcated by the hukou system still silently follow 
rural migrants moving to China’s largest and most desired cities in the form 
of a lack of access to welfare benefits which confines them to a second-class 
citizenship status.  
 
PART III. HISTORY OF CHINA’S EXTERNAL BORDERS  
Analogously to the case of internal borders, the management of 
migration across China’s international borders has undergone numerous 
shifts since 1949. One of the most peculiar features is that such management 
also pertained to the mobility of Chinese nationals. While the right of 
emigration is considered as a given in most countries in the world, this has 
not been the case until recently in China. As in other socialist systems, until 
the 1980s emigration was considered as an act of desertion in the PRC. The 
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limitation of the right to leave and return to China was closely related to the 
same static logic underlying the hukou system. This situation progressively 
loosened after the launch of economic reforms. China has never had as 
many citizens overseas as at this historical juncture. According to the latest 
statistics available, in 2015 the number of overseas Chinese (huaqiao) 320 
reached 60 million. 321  While until a few decades ago emigration was 
perceived as an act of desertion, currently the act of emigrating in pursuit of 
better education, work or investment opportunities has turned into a 
patriotic gesture towards the country’s economic development.  
Although China predominantly remains a country of emigration, since 
the 1980s it has also become a migrant destination country.  The ratio of 
foreign migrants compared to the national population remains extremely 
small when compared to that of other migration countries or to China’s 
internal migrants, which remain the government’s main priority. Despite 
these small numbers, over the last few decades international migration has 
undergone a monumental increase. In 1978, only 229,600 foreign nationals 
had crossed the Chinese border as a consequence of China’s closed-door 
policy, Western embargoes and UN sanctions (Liu 2011: 3). As a result of 
the Open Up and Reform Policy, China’s external borders have been 
liberalised and the numbers of foreign nationals in China have grown 
exponentially. According to the latest statistics available, in 2014 almost 53 
million foreign nationals entered China and 663,556 of them held residence 
permits with more than six months’ validity. 322  On the other hand, 
permanent residents in China are very rare due to the strict criteria for 
acquisition. Similarly, the naturalisation of foreign nationals has been 
extremely uncommon and has been granted to very few foreigners since the 
                                                          
320 The term huaqiao includes both Chinese citizens abroad and foreign nationals of Chinese 
descent living outside the People's Republic of China. 
321 International Organisation for Migration on migration in China. https://www.iom.int/countries/china 
Accessed 21 August 2017. 
322China Overview of migration activities, International Organisation for Migration report. Available at 
https://www.iom.int/countries/china Accessed 13 April 2016 
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inception of the People’s Republic in 1949. The following section provides 
an historical account of the main policies and laws regulating mobility of 
Chinese citizens and foreigners across the PRC international borders since 
1949.  
10. The ban on the emigration of Chinese nationals during Mao’s era 
Between the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and 1978 the act of 
exiting the country for Chinese citizens was strictly controlled. At the outset, 
China’s door to the outer world was mostly closed in order to give priority 
to the consolidation of the new government (Liu 2007: 134). Although to 
exit the country Chinese citizens had to apply for an overseas Chinese exit 
permit,323 in the period from 1949 to 1957 freedom of movement was still 
recognised in the statutes.324 During this time, hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic Chinese, many of whom were fleeing anti-Chinese policies and ethnic 
violence in Southeast Asia, returned to China. 325  Upon return, Chinese 
overseas were assigned to a specific overseas Chinese legal status. Overseas 
Chinese farms (huaqiao nonchang) were also created to separate the huaqiao 
community from the rest of the population (Ford 2014: 243-244). The 
return of Chinese overseas to contribute to China’s modernisation was a 
primary legislative objective for the government and for this reason 
immediate relatives of Chinese overseas and returned Chinese were granted 
preferential treatments (Thunø 2001: 914). However, these preferential 
policies were revoked at the end of the 1950s (Ibid). Movement across 
external borders for Chinese nationals was restricted. At the end of the 
1950s, the existing rules were repealed and the Ministry of Public Security 
                                                          
323 华侨出入国境暂行办法 (Provisional Measures on the Exit and Entry National Borders of Overseas 
Chinese) 2 August 1951, Ministry of Public Security, Art. 4. 
324中华人民共和国宪法(Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) 20 September 1954, National 
People’s Congress, Art. 90.  
325 After the establishment of the Communist Party in China, anti-Chinese sentiment developed 
across South-East Asian countries as both a consequence of anti-Communist sentiments 
disseminated by the Cold War and a long-rooted antagonism towards overseas Chinese, often 
perceived by locals as economically better off (Ford 2014: 245). 
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proclaimed further limitations on Chinese citizens’ exit and entry (Liu 2007: 
138).  
During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), legal 
movement across external borders was denied to both Chinese citizens and 
former overseas Chinese. 326  Citizens who lodged an application to travel 
outside China or overseas Chinese wanting to enter China were suspected of 
treason and collusion with foreign states to conspire against China. As a 
result, many of them desisted from applying to enter or exit the country 
(Ibid: 138-139). In the 1970s a one-nationality policy, which remains in force 
today, was further introduced to instigate overseas Chinese to give up their 
Chinese nationality out of concern that dissatisfied components among 
Chinese emigrants could organise in counterpart groups for dissident 
activities within China (Ibid: 139). While there were practically no 
applications for exit and entry for private affairs, the political chaos and 
hazards characterising the decade of the Cultural Revolution prompted 
irregular emigration in the form of refugees (Ibid). At this stage, the socialist 
state system considered emigration as “defection and tantamount to 
admitting its own failure” (Nyíri 2002: 221).  
11. Emigration of Chinese citizens in the reform era 
Following the Open Up and Reform Policy, radical reforms to China’s 
external borders were progressively introduced. Analogous to what 
happened to the borders of the hukou system, the economic reforms 
gradually loosened borders for Chinese citizens and overseas Chinese. In 
1980, Regulations on Passport and Visa stipulated that Chinese citizens, 
overseas Chinese and aliens who wanted to exit Chinese borders could do so 
upon application for an exit visa.327 The Regulations further conferred upon 
                                                          
326 As already observed in the case of China’s internal borders, this stance is reflected in the removal 
of the right to freedom of movement from the newly drafted 1975 Constitution. 
327 Supra, Art. 9.  
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Chinese citizens with specific credentials the right to obtain a passport.328 In 
order to get a passport, citizens had to undergo complex procedures, such as 
gaining approval from the work unit, submitting household registration 
evidence, an invitation from overseas as well as evidence of sufficient 
financial means for the duration of the visit. Citizens working for the 
government or a State-Owned Enterprise, the only ones who could really 
afford to travel abroad, had to go through an even stricter scrutiny process. 
As a result, the Regulations kept deterring almost all individuals who were 
likely to exit the state from doing so (Ibid: 141) Remarkably, it was even 
harder to acquire a passport if the person was a member of the Communist 
Party (Ibid).  
In 1980 the Law of Nationality confirmed the one-nationality policy that 
had been in force since the establishment of the People’s Republic.329 At the 
same time, a number of policies reintroducing a privileged status for the 
relatives of Chinese overseas and returned overseas Chinese were 
implemented to attract remittances and investments from Chinese overseas 
(Thunø 2001: 914-5). In the newly drafted 1982 Constitution, the legitimate 
rights and interests of returnees, Chinese overseas and their relatives were 
recognised by the law (Ibid).330In the 1980s, various political bodies were 
revived or created with the double purpose of connecting with overseas 
Chinese and protecting the interests of returned overseas Chinese and their 
family members (Nyíri 2002: 211-212, Thunø 2001: 916). In 1984 a number 
of measures recognised the legitimate right to exit China for Chinese 
                                                          
328 中华人民共和国护照签证条例 (Regulations on Passport and Visa of the People’s Republic of 
China) 13 May 1980, State Council. 
329中华人民共和国国籍法 (Law of Nationality of the People’s Republic of China) 10 September 1980, 
National People’s Congress, Art. 3 
330中华人民共和国宪法 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China) 4 December 1982, National 
People's Congress, Art. 50 
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citizens.331 Nevertheless, following the old ideological mindset, several local 
authorities did not implement these reforms (Liu 2007: 140). In all, during 
the first years of economic reforms legal entries and exits across China’s 
border witnessed a remarkable increase, from 1.88 million people in 1978 to 
12.8 million in 1984 (Ibid: 142). The right to enter and exit China for 
Chinese citizens in qualified terms was enshrined in a 1985 Law on the 
Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens and its implementation measures.332 
However, due to the lack of integration of this law into subsequent policies, 
its initial implementation was inconsistent and uneven (Ibid: 148).  
In 1990, a Protection Law defending the economic privileges for returned 
Chinese and the dependents of overseas Chinese was promulgated as a tool 
to grow China’s developing market economy.333 Throughout the 1990s, the 
implementation of the 1985 Exit and Entry law was undertaken through a 
number of policies including the elimination of the need for submitting an 
invitation from abroad to exit China and the possibility of applying for a 
passport without the need for a permit from the work unit (Liu 2007: 146). 
By the late 1990s, China’s policies of reaching out to ethnic Chinese by 
appealing to common ethnicity while simultaneously offering privileged 
investment conditions turned out to be very profitable (Ibid: 926-7). 
Between 2002 and 2005, further reforms were promoted, first through pilot 
projects and trial implementations. These included a “passport on demand 
policy”, allowing citizens to apply for a passport by simply presenting their 
ID and hukou documents; the cancellation of the requirement of providing 
invitation letters when applying for passports; the establishment of special 
                                                          
331 For example, 公安部关于放宽隐私出国审批条件的情事 (Suggestions of the Ministry of Public 
Security on Relaxing the Conditions of Examination and Approval of Exiting China for Private Affairs) 
11 April 1984, State Council. 
332公民出境入境管理 (Law on the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens) 22 November 1985, National 
People’s Congress. 
333中华人民共和国归侨侨眷权益保护法 (Law of People’s Republic of China concerning the protection 
of the rights and interests of the returned overseas Chinese and the relatives of overseas Chinese) 7 
September 1990, National People’s Congress. 
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channels at airports for Chinese citizens; the relaxation of restrictions on 
travelling to Hong Kong and Macau, for which Chinese citizens still need a 
visa (Ibid: 150-151).  
In 2007, a Passport Law came into effect and further systematised the 
legal framework of Chinese migration law. Gradually, restrictions on exiting 
China’s external borders eased. As of 2016 most of the Chinese population 
can freely apply for a passport. Yet, the right to leave and return is still 
restricted for certain categories of people such as certain minority groups 
suspected of separatist claims (e.g. Tibetans and Uighurs), children without a 
hukou, and political dissidents (Chodorow 2015). The legal framework of 
1985 was amended by the 2013 Exit Entry and Law, regulating the exit and 
entry of both Chinese and foreigners. The law confirms that Chinese 
citizens can apply for a passport and do not need exit permits to go abroad, 
however they still need to apply for exit/entry permits to travel to or from 
Hong Kong and Macau.334 In the 2010s, a number of policy measures, such 
as permanent residence permits to attract the talent of Chinese overseas, 
have been further promulgated by cities with high-tech zones or free trade 
zones by such as Shanghai and Beijing.335  
Over the 1990s and 2000s recent Chinese migrants, those who emigrated 
in the 1980s and 1990s, have started to receive more attention from the 
Chinese government. In 1996, a Directive called for the need to focus on 
new migrants (xin yimin) as “an important rising force within overseas 
Chinese and ethnic Chinese communities” (Thunø 2001: 922).336 Different 
from the old Chinese diaspora, these individuals normally still held Chinese 
citizenship and were characterised by strong family, education and cultural 
                                                          
334中华人民共和国出境入境管理法 (The Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic 
of China) National People’s Congress, July 1, 2013, Art. 10 
335 Capital aims to woo more top-level foreign workers, China Daily, 13 January 2016 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/13/content_23058308.htm Accessed 13 April 2016 
336国务院侨办关于开展新移民工作的意见 (State Council concerning ideas on developing work with 
new migrants) 22 January 1996, State Council. 
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ties. In other words, “new” emigrants distinguish themselves by way of their 
immediate loyalty to the Chinese state (Ibid). Since the 1990s recent 
emigrants have become the main target of the government’s preferential 
policies and are currently seen as an essential force to foster China’s 
economic development and international prestige. Although many of the 
government’s directives on emigration are not public, an examination of the 
role of Chinese emigrants in internal policies and directives has been 
conducted by Nyíri by way of looking at the references made to them by 
public officials in overseas Chinese studies journals and publications (2000, 
2002, 2005). Nyíri’s analysis shows that for migration state brokers 
emigrants are currently deemed as “agents of the Chinese economy and 
polity”, instrumental to reinforcing the bond of overseas Chinese to China, 
and to improving China’s reputation in their host countries (Nyíri 2005: 155-
156). Interestingly, the language used to portray them echoes the late Maoist 
language alluding to notions of national construction, modernisation and 
patriotism and depicting emigrants as active agents of China’s ongoing 
modernisation in an era of globalisation (Ibid: 156).  
12. Protecting China from foreign influences in Mao’s era 
In her historical account of the management of foreign nationals in 
China, Brady suggests that the key to understanding China’s shifting borders 
towards foreign nationals since 1949 is Mao’s aphorism “make the foreign 
serve China”. In her view, this principle has held true regardless of the many 
forms the management of foreign nationals has assumed between 1949 and 
today (Brady 2003: 253).  As the new government perceived their presence 
in the country as a remnant of China’s long period of international 
humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialists,337 it soon proceeded “first to 
                                                          
337 Until mid-XIX century China, then an empire, had considered itself for millennia as the centre of 
the universe and had deemed other civilisations peripheral (the very term China in Mandarin, 
Zhongguo, which literally translates as “middle kingdom” reflects this worldview. Events such as the 
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clean out the rooms before inviting new guests”, as Mao had it (Ibid). Most 
foreign nationals in China voluntarily left the country or were ejected, 
imprisoned or executed. The “foreign affairs” (waishi) system established 
after 1949 drew careful distinctions between foreign nationals and Chinese 
citizens in all spheres of social life (Ibid: 249). China adopted a closed-door 
policy.  
Despite a relatively very small group compared to percentages in other 
countries, foreign nationals have occupied a special place in the process of 
China’s nation building after 1949. As representatives of the outside world 
and remainders of foreign imperialism in China, their management has been 
“an essential element in the CCP’s hold on political power” (Ibid: 253). In 
the early years, anti-foreign sentiments were emphasised to bring forces 
together to promote national reconstruction under the Communist 
government. After having “cleaned the rooms”, the regime established a 
coercive entry and exit administration system with the purpose of strictly 
controlling both the influx of foreign nationals and their activities.338 Similar 
to Chinese citizens, foreign nationals leaving China had to apply for an exit 
permit from the Public Security bureau of the municipality where they 
resided.339  
During this time, only a small number of cautiously selected foreigners – 
sympathisers with the communist regime - were allowed to reside in the 
country and strictly monitored. These individuals could live and move only 
                                                                                                                                               
Opium wars, the Taiping rebellion, the Washington treaty and the Japanese invasion of China had 
put this conception in deep crisis. 
338 外国侨民出入及居留暂行规则（Provisional Rules on the Exit, Entry and Stay of Aliens in China） 
28 November 1951, Government Administration Council; 外国侨民旅行暂行办法  (Provisional 
Measures on Travel of Aliens in China), 10 August, Ministry of Public Security; 外国侨民居留登记及
居 留 证 签 发 暂 行 办 法 (Provisional Measures on Residence Registration and the Issuance of 
Residence Certificate of Aliens in China), 10 August 1954, Ministry of Public Security; 外国侨民出境
暂行办法 (Provisional Measures on the Exit of Aliens in China), 10 August 1954, Ministry of Public 
Security. 
339 Supra, Provisional measures on the Exit of Aliens in China, 10 August 1954, Art. 2.  
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within designated areas which were separate from the indigenous 
population. Similar to Chinese citizens, foreign nationals in the country also 
had to apply for a visa for the purposes of internal travel.340 During the 
Cultural Revolution, the administration of such regulations broke down. 
Foreign nationals already in the country were practically forbidden to exit, 
while many of them were prosecuted (Liu 2011: 7).  
13. De-securitisation of foreign migrants in China   
The shift in economic policy initiated by the Open Up and Reform policy 
provided new impetus for reform and the de-securitisation of international 
migration. In 1980, Regulations on Passports and Visas implemented a new 
visa system and normalised movement across the borders. 341  In 1983, 
provisional rules to attract foreign experts, especially those of Chinese 
ethnicity, were introduced (Ibid: 10). For the first time, China began to allow 
into the country individuals with different political views: while the post-
1949 government had encouraged the migration of leftists, after 1978 the 
policy switched to welcoming as a foreign friend “anybody who was 
influential and might help China in some way” (Brady 2003: 196). In 1985 a 
Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens repealed exit visas for 
foreigners.342 The promulgation of a law regulating the presence of foreign 
nationals indicates a turn from conceiving of their presence as “politically 
marked” and to be regulated through politics to the acknowledgement of 
their presence as “a normal aspect of social life” (Pieke 2012: 60). The 
relaxation was however gradual. In the early period of economic reforms, a 
special currency for foreign nationals was created (Foreign Exchange 
Certificate). This currency restricted foreigners to the hotels, shops and 
                                                          
340外国人入境出境过境居留旅行管理条例（Regulations on the Administration of Entry, Exit, Transit, 
Residence and Travel of Aliens in China）13 April 1964, State Council, Art. 7. 
341中华人民共和国护照签证条例 (Regulations on Passport and Visa of the People’s Republic of 
China) 13 May 1980, State Council. 
342外国人入境出境管理法 (Law on Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens) 22 November 1985, 
Standing Committee of People's Congress. 
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transportation offices that accepted it (Ibid: 204). This currency was 
abolished in 1994 and in the early 1990s, the physical separation of 
foreigners from the local population gradually disappeared (Yuan-Ihle and 
Bork-Hüffer 2014: 515).  
China’s external borders underwent further liberalisation in relation to 
international migrants in the 2000s as both central and local governments 
embarked on policies aimed at attracting high-skilled foreign managers and 
investors (Liu 2011: 54). In 2002, the State Council issued Provisions 
establishing the main conditions that foreign nationals have to fulfil to be 
defined as “foreign talents”, creating special visa to simplify entry and exit 
and stipulating conditions for issuing residence permits. 343  A permanent 
residence permit scheme or “green card” for foreign nationals was 
implemented at the national level in 2004. 344  However, due to its strict 
criteria for acquisition only 7,356 foreigners were granted the card between 
2004 and 2013.345 Interestingly, more than half such permits were allotted to 
returning overseas Chinese (Ibid). Overall, it could be argued that China’s 
relaxation of its external borders has been to a significant extent driven by 
economic considerations and preferential policies for ethnic Chinese 
overseas. The goal of attracting high skilled foreign nationals was further 
pursued with the 2008 “Thousand Talents Plan” aimed at recruiting foreign 
                                                          
343 关于为外国籍高层次人才和投资者提供入境及居留便利规定 (Provisions on Providing Entry and 
Residence Conveniences to Foreign Highly Skilled Persons and Investors) 29 April 2002, State 
Council. 
344 外国人在中国永久居留审批管理办法 (Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent 
Residence of Aliens in China) 15 August 2004, State Council. 
345 New ‘green card’ to ease daily life for foreigners, China Daily, 7 February 2017 
http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/02/07/content_281475561294723.htm Accessed 3 
March 2017 
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individuals which can advance China’s economic position internationally and 
strengthen economic and social progress internally.346  
Throughout the decades, the rapid growth in the number of international 
migrants and the fact that regulations and rules adopted after 1985 often 
contradicted the 1985 legal framework and made more and more necessary a 
revision of the legal framework of the country’s external borders. As seen 
earlier in the case of internal borders, political campaigns have traditionally 
played a key role in the implementation of China’s external borders. In 2012 
a campaign targeting the so called (sanfei) “three illegals” was launched to 
crack down on illegal foreigners in all China’s major cities.347 In Beijing, the 
campaign took place between May and August 2012. During this time, the 
police carried out random visa checks on foreign nationals in public spaces 
and houses and even created a hotline for the public to call and report 
suspicious foreign nationals.348 According to some observers at the time, the 
crackdown on foreign nationals, similarly to the ones that preceded it, was 
aimed at promoting stability and stirring up nationalism in view of the 18th 
National Congress of the CCP, which was going to elect a new Politburo 
Standing Committee that year (Chodorow 2012, unpaged). As the months 
leading to this event had been characterised by a situation of political 
unease, 349  this campaign has been viewed by some as a politically 
opportunistic attempt to excite nationalistic sentiments (Ibid). Despite 
China’s overall de-securitisation of international migration over the last three 
                                                          
346 中央人才工作协调小组关于实施海外高层次人才引进计划的意见 (CCP Central Committee Small 
Group on the Coordination of Talent Work’s Opinion on Foreign Talent Regarding Implementing the 
Plan of Attracting Foreign Highly Skilled Talent), CCP Central Committee, 23 December 2008. 
347 The three illegals consist of illegal entry, work and stay of foreign nationals in the country. 
348 Perhaps significantly, the campaign was proclaimed a few days after a video of an ostensibly 
drunk British man attempting to assault a young Chinese woman and so beaten by Chinese men 
went viral and stirred up xenophobic reactions from the Chinese public. Mood darkens in Beijing 
amid crackdown on 'illegal foreigners', CNN, 25 May 2012 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/asia/china-foreigners/index.html Accessed 21 April 2016 
349 These events included the fall of Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai in early 2012, the claim by his 
police chief, Wang Lijun, for asylum at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu and activist Chen 
Guangcheng's asylum claim at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. 
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decades, international migrants appear to have latently maintained one of the 
key functions they had during Mao’s era: to embody a threat to the nation, 
as a tool to revive national sentiments (Brady 2003: 253).   
While the excitement of nationalistic sentiments gradually blew over, the 
borders’ enforcement drive which characterised the “three illegals” 
campaign was fully endorsed in the 2013 Exit Entry Law. 350  Before the 
promulgation of the 2013 Exit Entry Law, it was common practise for 
foreign nationals to be legally in the country on a student or tourist visa but 
to be in employment or doing business.351 A foreign national found to be 
legally in the country working without a work permit did not incur strict 
sanctions, but instead a modest fee. The 2013 Law establishes harsher 
punishments for illegal stay or work in China. Foreign nationals face 
detention and investigation for overstaying their visas (up to sixty days if the 
case is complicated) 352  while foreign nationals working illegally may face 
monetary charges of up to 20,000 Yuan (twenty times more the previous 
penalty fine) or detention (five to fifteen days). 353 Foreign nationals may 
further be repatriated for illegally residing or working in China.354 Anyone 
who knows of foreign nationals who have entered, are residing, or are 
employed illegally in China are to inform the local Public Security Bureau.355  
On the other hand, the 2013 Law makes it easier for “foreign talents”356 
for whom a special visa was introduced and grants permanent residence to 
foreign nationals who make “outstanding contributions” to China or 
                                                          
350中华人民共和国出境入境管理法 (The Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic 
of China ) National People’s Congress, July 1, 2013. 
351 During my years as a student in Beijing (2011-2013) this phenomenon was extremely common. 
Among foreign students, many would teach English as a part-time job. Some were even registered 
as language students but did not attend classes and simply worked full-time. 
352 Supra, footnote 350, Art. 60. 
353 Supra, Art. 80. 
354 Supra, Art. 62. 
355 Supra, Art. 45. 
356 Supra, Art. 16, 31. 
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“otherwise meet the requirements” for permanent residence as set by the 
regulations.357The goal of facilitation of entry for “foreign talents”, seen as 
an asset to promote China’s economic development, was further pursued in 
early 2016 through an Opinion which individuated the reform of the 
permanent residence system as the main strategy to attract more foreign 
talents.358 The aforementioned Opinion further clarifies that in the future, 
the notion of foreign talent will be defined by market forces as an “essential 
factor” of assessment. 359 The same assessment orients the Pilot 
Implementation Plan of the Work Permit issued in late 2016, which divides 
foreign workers in China into three categories: foreign talents, ordinary 
foreigners and low-end foreigners.360 As the Plan explains, the new work 
permit system for foreign workers is based on the principle of “encouraging 
high-end talents, controlling ordinary foreigners, limiting low-end 
foreigners”: 361  this principle further explains the distinction between 
desirable and undesirable immigrants as a tool for economic modernisation 
which was already hinted at in the 2013 Exit Entry Law. Although the long-
term consequences of these legislative developments remain to be seen, they 
appear to bring China’s migration system closer to the immigration policies 
in Western countries (Yuan-Ihle and Bork-Hüffer 2014, Haugen 2015).  
Over the last fifty years or so, China’s external border controls in relation 
to its own nationals have undergone some radical shifts. Within the span of 
a few decades the act of emigration in China has turned “from treacherous 
to tolerated but ideologically suspect to patriotic” (Nyíri 2002: 223). A 
similar path has characterised the fate of overseas Chinese, who have shifted 
                                                          
357 Supra, Art. 47 
358  关于加强外国人永久居留服务管理的意见  (Opinion on Strengthening the Administration of 
Permanent Resident Services for Foreigners), CCP Central Committee General Office and State 
Council, 18 February 2016, subsection 1. 
359 Supra, subsection 3 (8).  
360 关于印发外国人来华 工作许可制度试点实施方案的通知 (Pilot Implementation Plan of the Work 
Permit System for Foreigners) State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, 9 September 2016. 
361 Supra, subsection 2.  
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from being considered a suspicious and unreliable group during Mao’s era to 
being patriotic vehicles of China’s development in the 1990s. A similar 
pattern can be observed in the evolution of external borders in relation to 
foreign nationals who similarly went from being considered a “politically 
marked category of people”(Pieke 2012: 60) to being predominantly 
managed as an economic opportunity rather than as a threat to China’s 
political stability as in the past.362  
The de-securitisation of international migration in the PRC has been a 
steady process which similarly to the de-securitisation of internal borders is 
fundamentally linked to China’s transition to market economy. As will be 
revealed in the next part dealing with legal categories of mobility, the de-
securitisation of foreign migration has nevertheless been combined with an 
approach of keeping foreign nationals at arms’ length rather than integrating 
them into society through the granting of substantial numbers of residence 
permits and naturalisation. Part Four, which focuses on the different legal 
profiles and statuses bestowed upon Chinese and foreign citizens on the 
move, will further substantiate these issues. 
 
PART IV. LEGAL CATEGORIES  
Having provided a historical overview of China’s internal and external 
borders, which illustrated a general trend of de-securitisation of borders 
coinciding with China’s transition to a socialist market economy, this section 
examines how current legal categories frame mobility and allocate different 
degrees of citizenship rights through which the migrant population is 
stratified and governed. As already posited in previous chapters, legal 
categorisations and different types of visas work as economic, political and 
                                                          
362 Even though their embodiment of a threat for China’s social stability occasionally re-emerges in 
policy discourses, as mentioned earlier, this role appears overall secondary to their function of 
economic opportunity. 
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cultural filters through which governmental power divides and rules its 
population. This Part will first consider the legal categories available to 
internal migrants and then move to those pertaining Chinese emigrants and 
foreign nationals.  The detailed consideration of the range of legal categories 
of mobility available to individuals on the move will bring me to emphasise 
that both in the case of China’s internal borders and in the case of external 
borders, migrants’ a high economic worth appears to be a key catalyst for 
the entitlement to citizenship rights.  
14. Rural vs urban hukou 
The first big divide of China’s internal population is between those who 
are entitled to a hukou and those who are not. Without a hukou, Chinese 
citizens are a non-person in Chinese society: among those who struggle to 
get hukou are for instance children born out of China’s family planning 
policy363 or out of wedlock.364 The second distinction is between urban and 
rural hukou. A local city hukou entitles the holder to a series of benefits not 
available to non-local hukou holders (including those who hold a hukou from 
other cities) including: free education and healthcare, subsidies for house 
leasing and purchasing and social security provisions. A rural hukou bounds 
its holder to the limited social services available in the rural location of 
registration. This aspect determines the chances of individuals to education, 
medical care and many other benefits. As already seen, during the first thirty 
years of the People’s Republic the provision of the rice iron bowl of cradle 
to grave welfare benefits was a prerogative of urban hukou holders. Despite 
the progressive opening up of the rights to move and work across China, 
                                                          
363 Since 1979, the one-child policy restricts couples in urban areas to only one child (exceptions are 
made for couples in rural areas, ethnic minorities and couples who both lack siblings); the policy has 
been recently eased by a NPC Standing Committee resolution 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于调
整完善生育政策的决议 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Resolution about 
revising the child-bearing policy), 28 December 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-
12/28/c_118749204.htm Accessed 25 April 2014 
364 The Dire Straits of Illegal children’s Hukou), Xinhua news, 30 March 2014 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2014-03/30/c_1110009695.htm Accessed 25 April 2014 
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social benefits generally remain a prerogative of urban hukou holders. Hukou 
conversions through migration (qianyi) greatly vary depending on the place’s 
settlement attractiveness: the more popular the destination, the more 
difficult is to obtain a local hukou. The most sought-after type of registration 
is a hukou from a city directly administered by the Central Government 
(zhixiashi) (e.g. Beijing, Shanghai); the second most popularly wanted is a 
capital city (shenghui) hukou (e.g. Guangzhou); thirdly, a prefecture hukou 
(diqu); a county (xianzhen) hukou; a township (xiangzhen) hukou; and at the 
bottom of the ladder a rural village (nongcun) hukou, normally seen as 
undesirable (Luo 2012: 129-30). 
15. Permanent vs temporary hukou 
According to the 1958 Regulations, two types of registration for internal 
migrants in Chinese cities are available: permanent and temporary hukou. 
Any Chinese citizen who moves out of his or her hukou zone permanently 
needs to apply for a migrant hukou certificate (qianyizheng) from his/her local 
hukou police, cancel his/her hukou record and re-register at the new hukou 
zone. Such registration per se however does not provide any affiliation or 
rights in the receiving place. Permanent hukou (changzhu hukou) is what could 
be compared to the nationality/citizenship of a person, in that it is inherited 
at birth and can only be converted in specific circumstances. Those who live 
outside of their permanent area of hukou registration for more than one 
month are further required to obtain a temporary residence permit in the 
place of destination (zanzhuzheng).365 This permit is valid for six months (up 
to a year if necessary) and can be renewed at the local hukou police station. 
While this permit can be compared to a short-term visa and as shall be seen 
in detail in the case of Beijing, its implementation is currently discontinuous 
and ad hoc. Temporary residence permits are the main arrangement for 
most of China’s internal migrants to legally reside in cities. Based on whether 
                                                          
365暂住证申领办法 (Methods to obtain temporary residence permit), 2 June 1995, State Council, Art. 
3. 
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a local hukou is granted by the receiving city as a result of rural to urban 
migration, two categories of migration can be identified. The first one entails 
a formal transfer of hukou and is officially considered as migration (qianyi) 
and the migrant is provided with state resources at her destination 
(Buckingham and Chan 2008: 590). The second one does not involve any 
hukou change nor a permanent right of residence at destination and is not 
defined as migration but rather a mere movement of population, or more 
precisely, a “floating of the population” (renkou liudong) (Ibid). As the term 
“floating” suggests, most of China’s internal migrants are considered 
transient in cities. While, as the appellation suggests, theoretically the 
floating population would not be authorised to permanently live in the city 
of destination, most of China’s internal migrants spend years in the urban 
areas and often establish themselves there permanently (Ibid).  
16. Hukou conversions 
As mentioned earlier, a permanent city hukou entitles its holder to a series 
of benefits not available to non-local hukou holders, including: free education 
and healthcare, subsidies for house leasing and purchasing, social security 
provisions and so on. Taking education as an example, local schools are free 
for local hukou holders but come at high fees for non-local hukou holders.366 
It should also be noted that large cities are the ones with the best services 
and facilities. One of the most noteworthy privileges which hukou holders of 
large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai retain over hukou holders of other 
localities is their precedence in college admissions. Given the system of 
different admission scores for hukou holders of different regions in the 
college entrance examination, the chances of being accepted by a top 
university are considerably poorer for hukou holders of localities outside 
large cities (Wang 2005: 68, 139-149). As already mentioned, a quasi-
                                                          
366 In addition, children who are non-local hukou holders are required to return to their permanent 
hukou location to take part in the college entrance examination, which is generally more competitive 
outside the big cities (Wang 2005: 67). 
 199 
 
permanent way to obtain local hukou in large cities is the blue seal hukou 
(lanyin hukou), a transitional residence permit reserved for a few highly skilled 
or flat buyer migrants, convertible to a permanent local hukou after some 
years of regular residence. This scheme and such statuses are set by local 
governments. This scheme – whose minimum requirements of access are 
wealth or skills are established by local governments - has allowed cities such 
as Beijing and Shanghai to grant permanent residence to a few wealthy and 
high-skilled individuals while maintaining the rest of the migrant population 
outside of social rights recognition if not out of the cities. Although 
permanent residents of big cities, the only legal recognition most internal 
migrants can achieve in a big metropolis such as Beijing or Shanghai remains 
a temporary residence permit.  
While the specific conditions for hukou conversion vary in different 
localities and are more restrictive in big cities, based on internal documents, 
evaluation reports and fieldwork observation, Wang has individuated general 
features and categories of hukou relocation (Wang 2005: 91-101). Two 
traditional ways of hukou relocation are state employment and working in the 
army (Ibid: 91-2). A third category of mobility is that of “the powerful”, 
which is, retired state cadres and their families, who can resettle in any 
desired location (other than Beijing); a Beijing hukou is instead available at all 
times to party and state leaders in the highest ranks of the central 
government and their families (Ibid: 92). Two other categories of mobility 
since the 1990s – attainable through a blue-seal hukou – are as already 
mentioned “the wealthy” (which include purchasers of real estate property, 
high-paid workers, self-employed businessmen and investors) as well as the 
“educated or talented” (Ibid: 92-3). At present, college graduates are 
commonly guaranteed urban hukou upon graduation in mid-sized cities while 
PhD degree holders are permitted to relocate their hukou to a city of choice 
 200 
 
even if they do not have a local job (Ibid: 94). 367  Another category of 
mobility is the “second generation relocated”. Although, even more strictly 
than national citizenship policies, a hukou cannot ordinarily be acquired 
through marriage, since 1998 the child of a rural-urban or inter-regional 
couple can decide whether to inherit a mother’s or a father’s hukou. 368 
Finally, hukou relocation might take place in the case of “owners of land 
development areas”, which is, rural hukou holders whose land is taken over 
by the state for urbanisation and economic development (Ibid: 96). It should 
be noted that until today, hukou conversions are rare. The majority of 
China’s internal migrants living in China’s largest cities remain unable to 
convert a native hukou. In terms of their legal status, they either live in cities 
as temporary hukou holders or as unregistered floaters.  
17. Irregular internal migrants 
As mentioned above, the largest part of the floating population lacks a 
permanent legal status in cities. Wang further estimated that in China's 
biggest and best managed metropolises more than half of the migrant 
population lives without any temporary registration (Wang 2005: 78). While 
during planned economy the system of food rations and assigned jobs in 
cities combined with the communes in rural areas made it very hard for a 
rural migrant to move without authorisation to urban centres, the transition 
to a market economy system changed the rules of the game. Progressively, 
unauthorised mobility across internal borders became a widespread practice 
which was both of concern for the government and at the same time greatly 
                                                          
367 Except for Beijing, where local employment remains a requirement for a PhD holder to apply for a 
local hukou. 
368国务院批转公安部关于解决当前户口管理工作中几个突出问题意见的通知 (Notice of Opinions of the 
Ministry of Public Security on  Solving Several  Current Prominent Problems on Hukou Management  
with approval of the State Council) 23 June 1998,  Ministry of Public Security. In the past, the child of 
a mother with rural hukou inherited her rural status regardless of their father’s hukou. Even when 
born in a city to a father with urban hukou, the child had no right to schooling or food staples in the 
city. In spite of China’s patrilineal tradition, by tying hukou registration to female lineage the State 
was determined to keep the urban population low (Davin 1999: 6).  
 201 
 
benefited the growing urban economies fuelling China’s growth. This 
initially ambivalent attitude is reflected in the lack of rigorous and consistent 
implementation of China’s internal border controls documented by various 
studies (Xiang 1997, He 2003, He 2005). Whenever the growth of migrant 
populations in large urban centres was not needed, local governments have 
occasionally launched political campaigns, with the purpose of “cleaning up 
and reorganising” (qingli zhengdun): to fight unregistered migrants, 
unauthorised migrant-owned businesses and housing compounds (He 2005: 
534). Nevertheless, due to the transitory nature of the campaigns irregular 
migrants normally left the city when the campaign was at its peak and 
returned when it came to an end (Solinger 1999: 69). As already mentioned, 
detention and repatriation measures for internal migrants caught without 
papers were repealed in the law in 2003 following the outcry of the Sun 
Zhigang case. Yet, the practice of random ID papers checks and forced 
repatriation for undocumented migrants still occasionally occurs in major 
cities (Wang 2010: 92). Moreover, sporadic campaigns for the purpose of 
“cleaning up and reorganising” unregistered migrants in cities such as Beijing 
are known to take place annually during politically sensitive times, such as 
on the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen events (June 4th), on China’s 
national anniversary (October 1st), and when the National People’s Congress 
is in session in March each year (He 2005: 534). This sporadic enforcement 
of the legislation of China’s internal borders encourages situations of semi-
legality, whereby migrants are not fully legal nor illegal (Ibid).  
Research conducted among business migrant communities in Beijing has 
revealed that at times, semi-compliance is the optimal situation for migrant 
entrepreneurs as legal compliance has too high a price for some migrants; 
this would be the result of a complex game of collusion of migrant 
entrepreneurs and local authorities, profiting from migrants’ situation of 
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semi-compliance (He 2005). 369  Research I conducted with a colleague in 
Beijing further shows that currently hukou laws are observed only when non-
compliance with them has some practical consequences (Fu and Pasquali 
2015). Remarkably, such lack of compliance does not call into question 
moral principles or a criminalisation of irregular migrants as hukou legislation 
appears to be followed out of practical considerations (Ibid). 
18. Targeted population 
Apart from managing China’s internal migration, another crucial - 
although less known - aim of China’s hukou system has been the control of 
the so called “targeted people” (zhongdian renkou) for maintaining social 
stability and combating crime. Modelled on a Qing Dynasty’s hukou practice, 
the monitoring of specific target groups has been key in the consolidation of 
the new post-1949 regime (Wang 2004: 103). This close monitoring of 
targeted individuals enabled the government to individuate, monitor and 
rectify political opponents. Apart from the police, it was significantly carried 
out through a net of politically inspired activists-informants, known as “the 
eyes and the ears” of the hukou system (Dutton 2005: 289). These individuals 
covertly monitored those considered politically suspect, gathering 
information about them and adding it to their hukou details and reporting 
anything suspicious to the police (Ibid: 288-9).  
The practice of monitoring the targeted population, which used to 
include a periodically updated blacklist, was formalised at the end of the 
1950s and revised in 1980 when a new blacklist targeted four types of 
residents: suspected of counter revolutionary actions, suspected of other 
criminal activities, suspected of threats to the public order, and suspicious 
                                                          
369 In analysing why most rural-urban migrant entrepreneurs in Beijing do not fully comply with 
license requirements but prefer license-renting from locals, He identifies, together with law’s lack of 
legitimacy, the fact that license-renting is protected and sustained institutionally by local businesses, 
law enforcement officers, and the local authorities, whose interests are entwined with it (He 2005: 
527). 
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ex-prisoners (Wang 2004: 127). In the early 2000s, as many as 300,000 hukou 
police officers were in charge of collecting information on each resident 
locally.370 With the transition to a market economy, the system of activists-
informants evolved from being a net of politically inspired “eyes and ears” 
monitoring political conduct to a system of “dubiously motivated hired 
help” mainly watching criminal offenders (Dutton 2005: 289). The Ministry 
of Public Security occasionally sends instructions to the hukou police 
nationwide on who should be classified as targeted people and requires 
monitoring them accordingly (Wang 2004: 125). Particularly during political 
campaigns to strike hard against crime, both targeted people and 
undocumented migrants may be preventively put into detention or undergo 
interrogations without evidence of criminal activities (Ibid: 125-6). While 
there have been reforms and a general relaxation in the management of 
China’s internal migration, the management of the targeted people is still 
“highly centralised, rigid and forceful” (Ibid: 116).  
19. Chinese overseas 
As mentioned in Part Three, the right to leave and return to China is 
currently granted to all Chinese citizens, yet it is still restricted for certain 
categories such as members of minority groups suspected of separatist 
claims (e.g. Tibetans and Uighurs), individuals without a hukou, and political 
dissidents (Chodorow 2015, unpaged). The category of overseas Chinese 
encompassed by the notion of huaqiao blends with distinctions between 
nationals and foreigners as the term includes both Chinese citizens abroad 
and foreign nationals of Chinese descent living abroad. Although for the 
                                                          
370  As Wang explains, resident information divides up into eight categories, including: basic 
information present on the hukou registration form, behaviour and political activities, personal 
financial status and way of life; friends and relationships; physical appearance, use of accent, 
personality and interests, daily relations and relevant past activities. For example, in Beijing the 
hukou police collects only the basic information and current behaviour of general residents but 
gathers all eight categories of information regarding the targeted people and monitors them closely 
(Wang 2004: 124-125). 
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purposes of legislation the latter count as foreign nationals, I have already 
mentioned how foreigner of Chinese descent have also been the target of 
various preferential policies at both national and local level, such as through 
the introduction of permanent residence permits for talented Chinese 
overseas in cities such as Shanghai and Beijing.371 Such policies reflect a 
governmental rationale which collapses national belonging with a specific 
ethnic group and illustrates the underlying preference for mono-ethnicity 
upon which the project of the Chinese state appears to be based. 
20. Foreign nationals: short vs long term 
For stays of less than a year, foreign nationals in China are required to 
obtain a visa and a temporary accommodation registration. For stays of a 
year or longer, a residence permit is needed. 372  The validity period of a 
foreigner’s work-type residence permit is 90 days at the minimum and five 
years at the maximum, while the validity period of a non-work-type 
foreigner’s residence permit is 180 days at the minimum and five years at the 
maximum.373  
21. Family members  
Foreign nationals who are family members of Chinese citizens, 
permanent residents or work permit holders have a right to family 
reunification. In the past, spouses of Chinese citizens and foreign nationals 
had to be married for five years and had to have lived in China for five years 
before receiving permanent residence. 374  Those who did not meet the 
requirement had to rely on continually renewing their tourist visa to be 
legally in the country. After the 2013 Law, relatives of Chinese citizens or 
                                                          
371 Capital aims to woo more top-level foreign workers, China Daily, 13 January 2016 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/13/content_23058308.htm Accessed 13 April 2016 
372 Supra, footnote 350, Art. 16. 
373Supra, footnote 350, Art. 30. 
374 Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China (外国人在
中国永久居留审批管理办法), 15 August 2004, State Council, Art.6. 
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foreign residents applying to reside in China for more than 180 days are 
eligible for residence permits which are valid for up to 5 years.375 Individuals 
on this type of permit are not allowed to work. Family members of a foreign 
national with a work permit can similarly obtain a residence permit as long 
as their work permit type allows it. It should be noted here that in contrast 
to this, similar provisions for family reunification are instead inexistent for 
the internally floating population. As seen earlier, an example for that is the 
lack of access to free education for non-local hukou children, which often 
forces migrant parents to leave their children behind in the rural areas.  
22. Citizenship acquisition 
As far as the acquisition of Chinese citizenship goes, Chinese nationality 
law follows the principle of jus sanguinis. According to the 1980 Nationality 
Law, a child born in China is a Chinese citizen if at least one of the parents is 
a Chinese national, or if the parents are settled in China and they are 
stateless or their nationalities cannot be determined.376 A child born abroad 
with at least one Chinese citizen parent is a Chinese citizen, unless the 
Chinese parent is settled in a foreign country and the child has acquired 
foreign citizenship at birth.377 As already mentioned, China does not allow 
dual nationality.378 Under the 1980 Law, a foreign national or stateless person 
who is willing to abide by China’s Constitution and laws and who is a close 
relative of a Chinese national, has settled down in China, or has “other 
legitimate reasons” 379  may be naturalised as a Chinese citizen. 380  The 
naturalisation of foreign nationals has been extremely uncommon and has 
been granted to very few foreigners since the inception of the People’s 
                                                          
375 Supra, footnote 350, Art. 30.  
376 中华人民共和国国籍法(Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China), National People's 
Congress, 10 September 1980, Art. 4. 
377Supra, Art. 5. 
378 Supra, Art. 8. 
379The term "legitimate reasons" is not further specified in the 1980 Nationality Law, since each local 
government has different requirements. 
380 Supra, Art. 7 
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Republic in 1949. The 2010 five-yearly national census counted only 1,448 
naturalised citizens in the whole of the country.381  
Apart from a deliberate governmental will to keep foreigners at arms’ 
length, it could be speculated that that the prohibition of dual citizenship is a 
deterrent in a few respects. First, relinquishing one’s own citizenship implies 
having to apply for a visa each time one enters one’s own country of birth. 
Second, for those foreign nationals who are passport holders of states which 
enable more visa-free international travel than a Chinese passport does, 
Chinese citizenship might not be convenient. According to this logic, within 
the global hierarchy of passports’ mobility, the only foreign nationals who 
may have an interest in acquiring Chinese citizenship would possibly be 
those from countries for whom Chinese citizenship represents an 
“upgrading” over their current citizenship. 
23. Foreign workers 
At the national level the employment of foreign nationals is regulated by 
the 1996 Provisions on the Administration of the Employment of Foreigners.382 To 
apply for a work permit, applicants need to have “the professional skills and 
job experience required” for the intended occupation. 383  Work visas are 
reserved for posts for which employers have a “special need” and cannot 
find local candidates for the time being.384 This vague guideline is interpreted 
differently in various locations. While mid-size or small localities tend to 
have low requirements, in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai the bar for 
                                                          
381 The 2010 China Population Census for the first time covered the count of foreign nationals in 
China (along with residents from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110514214156/http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevent
s/t20110429_402722638.htm Accessed 13 April 2016 
382外国人在中国就业管理规定 (Regulations on the Management of Employment of Foreigners In 
China), 1 May 1996, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
383Supra, Art. 7 
384Supra, Art. 6 
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national requirements is higher. The abovementioned pilot legislation on 
work permits implementing the 2013 Law is currently being experimented 
with at the local levels and takes further steps to promote the immigration of 
talents and high-level workers. As seen earlier, the 2016 Pilot Plan 
introduces a three-tiered classification (foreign talents, normal foreigners and 
low-end foreigners) reflects the different attitudes towards the immigration 
of foreign workers according to the supposed economic value that they can 
bring to the country.385 In the case of class A foreign talents, in order to 
attract them the government does not impose any quota on work permits;386 
in the case of class B, the government allocates and regulates the quotas 
according to the current market demands; 387  in the case of class C, the 
government strictly controls the quotas. 388  
24. Irregular foreign migrants 
While China’s legal framework of external borders encourages the entry 
and residence of high waged workers, a number of more “indeterminate” 
categories of international migrants who enjoy fewer legal protection or no 
rights at all exist in the Chinese context (Zhu and Price 2014: 6). One is that 
of international small-scale traders, engaged in small scale retail as well as 
wholesale export/import of Chinese goods to international markets.389 As 
                                                          
385Supra, footnote 360.  
386 Examples of class A workers include: winners of specific awards in academia, arts, entertainment, 
business or sports, top positions holders in business, academia, sports or entertainment, 
entrepreneurial or innovative talents, “outstanding” and young talents with PhD degrees or higher 
from a top 200 University or a Chinese University, former managers at a top 500 company. Supra, 
pp.7-11. 
387 Examples of class B workers include: holders of a minimum of bachelor’s degree combined with 
two years of work experience, master degree holders of a top 100 university, previous holders of job 
posts at certain foreign organisations, foreign language teachers with a bachelor degree and two 
years’ work experience in the field of education. Supra, pp.11-12. 
388 Class C workers include whoever does not score enough points to fall within the A or B category. 
Supra, pp. 12-13.  
389 Many of these migrants are based in Guangzhou - China’s main export hub - and mostly come 
from African countries. Different from other categories, their migration pattern is not linear: while 
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the current visa policy only allows work visas for migrants who are 
employed by a registered company, these traders work in the country by 
periodically renewing short-term business, student or tourist visas. However, 
visa extensions may often be denied by the local authorities (Zhu 2014, 
Haugen 2012). As a result, some of these traders end up being “trapped” in 
China following the expiration of their visas, as applications for exit visas for 
over-stayers must be submitted with housing registrations, which requires 
valid travel documents. This situation has been defined as a ‘‘second state of 
immobility’’ where individuals who have managed to emigrate once “end up 
becoming spatially entrapped in new ways in the destination countries” 
(Haugen 2012: 66).  
While traders and self-employed migrants juggle provisional legal 
categorisations, other groups of migrants are completely left out of the legal 
frameworks. This is the group of undocumented workers, most of them 
“smuggled” from neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos. Many of these migrants are employed in factories in Southern China, 
where the once abundant supply of cheap domestic labour is shrinking.390 
Others are employed as caregivers and domestic helpers, which are in high 
demand among middle class white collar families in China’s largest 
metropoles.  
Despite being the latest enablers of the competitiveness of many Chinese 
factories and businesses, these foreign workers are barred from any sort of 
legal recognition by their low-skilled work, similar to the situation of China’s 
rural migrants. The condition of irregularity is variably experienced in 
different locations across China. As seen earlier in this chapter, legislation is 
unevenly carried out among different administrative levels and authorities in 
                                                                                                                                               
many might only visit China a few times a year, others are permanently based in China (Castillo 
2014: 238). 
390 Special Report: How smuggled workers power 'Made in China', 6 August 2015 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-labour-illegal-special-report-idUSKCN0QB00H20150806 
Accessed 21 April 2016 
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China and greatly varies according to the location where a foreign national 
resides. As a result, provinces and local governments may pass more 
restrictive legislation than the one existing at the national level, or else, local 
funding arrangements may hinder the uniform implementation of the law, as 
the budget for the police to implement immigration policies depends on 
local governments (Haugen 2015).  
25. Lack of a category of humanitarian protection 
While presently legal migration into the EU is mainly framed through the 
category of humanitarian protection, as anticipated in this chapter’s 
introduction to the legal system, in China this legal category is practically 
non-existent. 391  In principle, China accepts asylum seekers and in 1982 
signed the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol. In practice however, China never had an institution to 
process asylum seekers and does not provide any assistance to asylum 
seekers or refugees in the country.392 As a result, an individual seeking shelter 
from political prosecution in China will probably do so by presenting herself 
as a tourist or a labour migrant as humanitarian protection is not an option 
on the legal spectrum. This lack of humanitarian assistance relates to China’s 
long-standing commitment to non-interference in other states’ internal 
affairs. The 2013 Exit Entry Law appears to have taken steps to introduce 
such category by announcing measures for asylum seekers, allowing them to 
stay in China during the processing of the applications.393 Yet, this provision 
is not enforceable until specific regulations and rules for implementation are 
promulgated.  
                                                          
391 As of December 2015, the total population of concern in China - comprising both refugees and 
asylum seekers - was 301,622, out of which 300,895 were from neighbouring Vietnam and had fled 
to China during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. UNHCR People’s Republic of China Fact Sheet, 
December 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/5000187d9.pdf Accessed 13 April 2016 
392 The Beijing office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out 
refugee status determination on behalf of the Chinese government. 
393 Supra, footnote 350, Art.46 
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As this Part demonstrated, China’s borders greatly vary for different 
categories of people. As far as internal borders are concerned, while hukou 
conversions and resident permits are granted to some privileged categories 
and largely oriented by an evaluation of migrants’ economic worth, most of 
China’s internal migrants are still referred to as a “floating population”, 
residing in cities without a permanent legal status. Remarkably, the status of 
irregularity, which possibly characterises most of China’s floating 
population, has ceased to retain criminal or moral repercussions on the lives 
of internal migrants. I further mentioned the category of the “targeted 
people” as one which remains strictly monitored by the government despite 
the general relaxation of China’s internal borders. I then examined China’s 
shifting external borders. I observed that apart from a few exceptions, at 
present Chinese citizens enjoy freedom of movement across international 
borders and that the Chinese diaspora is a target group whose immigration is 
promoted through preferential residence policies. As far as foreign nationals 
are concerned, I have noted China’s efforts to attract the immigration of 
talents and high-waged migrants to promote economic development. I 
further explained how current legal categories leave other segments of the 
migrant population in an indeterminate state of semi-legality or illegality. 
While the latest legislative developments appear to expand legal pathways to 
permanent residency for foreign nationals, it was noted that these pathways 
only target high skilled migrants and huge differences in treatment exist for 
different groups of international migrants based on their presumed 
economic worth. Although important, the management of international 
migration is derisory when compared to the numbers of internal migrants, 
which remain China’s top priority. In order to better understand the current 
trend of de-securitisation of migration in the Chinese context, the next 
section moves to the investigation of China’s internal borders in the case of 
Beijing. 
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PART VI. CHINA’S INTERNAL BORDERS CLOSE UP: BEIJING 
26. Historical outline 
Beijing is significant for this narration of China’s internal borders as it is 
the city with the most sought-after hukou and the strictest hukou legislation in 
the whole of China. While the main piece of law establishing the hukou 
system was introduced nationally in 1958, residence controls in Beijing 
started much earlier and were harsher in China’s capital. Prior to the 1958 
Regulations, in 1953 a local regulation mobilized thousands of people, 
including farmers, soldiers and unemployed workers to leave Beijing and go 
back to their hometowns.394 In 1957, further Instructions on Preventing the 
Blind Outflow of Rural Population were issued in Beijing. 395  Luo has 
distinguished three phases of the history of the management of human 
mobility in Beijing (Luo 2012). The first phase goes from 1949 to 1958 and 
is characterised by freedom of movement. Within only a decade the 
population of Beijing experienced an increase of 4.287 million, two thirds of 
its size (Ibid: 22). At the same time, the hukou system served as an 
instrument for the purposes of political control, to disclose and prevent the 
antagonism of counter-revolutionaries: for example, between 1949 and 1950, 
13,704 opponents and more than 24,000 “questionable persons” were 
caught through hukou registration and verification in the capital (Wang 2005: 
44).  
                                                          
394 北京市人民政府关于农民盲目流入京市情况和处理措施向华北行政委员会、政务院的报告 (Beijing 
Municipal Government’s Report to the North Administrative Committee, the Council regarding to the 
Situation and Measures responding to the Inflow of Rural Population) in 北京市档案馆，中共北京市
委党史研究室(Beijing Municipal Archives and Beijing Party Committee Research Office edit), 北京市
重要文献选编 1955 (The Important Literature Compilation of Beijing 1955) 中国档案出版社 (China 
Files Press) 2003 pp. 113-115. 
395 关于制止农村人口盲目外流的指示  (Instructions on Preventing the Blind Outflow of Rural 
Population), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, 劳动期刊
Labour Journal 1958.1, p.22. 
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At the second stage, the separation between urban and rural hukou was 
enforced and substantial increases in the size of the population led the local 
government to implement new regulations. However, strict controls were 
not always implemented in Beijing: for example, under the economic 
enthusiasm of the Great Leap Forward,396 in 1959 the Beijing government 
set aside the national hukou Regulations to allow urban enterprises to recruit 
cheap rural labour. 397  The following year the government changed its 
attitude back to strict control. Until 1970, the control of the migrant 
population was so strict that Beijing’s population only grew by 502,000 
people within 8 years of negative population growth.398 In Beijing as in other 
cities, the local population was further sent to rural areas through 
administrative methods. Movement into the city was also administratively 
planned. At the time, of those who legally migrated to Beijing, 63% were 
approved by the government, 24% by institutions of higher education, 10% 
by the military and merely 3% by the hukou police (Luo 2012: 25).  
The year 1978 initiated a third stage of hukou regulation following the 
Open up and Reform policy, which continues until the present day. As the 
demand for labour force increased in Beijing, the practice of rural workers 
entering the cities began to be permitted and was subsequently recognised 
by the central government in the mid-1980s. In 1985, the Beijing 
government issued Regulations which required the migrant population in the 
city to obtain a temporary residence permit.399 Remarkably, since the mid-
1990s non-local hukou residents have made up one-fourth of the Beijing 
                                                          
396 The Great Leap Forward was a political campaign which lasted from 1958 to 1961. Its aim was to 
transform China from a predominantly rural economy into a socialist society through fast 
industrialisation and collectivisation. The campaign had devastating effects on the rural population 
and is considered to be the cause of the Great Chinese Famine. 
397 Luo 2012 p.25. 
398《当代中国》丛书编辑委员会编,中国社会科学出版社 1989 年版, (“Contemporary China”, edited by 
the editorial board of Contemporary China Collections, China Social Sciences Press 1989) pp.401-
402.  
399关于暂住人口户口管理的规定 (Regulations on the Hukou Management of Temporary Residence) 
26 November 1985, Beijing Municipal Government. 
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population. At the beginning of 2016, out of a registered population of over 
21 million, non-Beijing hukou registered residents amounted to over 8 
million and accounted for 37.9% of all Beijing residents.400  
27. Legal categories of migration 
A Beijing hukou is key to accessing a host of benefits: free schooling and 
easier access to prestigious universities, high quality healthcare and access to 
many job openings reserved for Beijing citizens. Despite paying taxes, the 
migrant population is not entitled to these benefits, nor can its members 
participate in the election of the Community Residential Committee (julihui) 
(Ibid: 43). According to the Regulations in force, all migrants whose period 
of stay in Beijing exceeds one month, and people who come to work or do 
business in the capital, shall make a temporary residence registration and 
apply for a temporary residence permit (zanzhuzheng).401 There exist three 
categories of temporary permit: type C, allowing a length of less than a year 
for the purposes of business or engaging in work or business activities; type 
B, for individuals in Beijing for one to five years; type A, which grants 
temporary residence for more than five years if the person meets certain 
requirements (working for a high-tech enterprise; investing more than 
300.000 Yuan in the city; accessing the city with an honorary title or as an 
outstanding personnel). 402  The most common among temporary permit 
holders is the type C permit, which according to a municipal regulation is to 
be renewed every year at the cost of 5 Yuan. Interestingly, in the past, 
different districts in Beijing implementing this rule have imposed extra fees 
which could raise the cost of the permit to as much as 200 Yuan (adding 
                                                          
400《2015 年末北京常住人口达 2170.5 万人》(At the end of 2015 Beijing population reached 21 
million and 705 thousands), 北 京 青 年 报  (Beijing Youth newspaper) 20 January 2016, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/bj/2016-01-20/c_1117828550.htm Accessed 20 March 2016. 
 
401北京市外地来京人员户籍管理规定 (Beijing regulations on the management of migrant labourers 
household registration), 31 December 1997, Beijing Municipal Government, Art. 7.  
402暂住证的种类 (Types of Temporary Residence Permit) 17 July 1997, Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Public Security. 
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levies for accidental injury insurance, a public welfare development fee and 
even a requirement to make blood donations, only avoided upon payment of 
pecuniary “offers”).403 
In October 2001, the municipal government established a selective 
scheme to grant blue-seal hukou to allow certain categories of migrants to 
become permanent residents in Beijing. For a set of three urban hukou (self, 
spouse, and one child) a private entrepreneur had to have contributed more 
than three million Yuan as a total three-year tax payment and had to hire a 
minimum of a hundred local workers (or 90% of his/her employees had to 
be Beijing hukou holders) (Wang 2005: 189). Such conditions restricted the 
possibility of obtaining a blue seal hukou to multimillionaires. Interestingly, 
more than two months after the promulgation of this law, only one business 
owner had qualified for it (Ibid).  As in other cities, Beijing has similarly 
connected the purchase of real estate with hukou. In the mid-1990s, a house-
purchasing scheme, subject to the annual migration quota, was in place and 
granted a set of three Beijing urban hukou to purchasers of high-end real 
estate in selected areas at a minimum market price of 500,000 Yuan, fifty 
times the average annual income in Beijing (Ibid). This policy was annulled 
in 2005 as the acquisition of hukou by real estate purchasing 
disproportionately raised the real estate price in Beijing.  
According to current regulations, a non-local hukou holder cannot buy a 
flat without having paid taxes in Beijing for more than five years, can buy no 
more than one apartment,404 and can only obtain loans and mortgages at 
                                                          
403 有地方巧立名目乱收费-京城暂住证收费情况调查 (Illegal Fees Collection Under False Pretense-
Investigation on Fee Collection of the Temporary Residence Permit in Beijing), Southern.com, 7 April 
2002, http://www.southcn.com/news/china/china07/200204070048.htm Accessed 13 August 2013  
404北京市人民政府办公厅关于贯彻落实国务院办公厅文件精神进一步加强本市房地产市场调控工作的
通知 (Notice of Further Strengthening Regulating of the Real Estate Market in order to Implement 
Documents of the State Council) 15 February 2011, General Office of the Beijing Municipal 
Government. 
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very high rates.405 Scandals of illegal sale of Beijing hukou by government 
officials, belonging to the limited governmental quotas (15,000 per year) 
yearly allocated to some work units were also reported (Wang 2010: 96). At 
the same time, the city has continued to try to attract talented and highly 
educated persons. For example, PhD holders with a job in Beijing can apply 
for a Beijing hukou within the quotas. Moreover, in line with the policy of 
promoting the entry of talents, since 2016 a new Talent Scheme to attract 
high-level talent to Beijing allows non-local hukou internal migrants and 
returning Chinese overseas graduates employed in hi-tech start-ups to obtain 
a Beijing hukou.406 As seen in Part Two above, this measure is in line with the 
central government’s 2014 Instructions to maintain strict control over 
China’s megacities while promoting the settlement of a few selected 
categories of migrants. 
28. Borders’ enforcement 
While in the past the local police was traditionally in charge of 
implementing hukou regulations in Beijing for the preservation of the social 
order, at present controls are mostly related to the levying of fees and have 
increasingly shifted to institutions distributing licenses or permits, such as 
the Industry and Commerce Bureau, the Housing and Land Bureau and the 
Birth Control Committee (He 2003: 188).  For instance, the Industry and 
Commerce Bureau has an active role in regulating migrant business 
activities, monitoring streets and checking street vendors’ licences, granting 
licences and collecting fees.407 Another crucial control agent is the Housing 
and Land Bureau, as a 1987 Regulation prescribes landlords wanting to rent 
                                                          
405北京市人民政府贯彻落实国务院关于坚决遏制部分城市房价过快上涨文件的通知  (Notice of 
Implementation of State Council’s Documents on Strict Control of the Rising House Prices) 30 April 
2012, Beijing Municipal Government.  
406  Capital Aims to woo more top-level foreign workers, China Daily, 13 January 2016, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/13/content_23058308.htm Accessed 13 April 2016. 
407北京市外地人员经商管理办(The Management Measures on Migrants Conducting Business in 
Beijing) 1 March 1993, Beijing Municipal Government. 
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their properties to migrants to apply for rental permits from the Bureau.408 
Furthermore, the Birth Control Committee, in charge of enforcing the child 
policy on non-Beijing hukou residents, prescribes that once in Beijing, 
married women have to apply for a new marriage and fertility certificate 
from the Bureau. Without it, they are not allowed to apply for any other type 
of permit. 409  A study has shown that these bureaus have often been 
competing in levying the part of regulation fees or sanctions which do not 
go to the national government, leading to a sporadic and inefficient 
enforcement of the legislation (He 2003: 192).  
As various studies have demonstrated, the enforcement of hukou 
regulations in Beijing has been uneven (Xiang 1997, He 2003 and 2005, 
Wang 2005). A study a colleague and I conducted exploring the 
implementation of temporary residence permits in Beijing, the most 
common permits available to internal migrants, corroborates this picture of 
uneven implementation (Fu and Pasquali 2015). Our interviewees confirmed 
that to this day, during official events taking place in Beijing the police or 
their intermediaries may check ID cards or permits on means of transports 
and public places (Ibid: 277).  Apparently, the only situation within which 
someone can still be repatriated is when a non-Beijing hukou holder, not 
carrying his/her ID card, and, not remembering his/her ID number, is 
subsequently found without any temporary residence permit. Interestingly, 
only half of the non-local hukou interviewees believed that a temporary 
                                                          
408关于加强暂住人员租赁私有房屋管理的规定 (Regulation on Strengthening the Control of Private 
Rental Housing to Temporary Residents) 15 August 1987, Housing and Land Bureau, Beijing. Such 
regulation has been amended by 北京市房屋租赁管理若干规定 (Several Provisions of Beijing 
Municipality on House Lease Administration), Beijing Municipal People’s Government, 5 May 2011.  
409北京市外地来京人员计划生育管理规定 (Measures on Temporary Residents' Birth Control in 
Beijing), 13 June 1995, Beijing Municipal Government. The regulation prescribed non Beijing hukou 
females to obtain and always bring with them a certificate of marriage and fertility (from the 
government of their original hukou registration), documenting their fertility history and present 
contraceptive measures. This regulation is now invalid as it has been replaced by 北京市流动人口计
划生育管理规定 Provisions of Beijing Municipality on Administration of Family Planning among the 
Floating Population, Beijing municipal government, 5 November 2011. 
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residence permit is required to live and work in Beijing. A temporary 
residence permit may still be required by the employer of a specific 
profession or business as well as by landlords (Ibid: 278). Some interviewees 
further clarified that in the past they had to obtain it for specific reasons 
(e.g., in order to get a driving license) but at that time they did not have one 
as it was simply not needed (Ibid). The confusion around the 
implementation of temporary residence permits in Beijing appeared to be 
clarified by a semi-official website explaining that since 2009 this permit 
would have lost mandatory nature and instead follows a “voluntary 
principle” (Ibid).410 According to recent news reports Beijing is to gradually 
implement a residence permit system, however, the latter presently remains 
at a trial stage.411 In all, the implementation of hukou legislation in Beijing 
appears very much ad hoc and in a phase of experimentation. The notion of 
compliance to hukou regulations on a “voluntary principle” basis appear to 
confirm the notion of instrumentalism of law in the field of hukou 
legislation. 
Over the last 60 years or so, hukou legislation in Beijing has undergone 
substantial changes. Internal borders in China’s capital have considerably 
shifted from a function of political control to one of population 
management. As in the rest of the country, the opening up to a market 
economy has eased mobility across them. Nevertheless, criteria for the 
acquisition of a Beijing hukou remain very strict and leave the largest majority 
of migrants in a permanently temporary legal status, no matter how long 
they have resided or worked in the capital. Remarkably, even in the city with 
the most sought-after hukou and with the strictest hukou legislation in China, 
the implementation of hukou regulations is sporadic and seemingly ad-hoc.  
                                                          
410 北京暂住证 (Beijing Temporary Residence Permit), Beijing Network, 
http://ldjy.beijing.cn/bjzzz/index.shtml Accessed 1 August 2014. 
411 北京宣布实施居住证制度 暂住证退出历史舞台 (Beijing Announced the Implementation of a 
Temporary Residence Permit System: Temporary Resident Permit to Exit the Stage of History), 
News China, 14 January 2014 http://news.china.com.cn/2014-01/14/content_31187555.htm 
Accessed 7 July 2014. 
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PART VII. TRENDS OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN CHINA  
29. De-securitisation of internal and international migration 
This chapter’s outline of the recent history of China’s main legislation 
and policies pertaining to its internal and international borders has showed a 
general trajectory of de-securitisation of migration management over the last 
thirty years or so. At the outset of the PRC, during Mao’s era, the crossing 
of borders both of hukou and international migrants was viewed as a matter 
of security, a treason to the nation which saw the control over population 
mobility as a key governmental issue. Internal immobility was both a 
function of planned economy and a way to keep peasants out of the cities, 
to prevent overpopulation and social instability. During this time, the strict 
control of entries of foreign nationals into China was perceived as a matter 
of survival by the communist regime. The fact that only a small number of 
sympathisers with the regime were allowed into the country shows the 
centrality of the friend/enemy ideological distinction along which the 
political and private life of Chinese citizens was defined during Mao’s 
leadership.412 
At a time of ideological struggles characterising the Cold War period, the 
issue of immigration was more than just a tool to unite the population 
against the threat of foreign migration through what we described in 
Chapter I as a politics of insecurity. In the context of China’s “passionately 
governmental” system of governmentality (Dutton 2009) also mentioned in 
Chapter I, the entry of foreigners, potentially opponents of the government, 
or the emigration of Chinese citizens were both perceived as a threat to the 
very existence of the socialist state and were deemed equivalent to the 
admission of its failure.  
                                                          
412 Supra, footnote 249. 
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As this chapter illustrated, since the Open up and Reform policy, 
ideological distinctions and revolutionary passions have progressively faded 
and have been replaced by an economic rationality aimed at maximising 
profits at all government levels. Within such context, the de-securitisation of 
internal migration took hold as rural to urban mobility began to be allowed 
to feed urban areas with cheap labour and fuel China’s industrialisation in 
the urban centres. The de-securitisation of internal migration has been 
deeply intertwined with China’s pursuit of economic development.  
The chapter illustrated how this de-securitisation happened gradually. For 
a long time, migration from rural areas to the urban centres has been 
simultaneously allowed for economic reasons yet still considered a security 
issue, as exemplified by the fact that the practice of detention and 
repatriation of undocumented internal migrants has been repealed only in 
2003. To this day, the practice of random police checks of residence permits 
can still take place during politically sensitive events. I further noted that 
overall, due to hukou reforms and the predominance of policies over laws in 
hukou legislation, irregular migration is currently perceived and sanctioned 
(when sanctioned at all) as a lack of administrative compliance rather than a 
criminal offence. This trend strikes as opposite to the EU context, where 
mobility into the EU is increasingly criminalised through legislation and 
policies.  
As far as foreign nationals in China are concerned, I similarly remarked 
that following China’s opening up to the outside world, their presence was 
gradually de-securitised. This de-securitisation similarly began in the 1980s, 
when China started to allow into the country individuals with different 
political views. Contrary to ideological distinctions that until the late 1970s 
led the government to allow only political sympathisers into the country, 
after the launch of economic reforms, the government began to allow the 
entry and presence of anybody who could be beneficial to China in some 
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way. This relaxation of borders towards foreign nationals was gradual.413 I 
have further observed that sporadically, international migrants may still be 
labelled as threat to the Chinese nation as a tool for the government to 
revive national sentiments during situations of internal political unease. I 
mentioned earlier the occasional political campaigns targeting foreign 
nationals in situations of “illegal” work, residence or entry. In the whole, 
however, with the disappearance of the friend/enemy distinction 
characterising political life in Maoist China, foreign nationals appear to be 
currently managed as an economic opportunity for China’s socialist market 
economy.  
In a similar vein, the emigration of Chinese nationals went from being 
restricted and considered treacherous to the very existence of the socialist 
state to being celebrated as a patriotic gesture contributing to the country’s 
economic development. In the whole, China’s policy of prioritising 
economic growth has led to a situation where the economic uses and 
benefits of migration – internal and international – are overtly stated in 
legislation and official language and this arguably makes the issue of 
migration less susceptible to being conceptualised as a security issue. Next 
section further expands on this theme, which I describe as an open 
economic rationale in China’s migration management. 
30. A forthright economic rationale in China’s migration management 
This Chapter’s analysis of the main legislation and policies instituting 
China’s internal and external borders showed how in post-Mao’s China the 
transition to a socialist market economy coincided with a shift in China’s 
political life. From a situation of political rule based on ideological 
distinctions, China has moved to a mode of governmentality within which 
                                                          
413 For example, as I mentioned earlier, in the early period of economic reforms, a special currency 
for foreign nationals physically restricted the movement of foreigners within China to the hotels, 
shops and transportation offices that accepted it. 
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the pursuit of economic growth is the key orientation of policy-making. The 
management of China’s borders has been no exception to this shift. 
Contrarily to what showed in the European case, where despite the deep 
economic underpinnings of the EU migration regime, migration and its 
economic uses are rarely articulated in EU policy and legal discourses, I 
noted throughout this chapter that a forthright economic approach to 
migration management has characterised instead China’s migration regime 
over the last few decades. What is significant here is the straightforward 
connection between economic imperatives and the various measures - such 
as temporary residence permits – aimed at controlling the mobility of 
China’s population.  
Earlier in this chapter I also noted that the goal of economic growth has 
been at times pursued ruthlessly, for example through the direct sale of 
hukou by some local governments and bureaus in the early stages of 
economic reforms. I further added that current schemes such as the blue 
seal hukou (lanyin hukou) - the equivalent of the EU’s so called blue card - 
obtainable through talent schemes or by making a large investment or large 
real estate purchase, are in fact driven by the same market logic. Differently 
from the EU context, the importance of the latter has been openly 
acknowledged in many pieces of migration legislation and policy, justifying 
the introduction of specific migration management measures for their role in 
furthering economic and social progress.  
As mentioned earlier, in its early years, this way of pursuing economic 
growth through migration management has translated into a ruthless and 
open capitalisation on rural migrants, their labour and aspirations and their 
already scarce resources. The rationale behind this policy was, as famously 
stated by Deng Xiaoping during his 1992 Southern Tour, “to let a part of 
the population get rich first” in order to achieve common prosperity faster. 
The suggestion was that eventually wealth will be redistributed among the 
whole population, including internal migrants. In more recent times, 
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legislation and policies have shifted towards a more rights-oriented approach 
aimed at promoting migrants’ rights and their wellbeing. This shift in the 
legislation should be seen in the context of Chinese government’s pursuit of 
political legitimation, which currently depends on improving the living 
conditions of the whole of its population rather than just China’s aggregate 
GDP as in the past. The open connection between migration control and 
economic gains has also possibly been conducive to the progressive 
acknowledgment of the economic contribution that internal migrants have 
made to the country.  
As further illustrated in Part Three, China’s market oriented approach to 
migration management characterises to a significant extent also the 
management of foreign migrants, particularly in the terms of a policy to 
attract high skilled, “talented” individuals and investors to boost the labour 
market and benefit China’s economic development. The latest legal 
developments concerning work permits confirm a similar open economic 
approach in China’s management of international migrants. As the case of 
the new work permit system for foreign workers - openly based on a 
governmental will to match the management of international migration with 
the current needs of China’s labour market – exemplified. I also emphasised 
that legal avenues remain unavailable to low skilled labour migrants or small 
traders, whose lack of legal recognition generates precarious statuses which 
go in the same direction of filling the gaps of the Chinese labour market. 
While generally foreign nationals are poorly integrated as permanent 
residents in Chinese society, the chapter made clear that their entry and 
presence is at present mainly framed as an economic opportunity in official 
language. This is in line with the abovementioned open economic rationale 
characterising China’s current management of both international and 
internal migration, which remains China’s government top priority. Not only 
economic prosperity is at the basis of the Chinese government’s promotion 
of a harmonious society. After the demise of revolutionary ideology and 
passions, economic growth in the Chinese context has turned into the main 
 223 
 
basis for the current government’s legitimacy. In this sense, the Chinese case 
seamlessly illustrates the Foucauldian inspired reflections on neoliberalism as 
a political rationality productive of political legitimation advanced in Chapter 
I.  
Conclusion  
While in the EU external migration has undergone a process of 
securitisation as EU internal borders were erased for EU citizens, this 
Chapter has illustrated that China has experienced instead a pattern of de-
securitisation of both internal and international migration over the last three 
decades. This process has been connected with China’s transition to a 
socialist market economy. After an introduction to the Chinese legal 
tradition and China’s legal system’s current characteristics, the chapter 
provided a general overview of China’s internal borders as demarcated by 
the hukou system. It illustrated that from a conception of rural to urban 
migration as a phenomenon which had to be strictly controlled, after the 
launch of the Open Up and Reform Policy migration management gradually 
shifted to an attitude of allowing internal mobility. I also showed that in 
spite of a general de-securitisation of internal migration, legal affiliation and 
welfare rights in China’s largest cities remain a prerogative of the wealthy 
and high-skilled few.  
I then moved to discuss the history of China’s external borders in 
relation to Chinese nationals and foreign nationals. Since the first decades of 
the PRC until the late 1970s, the emigration of Chinese nationals was 
restricted and considered treacherous to the socialist state. Ever since 
China’s economic reforms in the 1980s, external border controls against 
Chinese citizens have been dramatically de-securitised, to the extent that at 
present the immigration of Chinese nationals is celebrated as a patriotic 
gesture contributing to the country’s economic development. In relation to 
foreign nationals seeking to enter the country, China’s external borders have 
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undergone a similar opening up from a period where immigration was a seen 
as a high security matter and only political sympathisers were allowed into 
the country, to one where foreign nationals are perceived as an economic 
opportunity and their number in the country has increased dramatically.  
Part Four examined the many legal profiles bestowed upon individuals on 
the move by different legal categories. I noted that most of China’s internal 
migrants are still referred to as a “floating population” (liudong renkou), 
residing in cities without a permanent legal status either as temporary hukou 
holders or as irregular “floaters”. Among the main categories of hukou 
conversion, a procedure for which the majority of rural migrants do not 
qualify, I mentioned: state employment; “the powerful” (retired state cadres 
and their families); “the wealthy”; “the educated or talented” and “the 
second generation relocated” (Wang 2005). Legal categories of mobility 
across international borders include overseas Chinese, naturalised citizens, 
foreign workers, irregular or semi-legal migrants. The case of Beijing, the city 
with the most restrictive legislation on internal borders in the country, 
demonstrated that while in the rest of the country the opening-up to a 
market economy has eased mobility into the city, criteria for the acquisition 
of a Beijing hukou remain very strict. It was further revealed that even in the 
city with the strictest hukou legislation in China, the implementation of hukou 
regulations is sporadic and ad-hoc. Part Seven discussed the main trends of 
migration management in the PRC as they emerged throughout this chapter. 
It emphasised that the trajectory of de-securitisation characterising China’s 
internal and international borders over the last thirty years has been 
intertwined with China’s pursuit of economic development.  
My investigation of the legislation and policy variably constituting the 
borders of China’s migration regime systems suggests that despite many 
differences, China and the EU share similar economic underpinnings when 
looking at the determination of who is entitled to move, under which 
conditions and with which rights. These economic underpinnings, tacitly 
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pursued in the EU context and straightforwardly articulated in official 
language in the Chinese case are a symptom of the two contexts’ 
embeddedness in a global neoliberal era.  This issue will be elaborated on in 
the next chapter, which will discuss the outcomes of the comparative view 
and offer new insights on current EU migration management in the light of 
the Chinese comparison. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Migration management in a neoliberal era: forthright and 
hidden capitalisation of migration 
                                                       
Introduction 
This thesis provides a new perspective on the trend of securitisation of 
the EU external borders in contemporary Europe, and began by taking cues 
from a rebuttal of the common-sense notion that borders are territorial 
entities naturally demarcating politico-legal spaces. In its place, an 
operational definition of borders as shifting processes made of 
conglomerates of laws, policies and measures and which operate as obstacles, 
impediments or incentives to mobility across politico-legal spaces was 
proposed. With this definition in mind I set to investigate borders in the 
European context, where non-EU migration is increasingly securitised, 
through an innovative comparative perspective with the Chinese migration 
system.  
Chapter II examined the EU migration management context in detail, 
beginning with an historical account. It showed how on the one hand, EU 
frameworks and policies have substantially erased internal borders for EU 
citizens. On the other, these policies have increasingly come to conceptualise 
non-EU migration as a security issue as a correlate of the abolition of the 
internal border controls instituting the EU internal market. The analysis of 
the main legal categories of migration in the EU revealed how despite the 
dominant framing of non-EU migration as a humanitarian or a security issue 
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in official language, its management is underpinned by a wide-ranging 
economic rationale. 
Chapter III took the reader to China. It showed how over recent decades, 
internal and international migration have in general been de-securitised in 
the Chinese context. The historical account of China’s borders and the 
examination of the legal categories of migration in the Chinese system 
highlighted that China’s relative opening of migration management has been 
characterised by an open articulation of the nexus between migration 
management and the government’s pursuit of economic growth. The 
detailed analysis of the legislation and policy variably constituting borders in 
the two migration systems foregrounded in both cases the significant role of 
economic considerations in the determination of who is entitled to move, 
under which conditions and with which rights. 
The main goal of this final chapter is to reflect upon the main findings of 
previous chapters and to offer new insights on current EU migration 
management in the light of the Chinese comparison. Section one will recap 
the general convergences and divergences that emerged from the descriptive 
analysis of the two contexts. They include: generally opposite trajectories 
characterising the migration security nexus; perceptions and policies dealing 
with irregular migration; the role of humanitarian reasons and their presence 
in legal discourse. I will observe that instead, a pervading economic rationale 
characterises both the EU’s and China’s migration systems. Section two will 
zoom in on this notion of economic rationale and contextualise it with both 
migration systems’ embeddedness within the neoliberal global economy. 
While the pursuit of the neoliberal logic appears to have led to an increase in 
the securitisation of migration in the EU context, in the Chinese context it 
has been conducive to an overall de-securitisation of migration as compared 
to the Maoist era. This difference will be further investigated in the 
following two sections individuating two different approaches in migration 
management as a result of this comparison: a “forthright economic 
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approach” to migration and its capitalisation in the Chinese case (Section 
three), and in opposition to that, a “tacit economic approach” to migration 
management in the European context (Section four). Section five will survey 
some of the theories explaining the nexus between the pursuit of neoliberal 
growth, migration management and security. I will argue that the 
comparative consideration of the Chinese case compels a rethinking of the 
causality normally posited between pursuit of market logic and growing 
levels of securitisation of migration. The comparative view with the Chinese 
case appears to suggest that it is specifically when the pursuit of market logic 
remains hidden that the issue of migration can easily be turned into a 
security matter. In Section six I will further explore how these two different 
economic approaches to migration management are a product of different 
historical legacies and trajectories. I will individuate what I define as the 
“ideological foundations” of both the Chinese and EU migration regimes. 
The section shall particularly focus on the European case, where the dual 
framing of issues of migration either through humanitarian or security 
concerns pervades the field of migration management.  
Consequently, Section seven will posit the ambivalence of humanitarian 
concerns in the neoliberal setting of EU migration management. I will note 
that the use of the humanitarian category in migration management 
introduces the possibility of a somewhat moral condemnation of any 
movement which does not take place for humanitarian reasons. The 
counterpoint of the Chinese case, where the humanitarian category is not 
implemented and asylum seekers enter the country as economic migrants, 
dramatically stands as a reminder of the arbitrariness of legal categories, 
including the humanitarian category. I will observe that notions of 
protection and risk as related to non-EU migrants are ultimately still heavily 
influenced by economic considerations despite the human rights ideals they 
appeal to.  
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Section eight posits that humanitarian concerns contribute to the 
occlusion of the economic underpinnings of a migration system. I will 
further advance the hypothesis that migration is possibly more accepted as a 
legitimate activity when the economic purposes underpinning its 
management are made explicit. On the contrary, when economic reasons in 
migration management are not openly articulated in public and official 
discourse, the lack of transparency leads to a situation where the 
securitisation of migration feeds into itself, as exemplified by the EU case. I 
will further emphasise how even though China is a non-democratic system, 
its current migration management is not characterised by the levels of 
securitisation of migration which characterise the contemporary EU regime 
and this fact will beg the question of whether an open articulation of 
migration as an economic matter is in fact compatible with the current 
ideological framework grounding the EU project. The last section will close 
the chapter with a brief discussion of possible future scenarios of migration 
management in the EU and in China. I will conclude that the securitisation 
of migration in the EU and de-securitisation of migration in China are to be 
considered as cyclical trends which might endure or reverse in the future.  
1. Diverging trends of migration management in the EU and in China 
As seen through Chapter II and III, current borders’ configurations in 
the EU and in China and their related trends in migration management stem 
from different historical legacies, local conditions and institutional 
frameworks. The two historical outlines showed that in the EU case, non-
EU migration and the EU external borders have been increasingly 
securitised as EU internal borders have been gradually removed for EU 
citizens. On the other hand, from a situation where mobility was highly 
restricted based on political ideology, over the last thirty years or so China’s 
migration management has been characterised by a relaxation of both its 
internal and external borders. While the recent strengthening of China’s 
international borders might point to the development of a somewhat 
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different trend, the current levels of securitisation of international migration 
in China do not compare to the levels of securitisation characterising 
migration management in contemporary Europe for the time being. 
The work’s comparative overview also exposed to two different 
configurations of welfare and mobility. In the case of China’s internal 
borders, welfare benefits are “territorialised”, in the sense that the provision 
of welfare is geographically restricted to one’s legal affiliation to an 
administrative location which is assigned at birth. I also noted in Chapter III 
that while social benefits such as free education or healthcare generally 
remain a prerogative of local hukou holders, hukou reforms are targeted at 
achieving a more flexible provision of welfare in China’s medium sized cities. 
I also observed that welfare rights in the chosen place of residence are 
instead granted in the cases of blue seal hukou and green cards for foreign 
nationals.  
China’s geographically restricted and rigid configuration of welfare is in 
contrast with the more universalistic welfare approach which characterises 
the government of populations in the EU and which includes to different 
degrees segments of the migrant population, as shown in Chapter II. As 
mentioned in Chapter I, while since World War II welfare rights have been 
an important instrument in governing populations and in balancing the 
negative effects of market economies in the European context, the 
European integration process and advent of the common market has 
nevertheless coincided with the adoption of neoliberal policies undermining 
this welfare tradition. Of course, the welfare systems’ capacities of the two 
politico-legal units in comparison should also be seen in the light of 
different resource availability and economic status, the EU comprising a 
group of developed economies and China a developing country.  
The comparative overview further revealed divergent perceptions of 
migrant illegality. On the one hand, in the European context irregular non-
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EU migration is currently a central issue in political discourses, which 
present migrant illegality as morally reproachable and criminal. In this 
context, irregular migrants are portrayed as untrustworthy and dangerous 
individuals seeking to escape the control of the state. Of course, this 
depiction is intertwined with the abovementioned processes of securitisation 
of migration. China was an interesting case to look at because it is a politico-
legal space characterised by internal borders and a migration regime within 
the same nation state. Because of that, the arbitrariness of different legal 
statuses produced by migration policy frameworks is perhaps even more 
apparent than in the case of nation states managing international migration. 
I observed in Chapter III how currently irregular internal migration is merely 
perceived as a matter of administrative noncompliance. This perception is 
further supported by the sporadic implementation of China’s internal 
borders. I further noted that although foreign migrants are periodically 
targeted for their irregular status, and although the latest legislation provides 
for harsher punishments for irregular foreign migrants, they were not 
equivalent to the way in which irregular migration functions in EU migration 
management. In the latter, the notion of “illegal” migration is attached to 
negative moral judgements and is a key lever in the discourses and practices 
constructing migration as a security issue. It could be noted that this status 
of irregularity as not being criminalised may further relate to the 
characteristics of China’s legal system, whereby policies may at times trump 
legislation and the latter is still to some extent perceived as an instrument of 
politics rather than something that is autonomous from it and a value to be 
upheld. Yet, as the two historical perspectives on legislation have shown, 
these two diverging approaches to migrant illegality are contingent and 
changing. 
Another diverging trend was the different role that human rights and 
humanitarian concerns play in the two migration systems. In the Chinese 
context I noted how the management of international migration still lacks an 
asylum reception and processing system and references to human rights are 
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mainly absent in its policies and legislation. In contrast to that, in the current 
EU migration system the humanitarian category414 is the main legal avenue 
into the EU for non-EU migrants and policies and legislation on migration 
always pledge observance of human rights conventions. Humanitarian 
concerns occupy a somewhat opposite place in contemporary China’s and 
the EU’s migration regimes. In the former, references to human rights 
instruments are practically absent in the legal language and lack 
implementation. In the latter, the humanitarian category is instead a central 
tool of migration management of the non-EU migrant population. Despite 
the lack of a legal humanitarian category in China’s migration system, a 
similar governmental approach towards vulnerable migrants can be detected 
in the case of internal migrants, currently depicted as vulnerable groups in 
need of protection within official language and policies.   
Generally opposite trajectories characterise migration management in the 
EU and in China as far as the migration security nexus, welfare systems, 
perceptions and policies dealing with irregular migration and the role of 
humanitarian category go. Yet, this work’s comparative perspective 
highlighted how despite their very different historical legacies and 
trajectories, a prominently converging trend in both the EU and China is the 
economic rationale orienting migration management and migrant legal 
profiling. The next section elaborates on this trend as it emerged throughout 
previous chapters. 
2. Converging economic rationale as a symptom of China’s and the EU’s 
embeddedness in a global neoliberal setting 
A converging economic rationale characterises both the European and 
the Chinese context. This work has shown that in both contexts current 
                                                          
414As explained in Chapter II, the institute of humanitarian protection is distinct from political asylum - 
being normally granted to individuals who are deemed to have a need for protection but who do not 
meet the conditions for refugee status. In this chapter I will converge both under the label 
“humanitarian category” or “humanitarian concerns” for practical reasons. 
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migration legal frameworks generally entitle high income or high-skilled 
mobile individuals easier access to free movement and establishment 
compared with low-income migrants, who are generally seen as undesirable 
and socially dangerous to host societies. This held true regardless of the 
administrative level of the legislation in question (national, sub-national, 
supranational or local). I showed that in the EU case, legal routes into 
European countries are currently available only to affluent or hyper-skilled 
migrants, leaving the only option of irregular journeys or irregular stays to 
those individuals who do not meet these criteria. Chapter III demonstrated 
that a similar economic rationale orients both hukou legislation and Chinese 
immigration law. I noted that hukou conversions from a rural to a hukou of 
large cities are rare and circumscribed to a few selected categories while the 
majority of internal migrants in China’s megacities are barred by the legal 
framework from acquiring a permanent legal status. Similarly, I showed how 
the current legal frameworks regulating international borders increasingly 
promote the immigration of “talents”, high-skilled or wealthy foreign 
nationals while confining other persons to ambiguous legal statuses. In both 
the Chinese and EU cases I described the promotion of residence schemes 
through blue cards as a straightforward trade-off of citizenship rights in 
exchange for skills or investments.  
At times, the economic rationale assumed different shapes in the two 
contexts. For instance, in the EU a mercantilist economic approach to 
migration is exemplified by Member States’ reluctance to accept more 
refugee quotas, as illustrated by Member States’ tug of war around reforms 
of the Dublin system. But also, the management of EU external borders and 
the refugee reception system have themselves become productive, a way for 
governments to yield profits from the management of irregular migration 
(Andersson 2014).  In the Chinese case, a similar situation was observed 
where I noted that the introduction of visas and various types of migration 
permits have created an entire “economy of migrants” which enabled local 
governments to yield revenues from the business of migration (Xu 2009).  
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Finally, I remarked that another more traditional way in which 
governments profit from irregular migration is through labour markets, 
insofar as the lack of legal avenues of migration creates a precarious and 
highly exploitable labour force which is beneficial to local labour markets. 
We saw this, for example, in the Chinese context, where especially at the 
outset of economic reforms, rural hukou holders’ lack of legal status in urban 
centres provided local governments with a supply of cheap labour which 
could be expelled in times of economic contraction based on their illegal 
status. I also mentioned that this condition resembles that of many irregular 
foreign migrants from China’s neighbouring countries employed in low-
skilled jobs, barred from any sort of legal recognition. This phenomenon 
was further observed in the EU context and particularly in the Italian case - 
although this happens in all other Member States – where I noted that Italy’s 
labour market is based on an informal economy largely fuelled by irregular 
migrant labour. This work showed that in both contexts, migration 
management has been employed by governments to serve their economies, 
in particular from the perspective of optimising their labour markets. The 
joint consideration of the legislation and policies constituting borders in the 
EU and in China uniquely shed light on the centrality of neoliberal 
imperatives in the management of migrant populations, regardless of the 
particularities and trends characterising their local contexts.  
While neoliberalism is commonly associated with schemes to promote 
market capitalism by maximising competition and free trade through de-
regulation and social policy cuts, Brown points out that these are “the 
inadvertent political and social consequences of neo-liberalism” rather than 
neoliberalism per se (Brown 2009: 38). Following the Foucauldian 
interpretation of neoliberalism already posited in Chapter I, the latter is to be 
conceived as that political rationality which both determines the consequences 
mentioned above and “reaches beyond the market” (Ibid, original emphasis). 
While foregrounding the market, this rationality crucially involves “extending 
and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, even as the 
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market itself remains a distinctive player” (Ibid: 39-40 original emphasis). 
The previous descriptive accounts of the EU and Chinese cases showed the 
extent to which market values have been extended to migration policies and 
actions and the extent to which they do intertwine with a supposedly non-
economic matter as citizenship acquisition. 
Despite both contexts being characterised by a similar economic rationale, 
this thesis demonstrated that the two migration systems deal differently with 
it in official language and legislation. As substantiated in previous chapters, 
an open embrace of the market logic characterises China’s current migration 
management and highlights by contrast a less upfront pursuit of the same 
logic in the European case. The next two sections shall rehash the main 
features of these two different approaches, which would have been 
indiscernible if not for the descriptive comparative account of borders in the 
EU and China carried out in the main body of this work.  
3. China’s forthright market approach to migration management 
The analysis of the main legislation and policies instituting China’s 
internal and external borders in Chapter III discovered an open articulation 
of the economic uses and benefits of migration and its management in the 
Chinese context. This feature is in striking contrast to the lack of 
transparency about the economic underpinnings of migration characterising 
the EU context. This section revisits some of the main passages where this 
feature most clearly emerged in legal language and defines it as a “forthright 
market approach to migration management”. It then briefly discusses the 
possible reasons behind it.  
As previously mentioned, China’s ideological transition to socialist 
market economy after 1978 marked a shift in its government’s mode of 
managing its population. From a situation of political rule based on 
ideological distinctions, China moved to a type of governmentality within 
 236 
 
which the pursuit of economic growth became the key orientation of policy-
making as well as the basis of its government’s legitimacy. I noted that in the 
early 1980s, the transition from planned to market economy led to the 
gradual relaxation of internal mobility. Such relaxation of borders, 
ambivalently combining lenience and occasional restriction, was functional 
to satisfy the labour demands in China’s developing industrial areas with 
cheap and easily dischargeable rural migrant labour. Chapter III showed how 
the goal of better suiting the needs of the new economic system was clearly 
stated for example in the 1985 Provisional Regulations, introducing 
temporary residence permits for rural hukou holders in urban areas. 
Remarkably, these Regulations begin with the consideration that, as the 
country has embarked on a new path of economic reforms and internal 
migration has developed, temporary residence permits will better “suit the 
needs of the new model of development”.415 What is significant here is the 
almost consequential connection between the needs of the new model 
development, that is, market economy, and the creation of temporary 
residence permits. 
I further illustrated that this model of development was at times pursued 
bluntly, an example being the introduction of the direct sale of hukou by 
some local governments and bureaus to accumulate revenues. I nevertheless 
observed that schemes such as the blue seal hukou (lanyin hukou) - the 
equivalent of the EU’s so called blue card - obtainable through talent 
schemes or by making a large investment or large real estate purchase, are 
underpinned by the exact same market logic. In fact, this market logic was 
openly stated in the local regulations introducing blue cards, which typically 
opened with statements such as “in order to better suit the needs of a 
                                                          
415 Supra, footnote 283. 
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construction of a socialist market economy” and “in order to advance 
economic and social progress”.416  
I would suggest that while this open connection between migration 
control and economic gains has translated into an often ruthless 
marketisation of migration management, it has also possibly been conducive 
to the progressive acknowledgment of the economic contribution that 
internal migrants have made to the country. I noted earlier that the benefits 
of internal migration were first acknowledged in official language in the 1994 
Temporary Regulations which for the first time recognised internal 
migration as a legitimate activity and shifted from a policy of “blocking” 
migration to a strategy of “channelling” the movement in an orderly way 
(Xiang 2007: 5). Another key example of this is the 2003 Notification, which 
emphasises the positive economic effects of rural to urban migration for 
both rural migrants and the economic and social prosperity of Chinese 
cities. 417  Or again, the 2006 Opinions, which stated that rural migrants 
working in cities have made an important contribution to the country’s 
modernisation and their problems have to be resolved through rights’ 
awareness promotion, training and employment.418  
I showed in Chapter III how in recent years the blunt economic rationale 
which characterised China’s earlier legislation and policies has tended 
towards a more rights-oriented approach, aimed at promoting migrants’ 
rights and their wellbeing. The move towards a promotion of the well-being 
of rural migrants should be seen in the context of the government’s pursuit 
of popular support through the promotion of a harmonious society, which 
at the moment largely depends on improving the living conditions of the 
whole of its population. This governmental rationale is reflected in the 
words of the 2011 Notice on the reform of the hukou system, warning that if 
                                                          
416 Supra, footnote 289. 
417 Supra, footnote 292. 
418 Supra, footnote 295. 
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the various issues encountered with local experimentations of hukou reforms 
or lack thereof are not resolved in a timely manner “they will severely affect 
the stable and rapid development of the economy as well as social harmony 
and stability”.419 I have also observed that while many of the government’s 
directives on emigration are not public, a similar economic rationale can be 
generally observed underpinning the government’s approach towards 
Chinese emigrants since the 1990s. As the analysis of secondary sources on 
this topic has shown, for migration state brokers emigrants are deemed as 
“agents of the Chinese economy and polity”, instrumental to reinforcing the 
bond of overseas Chinese to China, and to improving China’s reputation in 
their host countries (Nyíri 2005: 155-156). 
Finally, this market oriented approach in China’s migration management 
of foreign migrants has openly manifested as a policy to attract high skilled, 
“talented” individuals and investors to boost its labour market and benefit 
China’s economic development. In this context, the 2002 Provisions on 
foreign investors and talents posited that a long-term and important policy 
in China was to attract this group of migrants “to provide services and 
invest in China”. 420  This goal was furthered with the envisioning of a 
“Thousand Talents Plan” which began in 2008, aimed at recruiting foreign 
individuals who can advance China’s economic position internationally and 
strengthen economic and social progress internally”.421  
The 2013 Exit Entry Law confirmed the governmental will to facilitate 
the entry of “foreign talents”422 by introducing a special visa category for 
them and envisaging easier avenues to permanent residence.423 Similarly, in a 
2016 Opinion furthering the reform of the permanent residence system as 
                                                          
419 Supra, footnote 300. 
420 Supra, footnote 343. 
421 Supra, footnote 345.  
422 Supra, footnote 350, Art. 16 and 31. 
423Supra, Art. 47. 
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the main strategy to attract more foreign talent,424 it is stated that in the 
future, market forces will be an “essential factor” in the assessment of the 
notion of foreign talent. 425 The same market logic structures the Pilot 
Implementation Plan of the Work Permit issued in late 2016.426 As the Plan 
makes clear, the new work permit system for foreign workers is based on the 
principle of “encouraging high-end talents, controlling ordinary foreigners, 
limiting low-end foreigners”. 427  These latest legal developments are 
exemplary of the governmental will to match the management of 
international migration with the current needs of China’s labour market. In 
Chapter III it was observed that while most international migrants in China 
are managed as an economic opportunity, the latest legislation does not 
provide for legal avenues for low skilled labour migrants or small traders and 
has introduced increasingly restrictive measures to tackle irregular conditions. 
In this domain, China would resemble the EU situation, where the lack of 
legal recognition renders migrant labourers more precarious and at the same 
time more attractive for host labour markets.  
The Chinese government’s straightforward view of migration as an 
economic matter directly contrasts with the EU context, where currently 
migration is predominantly framed either as a humanitarian or a security 
issue. China’s approach could be framed as a “straightforward approach” to 
migration management in relation to the economic uses of migration 
management. What could be the reasons behind such open an approach? 
My account of China’s borders has shown the coincidence of the latter with 
the country’s transition to a market economy. It could be further speculated 
that insofar as the latter was a new system which depended on the 
establishment and maintenance of certain conditions, clarity about market 
needs in policies and legislation was fundamental for the central government 
                                                          
424Supra, footnote 358. 
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426 Supra, footnote 360. 
427Supra, subsection 2.  
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to fully master such a model and to guide the action of local governments. 
This was especially visible in the legislation on internal migration. Chapter 
III further showed that while the governmental approach towards internal 
migrants was initially characterised by a blunt capitalisation on rural migrants’ 
movement, in more recent times the government’s economic-oriented 
approach has become more nuanced and increasingly concerned about 
migrants’ rights and well-being as a corrective to the growing inequalities 
produced by the blunt pursuit of profit of the early reform period. The 
account of governmentality put forward in Chapter I similarly highlighted 
the role of the welfare state as a key tool for governments in the European 
context in fostering their power by way of promoting the well-being of the 
population in a context of market economy.  
With the Chinese case as a counterpoint, the next section discusses the 
EU “tacit market approach to migration management”, where the market 
economy system has been in place for a longer period and has traditionally 
been paired with the welfare state system. 
4. The EU’s tacit market approach to migration management  
The comparative argument running throughout this thesis is that Chinese 
migration management uniquely highlights how current migration 
management in the EU, characterised by increasing levels of securitisation of 
non-EU migration, lacks an open articulation of the connection between 
migration management and its economic underpinnings. Instead, migration 
management in the EU is predominantly discussed and tackled either 
through the language of humanitarian concerns or that of security discourses. 
This section examines closely what I describe as a “tacit market approach” 
characterising EU migration management.  
As emerged from the analysis of EU and Italian legislation in Chapter II 
and the consideration of the Chinese case, the EU migration system presents 
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deep economic underpinnings in spite of the lack of a forthright enunciation 
in legislation and official language, as compared with the Chinese case. 
Tracing the ambiguous articulation of the nexus between migration and its 
economic uses in the EU is thus by definition a harder a task. Chapter II 
nonetheless revealed this nexus through the analysis of the history of EU 
borders and the current categories of EU’s migration management. The 
economic underpinnings of the EU’s migration regime were exemplified by 
the fact that the mobility of EU citizens was at its beginnings conceived as a 
function of the construction of a single European market. I noted that to 
this day, a financial means test for economically passive EU citizens 
internally migrating is in place. Most notably, economic underpinnings 
impacted on the categorisation of the mobility of non-EU nationals and 
their levels of dangerousness. Chapter II posited how the label of “threat” to 
the internal security or cultural identity of Member States differentially 
applied to non-EU citizens according to their economic worth. I mentioned 
the fast-track permanent residence status granted by many Member States to 
non-EU investors based on their monetary contribution to the local 
economy. While currently legal routes into European countries are available 
to affluent, hyper-skilled individuals and family members, and legal 
recognition is granted to asylum seekers who are lucky enough to make it 
into the EU space, most non-EU migrants are left with the only option of 
irregular routes and irregular work and are criminalised.  
The logic emerging from the current legal framework is that migrants 
who do not possess the skills or capital in high demand are highly 
undesirable and threatening for EU societies. Despite this, all national 
markets in the EU continue to profit from cheap and readily exploitable 
irregular migrant labour. The economic rationale is further underpinning 
migration management in the way labour migration is generally managed at 
the national level through criteria of skills fulfilment, labour market test (fall 
within the needed quotas), wage (admitting only those paid over a certain 
wage). I noted that an exception to the lack of articulation of migration and 
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its economic uses in official language is the articulation of the need for legal 
labour migration by the EU Commission since the early 2000s. As 
documented by Hansen, in several official documents the Commission 
solicited EU Member States to open legal avenues for migrant labourers 
motivating this with the fact that millions of non-EU workers will be 
increasingly needed to sustain the current levels of welfare in EU countries, 
given their shrinking working-age population (Hansen 2010, 2016, 2017). 
This aspect was again reiterated by the Commission in the 2015 Global 
approach to migration, which in spite of its prioritisation of a view of 
migration in the EU in terms of humanitarian emergency and as a security 
matter, notes that as the decline of the EU’s working age population 
advances, “[m]igration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the 
sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the 
EU economy”.428 It is significant that the Commission is raising this matter, 
even if for now the issue remains a statement of purpose rather than a policy 
guideline.   
I also mentioned that the prioritisation of migration as a humanitarian 
emergency or as a security matter has fed into what has become a profitable 
industry – encompassing preventive operations, search and rescue 
operations, processing centres, detention centres and so on (Andersson 
2014). Governments, defence contractors, aid workers, NGOs would all 
profit from the macroeconomic stimulus produced by the management of 
irregular migrants. The pursuit of this economic rationale in migration 
management was confirmed in the Italian case, where based on low numbers 
of actual expulsions, scholars have argued that migrant detention centres are 
aimed at regulating the speed of migrant entry to the labour market 
(Mezzadra 2006: 109-110).  
While the pursuit of market economy in the context of EU migration 
management can be identified from all these examples, the detailed analysis 
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of the legislation in Chapter II disclosed that it is not an apparent policy goal 
as in the Chinese context but remains in the background rather than being 
forthrightly enunciated. In its place, I showed that non-EU migration is 
tackled predominantly through humanitarian categories or alternatively 
security concerns. One might at this point wonder why this is so. One 
hypothesis could be that differently from China, the EU has been 
characterised by a market economy system for a long time, therefore this 
system is taken for granted and makes its open articulation unnecessary. 
Another supposition is that governments at the national level do not dare 
articulate the connection between economic growth and migration and 
prefer restrictive agendas so as not to antagonise certain segments of 
national publics unwilling to accept more international migrants. It could be 
also argued that the lack of articulation of migration and its economic uses is 
instead itself part of a hidden agenda to maximise profits from irregular 
migrant labour. Regardless of the answer to why governments’ capitalisation 
on migration is not openly articulated in the EU context, as this thesis’ 
comparative outlook showed and as outlined in this section, the EU 
migration regime has deep economic underpinnings which derive from its 
embeddedness within the global neoliberal economy.  
 Whether in the form of a tacit or in that of a straightforward approach, 
in both contexts the market approach can be understood, as posited earlier, 
in the broader terms of a neoliberal political rationality where market values 
exceed the field of the market and extend to institutions and social actions. 
Neoliberal practices and imperatives express a set of practices which are 
aimed at the accumulation of capital. The next section reviews some of the 
main theories which have connected global capitalism and migration 
management and reflects upon the different repercussions that these two 
economic approaches have on the phenomenon of the securitisation of 
migration.   
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5. Migration management and the securitisation of migration in a neoliberal 
era 
Previous sections posited that the different ways in which economic 
growth is pursued through migration management in the EU and in China, 
demonstrated for example by both systems’ race for global talents and 
investors as well as their differential inclusion of low waged migrants to 
profit their labour markets. The last two sections have further examined 
how in the Chinese case the pursuit of an economic rationale was openly 
stated while in the EU context, the economic rationale remained in the 
background to the advantage of security and humanitarian categories. This 
market approach to migration is a symptom of the two being situated in a 
context of neoliberalism and global capitalism. This section surveys some of 
the main theories focusing on the nexus between migration management 
and global capital. As will be seen, most of these theories, which are based 
on empirical evidence from countries in the global North, tend to see a 
causal relationship between neoliberal economic rationale and increasing 
securitisation of migration. I will posit that the comparative consideration of 
the Chinese case, where the open pursuit of market economy has led to a 
de-securitisation of migration, compels a redefinition of such causal 
relationship in the more specific terms of a causality between hidden market 
economic rationale and increasing securitisation. In other words, the 
Chinese case suggests that it is specifically when the pursuit of market logic 
remains hidden that the issue of migration can be easily turned into a 
security matter.  
The connection between migration management and global capital has 
received a few interpretations from different disciplinary perspectives. For 
some scholars the securitisation of migratory movements has been triggered 
by the perceived loss of control by national governments in the face of 
global capitalism. This perceived loss of control would have invested 
migration laws and their enforcement with the status of “last bastion of 
 245 
 
national sovereignty” (Dauvergne 2008: 47, Brown 2014). Others have 
questioned this reading, which separates the decisional power of the state 
from neo-liberal considerations already orienting its policies. As migration 
management is already oriented by neoliberal considerations – namely, what 
is good for the global economy is good for the national state – migration 
management and border controls ought to be considered as “an instantiation 
of the neo-liberal Empire” rather than an instantiation of national 
sovereignty (Amaya-Castro 2012). Within this context, migration legislation 
and policies would have ceased to be an expression of nation states 
“sovereign right” to protect their borders and should rather be seen as the 
nation state’s contribution to the development of that very same 
globalisation of the capitalist system (Ibid). Economic considerations in 
migration management – which in developed countries are most evident in 
nationality and visa policies attributing more mobility capacity to nationals 
of developed countries and individuals with “higher skills” – would be 
contributing to the development of a global regime of social differentiation 
of migrants (Amaya-Castro 2017). Through the criteria of nationality and 
higher skills, economic globalisation would cut through national citizenship, 
enhancing the differentials in economic worth of different segments of the 
world’s population (Ibid: 95). In this context, national borders appear as 
dividers of people into distinct national populations and a specular 
international state system which functions as a “dispersed regime of 
governance” of the larger world’s population (Hindess 2000: 1494). As the 
Chinese and European cases demonstrated in this work, national citizenship 
is one among many modalities (i.e. hukou and EU citizenship) in which the 
world population is socially stratified and governed within and across 
political spaces. 
This dispersed regime of governance of the world’s population heavily 
reliant upon economic considerations does not have a head or a sovereign as 
already remarked in this work drawing on Foucault’s interpretation of 
neoliberalism, as a political rationality which reaches beyond the market and 
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entails an extension and dissemination of market values to all institutions 
and government actions as well as a depiction of the individual as a homo 
oeconomicus (Foucault 2008). 429  As Geiger and Pécoud have noted, the 
neoliberal type of rationality cannot only be found in Chinese or EU 
migration management but can also be observed among the policies of 
international agencies such as the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) (Geiger and Pécoud 2010). On the one hand, policy and legal 
frameworks at the national or regional level tend to tackle migration with the 
goal of maximising the interests of the nation or supranational entity in 
question while on the global level international organisations take into 
consideration the needs and welfare of both origin and destination areas 
(Kalm 2010: 22). On the other hand, the global policy discourse on 
migration by international agencies remains embedded in economic 
considerations (Ibid). While such agencies advocate internationally for 
migrants’ well-being and assist global migration out of technical and 
humanitarian concerns, their solutions remain grounded on a neoliberal 
rationality which aims to regulate the supply of labour migrating from poor 
areas to the demand for migrant labour in rich areas of the globe (Geiger 
and Pécoud 2010: 14; Walters and Andrijasevic 2010). 
The connection between migration management and global capitalism 
has received further interpretation by a group of scholars drawing on a 
Marxist autonomist framework, as a part of the theory of an “autonomy of 
migration” (Moulier Boutang 1998, Mezzadra 2006, Mitropoulos 2007, 
Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos 2008, Karakayali and Rigo 2010, De 
Genova and Peutz 2010, Mezzadra 2011, Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013, 
Mezzadra and Neilson 2013).  The theory moves from the centrality of 
labour markets in shaping political configurations and observes how in the 
                                                          
429 One of the few hasty allusions Foucault makes to migration precisely relates to his application of 
the neoliberal perspective to the phenomenon of migration by equalling migration to an investment, 
and the migrant to an investor (Foucault 2008: 130). 
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current condition of global capitalism, (irregular) migration – as an endless 
reserve of exploitable labour below national minimum standards - has 
become “one of the main forces in the production and reproduction of 
capital” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013: 180). Within this context, the role 
of migration controls would not be to stop mobility but rather, “to make 
different time registers of the entry in the productive sphere along the path 
of mobile populations compatible”. More specifically, the main function of 
migration control would be “to render the speed of absorption into the local 
labour markets compatible with the speed of flows of mobile populations” 
(Ibid). According to this perspective, the main goal of migration regimes – 
including their practices of detention, asylum reception and so on – would 
not be blocking migration but rather, institutionalising it by regulating its 
speed and scale (De Genova and Peutz 2010, Papadopoulos and Tsianos 
2013).  
The assumption of this theory is that migration constitutes a creative and 
unpredictable force which always exceeds full control by governmental 
policies and the supply/demand structure characterising national labour 
markets. Migrants, and particularly irregular migrants, would possess an 
inherent potential to subvert the sovereign order according to which borders 
are governed, for their agency escapes and precedes the control of sovereign 
order and its framing of migration into categories (e.g. legal/illegal, asylum 
seeker, high skilled labourer and so on). The figure of the irregular migrant 
worker would fully embody and at the same time advance/exceed the 
struggle between oppression and would embody subversion under 
conditions of global capitalism (Mezzadra 2006, 2010 and Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2013). The thesis of an autonomy of migration emphasises the 
social and subjective features of mobility before the aspect of migration 
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control and sees migration as “a political movement and a social movement” 
(Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013: 184).430  
According to this perspective, the connection between migration 
management, global capital and the securitisation of migration in the EU 
and in other countries of the global North is overdetermined by market 
forces: the “irregularisation” of migrant labour would create an unlimited 
supply of cheap and exploitable labourers who due to their outlaw status can 
be discarded and replaced with fresh migrant blood whenever turning 
disobedient or more demanding (De Genova 2011). Compared to the vision 
that the pursuit of the EU common market has spilled over into an 
increasing securitisation of migration (Huysmans 2006), as posited in 
Chapter II, this reading lays more emphasis on labour markets and their 
centrality. Yet both these theories agree on the existence of a link between 
the pursuit of market economy and securitisation of migration.  
Nevertheless, as anticipated earlier the consideration of the Chinese 
context – where the pursuit of a market logic has run parallel to an overall 
de-securitisation of the issue of migration – somewhat problematises the 
universal causality put forward by these theories on the link between 
migration management, pursuit of economic profits and securitisation of 
migration. These theories are informed by the observation of contemporary 
migration regimes in the global North.  The inclusion of China’s migration 
system in the picture thus compels a redefinition of this causal relationship 
between neoliberalism and increasing securitisation of migration in the more 
specific terms of a causality between a hidden market economic rationale and 
growing levels of securitisation. To put it differently, the Chinese case, 
                                                          
430 Similar to these perspectives, I see human mobility not as an object of migration laws and policies 
but a phenomenon which, as an agglomerate of individual decisions, has political agency and impact 
on governmental frameworks. Differently from the autonomy of migration theories, I do not see 
contemporary migration as an organised or coordinated movement, despite the occasional struggles 
that bring together groups of migrants around particular issues.  
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where the open pursuit of neoliberal economic growth has been conducive 
to a de-securitisation of the issue of human mobility, indicates that it is 
specifically when the pursuit of market logic remains hidden that the issue of 
migration can easily grow into a security matter.  
As this work’s comparative perspective has shown, the pursuit of 
neoliberal growth in migration management can produce opposing 
outcomes as far as the migration and security nexus are concerned. These 
outcomes are products of different historical legacies and trajectories which 
have been sketched in previous chapters. The following section foregrounds 
these legacies and discusses their mutual implications. This will lead me to 
bring out and make explicit the ideological foundations of the politico-legal 
system underlying migration management in Europe as opposed to those 
underlying the Chinese system.   
6. Migration management, neoliberal imperatives and ideological foundations 
of the EU space 
As set out in earlier sections, China’s forthright economic approach in 
migration management stems from a specific historical legacy and coincides 
with China’s transition from planned to market economy. This transition 
further entailed a shift in the governmentality of the population: from a 
political setting ruled along the lines of ideology and friend/enemy 
distinctions to one where the pursuit of economic growth became the 
country’s main policy goal. As seen in the introductory part on China’s legal 
system, while Marxism remains the official ideology and official language, 
the political and revolutionary passions which characterised the Maoist era 
have given way to the legitimation of the pursuit of self-interest and profits 
at both the individual level and at all levels of government. I noted how 
economic performances and continuous growth have possibly become the 
main basis for the current legitimacy of China’s one-party state. This 
situation, where government bases its grounds for survival on economic 
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performances is different from what grounded the state during Mao’s era: a 
socialist ideology deployed against the evils of capitalism at home and 
internationally. The prime role that economic growth has come to occupy in 
the governmentality of China’s population has invested its migration 
management and is arguably the main reason for why China’s migration 
system displays a forthright market approach. For the introduction of 
market economy and its principles had to be clear and explained to all levels 
of government and to the population itself. I also remarked at various stages 
in this thesis that differently from the European context, the doctrine 
grounding China’s legal system is characterised by the absence of human 
rights discourses and China’s upholding of the principle of non-intervention 
in other countries’ internal affairs. This ideological stance is translated in the 
lack of humanitarian categories in China’s contemporary migration regime. 
Finally, in the Chinese context the mobility of internal migrants is 
determined within an openly discriminatory framework which establishes 
the distinction between rural and urban citizens and attributes differential 
rights to each group. 
The comparative outlook on the Chinese case highlights by contrast the 
central role that humanitarian categories and human rights discourses hold 
in current EU migration management. Not only are humanitarian categories 
currently the main avenue to enter the EU,431 in the Union, the legislation 
and policies governing non-EU migration management are often allegedly 
framed on the basis of humanitarian concerns and their preambles normally 
reference human rights obligations. I suggest that this feature is a direct 
consequence of the European politico-legal tradition, which ostensibly holds 
notions of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights as the founding principles of the Union’s polity 
                                                          
431 I include family reunification among the definition of humanitarian, insofar as the right to family life 
is a human right according to various international conventions. 
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and of its legitimacy.432 It should be noted that although applying to the 
European space, these ideals are assumed to be “indivisible and universal” 
or have at least a universal aspiration.433 The same universal ambition seems 
to apply to the notion of freedom of movement within the EU and together 
with the ideals mentioned above, could be individuated as the main 
ideological tenets of the EU politico-legal space.434  
Despite the universal aspirations of the ideals through which the 
European politico-legal project defines itself, the analysis of legal categories 
and policies in previous chapters showed that the management of migrant 
populations in the European space enacts severe institutional exclusions and 
stratifications, Third Country nationals being the most severely affected by 
such exclusions. I also noted that all the legislative measures which have 
advanced the trend of securitisation of non-EU migration did refer in their 
preambles to the EU’s fundamental rights commitments and ideals and the 
securitisation of non-EU migration happened regardless of them. My 
analysis further stressed the different degrees of enjoyment of citizenship 
rights enacted by EU borders. At the extreme end of the governmental 
spectrum, these coincided with the deprivation of the very right to have 
rights, as exemplified in the case of administrative detentions of irregular 
migrants and Member States’ push back policies at sea. The differential 
treatment of individuals was further seen in the restriction of freedom of 
movement within the EU space, particularly criminalised in the case of the 
Dublin system through the so called first country rule, severely restraining 
                                                          
432 These principles are for example stated in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union. EU Council and Parliament, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 26 October 2012, OJ C 326/391.  
433 Supra, preamble. 
434 The adjective “ideological” is normally not employed by scholars and policy makers to define the 
EU space for it carries a negative connotation, as a set of rigid, undemocratic normative beliefs. Yet, 
as also observed in the introductory part on China’s legal systems, liberal democratic systems also 
function within the limits which are related to what is considered a major threat for the stability of the 
politico-legal unit in question.  
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the mobility of asylum seekers within the Union to their first country of 
entry.  
The perspective on China’s migration regime and the market economy 
discourse which openly grounds it highlights by contrast the European 
context as one where the legitimacy of the regime is based on a discourse 
pledging universalist ideals and equal rights for all. In this context, in spite of 
the system’s differential granting of citizenship rights and the criminalisation 
of certain non-EU migrant groups, neoliberal imperatives are not pursued in 
a straightforward fashion. As shown in Chapter II, the neoliberal goal of 
optimising labour markets through different types of migrant labour passes 
more subtly through the way in which legal categories of migration are 
defined and implemented. The lip service so to speak, to the values 
mentioned above combines with Member States’ hidden capitalisation on 
migration. The ideological foundations and the narrative of the EU as a 
space of equal rights for all contribute to the occlusion of the economic 
underpinnings of EU migration management. 
This hidden economic rationale orienting migration management in the 
EU to the advantage of humanitarian discourses, which then have a central 
role in the official language, has repercussions on the way in which 
movement of different categories of people is constructed as legitimate or 
criminal. One key example of this is the distinction between “legitimate” 
economic migration (that is, investment or hyper-skilled migration) and 
dangerous, illegitimate economic migration. Another ambiguous dichotomy 
is that between asylum seekers and dangerous, economic migrants disguised 
as asylum seekers, whereby the first one is the object of protection and 
compassion and the other is once again considered as a dangerous and 
opportunistic individual. While of course the implementation of such legal 
categories greatly varies according to national and local interpretations, it has 
created across the European space a situation whereby some migrants (i.e. 
“real” asylum seekers, investors, hyper skilled individuals) deserve 
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humanisation and rights, while the others do not and exist as a security 
matter which threatens the stability of the EU space. This security 
connotation justifies the fact that irregular migrants can have less or no 
rights at all, in a space which can thus continue to present and even perceive 
itself as a champion of equality and human rights for all.  
China’s current migration system is strikingly different, being openly 
based on the acknowledgement that internal migrants are not entitled to the 
same rights as city-born dwellers in metropolises and openly endorsing 
neoliberal imperatives. Perhaps paradoxically, the combination of the open 
lack of formal equality with an upfront pursuit of market economy in the 
Chinese context has had as a somewhat ironic consequence the recognition 
of movement to improve economic conditions as a legitimate act and of 
internal migrants’ contribution to China’s growth. On the contrary, the 
current ideology grounding the EU space creates a situation whereby 
Member States’ governments either save victims and recipients of 
compassion or reject “dangerous” economic migrants or bogus asylum 
seekers. At the same time, nonetheless tacitly following neoliberal 
imperatives, economic migration is only considered legitimate when 
migrants possess high levels of resources or social capital required to 
optimise local labour markets. Due to the centrality of human rights and 
equality discourses grounding migration management in contemporary EU, 
the fact that the majority of current non-EU migrants enter European 
labour markets on an unequal footing – as either a recipient of humanitarian 
compassion or as an exploitable and precarious irregular – goes unnoticed.  
The dual framing of issues either through humanitarian or security 
concerns seems to pervade current migration management of non-EU 
nationals. This two-fold scheme does not leave much room for other 
statuses in between. At this point, one might wonder what exactly is the 
relationship between these two opposed yet coexistent ways of framing 
migration and what is their relationship with the growing securitisation of 
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migration in the EU as it was acknowledged in this work. The next section 
explores this connection between security and humanitarian concerns in the 
EU migration regime in the light of the observation of China’s migration 
regime.  
7. The ambivalent relation between humanitarian and security concerns  
In renditions of public discourses, humanitarian protection and political 
asylum are legal institutions which virtuously put the lives and dignity of 
human beings before governments’ national interests. The idea being that 
the granting of political asylum or humanitarian protection is a non-political 
and magnanimous act by governments. In the EU, one level of critique of 
such discourse denounces the conduct of some Northern European 
Countries in particular, reluctant to have an equal share of asylum seekers, 
disproportionately forced to remain in Southern European Countries 
sharing borders with Third Countries due to the first country of asylum rule. 
Interestingly, in mid-2015 for a short period of time Sweden and Germany 
experimented with an opening of their countries to larger quotas of asylum 
seekers and refugees’ admissions to fill their labour market gaps actual and 
projected.435 Yet, both countries revoked such policies after a few months, 
claiming they were not sustainable allegedly due to growing public 
intolerance towards asylum seekers.436  
For Hansen, such policies were implicitly meant to address the 
abovementioned demographic gap the EU Commission has been warning 
about since the early 2000s and were in truth revoked due to the neoliberal 
austere framework constricting public spending in the EU (Hansen 2017, 
unpaged). In order to challenge “refugee austerity” in the contemporary EU, 
                                                          
435Kirk, L. “German and Swedish leaders welcome migrant”, EU Observer, 8 September 2015 
https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/130162 Accessed 10 September 2017 
436“Germany tightens refugee policy as Finland joins Sweden in deportations”, The Guardian, 29 
January 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/germany-tightens-borders-as-finland-
joins-sweden-in-deporting-refugees Accessed 10 September 2017 
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the German and Swedish governments would have had to get away with the 
EU’s regime of fiscal austerity at large, as the reception of refugees would 
necessitate large initial public investments (Ibid). Moreover, according to the 
same neoliberal logic, refugees would be the wrong type of migrants with 
which to solve the EU’s demographic deficit: the market-optimising being 
mobility in the form of temporary or circular workers rather than an 
“embedded, capacious form of refugees put on paths to citizenship” (Ibid). 
The intertwining of the management of humanitarian protection with 
neoliberal imperatives is once again apparent.   
While the criticism of the attitude of some Northern European Member 
States is relevant and apt, if one stops at the level of states’ behaviour, it 
could be wrongly concluded that the way to go is thus the model of 
Southern European States which would be doing the right thing (although 
compelled by the Dublin system). This reading however fails to see how the 
humanitarian category is also instrumentally employed in Southern 
European States within the contemporary EU migration regime. For it does 
not account for the fact that as any legal access to economic migration has 
been closed in the EU, including in Southern EU countries, most non-EU 
migrants are compelled to present as asylum seekers in all cases. This aspect 
differs from the Chinese system, where as previously discussed the 
humanitarian category is not even a possibility on the legal spectrum. 
Paradoxically, someone who moves to China seeking shelter from political 
prosecution will probably do so by presenting herself as a tourist or a labour 
migrant as humanitarian protection is not even an option on the legal 
spectrum. Conversely, the lack of access for economic reasons into the EU 
turns humanitarian protection into the only option to be legitimately present 
in the EU space: by presenting themselves as victims of political prosecution 
or other atrocities. The alternative is to be criminalised as irregulars and 
dangerous individuals. 
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Drawing on evidence from the French context, Fassin has argued that 
humanitarian concerns have turned into a central device for governing the 
migrant population: one where their legal and political status is granted out 
of compassion (Fassin 2012). While the notion of compassion for the 
suffering of others in Western morality is rooted in Christian doctrine 
(although of course it is equally central in all other religious traditions), he 
draws attention to the fact that the deployment of moral sentiments has 
become a distinctive feature in contemporary Western politics (Ibid: 1).437 
Humanitarian government, warns Fassin, is ambiguous because it establishes 
an asymmetrical relationship between government and objects of 
compassion: 
[t]he asymmetry is political rather than psychological: a 
critique of compassion is necessary not because of the 
attitude of superiority it implies but because it always 
presupposes a relation of inequality. Humanitarian reason 
governs precarious lives: the lives of the unemployed and the 
asylum seekers, the lives of sick immigrants and people with 
Aids, the lives of disaster victims and victims of conflict— 
threatened and forgotten lives that humanitarian government 
brings into existence by protecting and revealing them. When 
compassion is exercised in the public space, it is therefore 
always directed from above to below, from the more 
powerful to the weaker, the more fragile, the more 
vulnerable— those who can generally be constituted as 
victims of an overwhelming fate (Fassin 2012: 5) 
                                                          
437 A key example of this in French immigration law was the 1998 introduction of an illness clause, 
allowing residency status for humanitarian reasons to irregular Third Country migrants affected by 
life threatening illnesses, while at the same time the main avenues to labour migration and asylum in 
France were restricted (Fassin 2005, 2012). 
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Humanitarian government through compassion and morality dangerously 
move migrants’ rights from the sphere of the political to that of compassion. 
In this way, their rights and legitimate status are transformed into 
paternalistic acts of generosity by governments in the EU. At the same time, 
migration for economic or other reasons is increasingly viewed as 
illegitimate and criminalised. With its alleged neutral status and universal 
aspiration, the humanitarian category is ambivalent: for it can deprive the 
other of such quality and lead to the most extreme forms of its negation. As 
Carl Schmitt notably remarked as early as 1921,  
 [t]he concept of humanity is an especially useful 
ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its 
ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic 
imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified 
expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants 
to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and 
monopolise such a term probably has certain incalculable 
effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being 
human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a 
war can thereby be driven to the most extreme 
inhumanity.” (Schmitt 2007: 54).  
While the Schmittian insights have been employed to criticise notions of 
“just war” waged in the name of humanitarian motives (Zolo 2000), I 
suggest that they can also be applied to the humanitarian feature of current 
EU management of migration as highlighted through the comparison with 
the Chinese context. Schmitt’s considerations on the use of the notion of 
humanity in the political realm foreground the dangers of universalist 
presumptions, which can result in a total expulsion from the politico-social 
realm of whoever is not included within this category in a way which is more 
severe than when other categories of legal migration, such as labour 
migration, are employed in its place.   
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The predominant use of the humanitarian category in EU migration 
management introduces the possibility of a somewhat moral condemnation 
of whoever does not qualify for it. It is important to note that while on the 
surface this condemnation has nothing to do with economic considerations, 
as demonstrated through my analysis of legal categories of migration in the 
EU, at a closer scrutiny the ranking of migrants as desirable or dangerous for 
Member States remains to a significant extent based on the assessment of 
their economic worth. The fact that migrants’ economic capital is the main 
laissez passer in case they do not qualify for humanitarian protection or 
political asylum is revealing of how notions of protection or danger as 
related to non-EU migrants are ultimately more grounded on economic 
considerations than on human rights ideals. The lack of a straightforward 
articulation of this fact in official language possibly contributes to the 
preservation of the self-narrative of the EU project as a space where ideals 
of equality, dignity and human rights protection come before economic 
considerations. 
The prioritisation of human rights commitments over economic 
considerations in migration management is further debatable when looking 
at governmental actions of Member States as well as the EU institutions. 
Despite the proclaimed centrality of humanitarian concerns in migration 
management, both EU institutions and individual Member States have 
pursued cooperation on migration management with neighbouring Third 
Countries with problematic human rights records, such as Turkey or 
Libya.438 It should also be noted that the very lack of legal avenues to the EU 
                                                          
438 Reports and news articles from governmental and non-governmental organisations have warned 
how human rights violations are an intrinsic part of the EU-Turkey deal, enacting a system where 
individuals who would have a right to claim humanitarian protection are forced or returned to a 
country in which their safety and fundamental rights cannot be guaranteed. See for example Rankin, 
J. (2017) “Council of Europe condemns EU's refugee deal with Turkey”, The Guardian, 20 April 2016 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/20/eu-refugee-deal-turkey-condemned-council-of-
europe Accessed 10 August 2017 
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is one of the main causes for why migrants embark on dangerous trips and 
often lose their lives, 5000 in 2016, to reach EU shores.439 The absence of 
legal avenues to the EU can be seen as a violation of human rights, 
understood as that set of rights characteristic to all human beings regardless 
of their status  – including the right to life, liberty and freedom from torture 
- enforced through jurisdiction.  
The absence of legal avenues into the EU can alternatively be seen as 
evidence that the EU human rights framework is not fit as a framework of 
protection for non-EU migrants. As Dembour has revealed in her study of 
human rights violations’ claims by migrants at the ECHR, even at a human 
rights court such as the ECHR, it has been and continues to be enormously 
difficult for migrants to have violations of their human rights acknowledged 
and condemned by the Court as compared to those made by citizens of 
ECHR contracting States (Dembour 2015: 1). It is furthermore noteworthy 
that, as observed in Chapter II, the progressive securitisation of non-EU 
migration illustrated earlier has taken place regardless of the constant 
reference in EU policy documents and directives’ preambles to EU’s 
declarations of human rights commitments.   
The comparison with the Chinese migration system, openly addressing 
migration as an economic matter, where the humanitarian category is not 
implemented and even asylum seekers enter the country as economic 
migrants,440 dramatically sheds light on the currently predominant role and 
consequences of human rights discourses in official language on migration. 
The centrality of humanitarian concerns in the management of non-EU 
                                                                                                                                               
Gogou, K. (2017) “The EU-Turkey deal: Europe's year of shame”, Amnesty International website, 20 
March 2017 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-
shame/ Accessed 10 August 2017 
439 http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-
deadliest-year.html Accessed 10 August 2017 
440 Of course, this feature is not historically unprecedented in other contexts, including post-World 
War II Europe, where before the establishment of the legal category of refugees, individuals seeking 
shelter from political persecutions entered Northern European countries as workers. 
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migration possibly contributes to concealing the economic motivations that 
orient EU migration management in a neoliberal era. When not framed as 
victims in need of humanitarian protection, the only alternative for irregular 
migrants is to be framed as unwanted individuals threatening Member States’ 
political, economic and cultural stability.   
These two alternative ways of legally framing non-EU migrants in the EU 
are seemingly opposite and incompatible with each other. However, at a 
closer look, they complement each other. As illustrated in Chapter II, the 
granting of rights to migrants out of compassion has in fact gone hand in 
hand with the shutting off or limiting of other legal avenues to the same 
rights. On the one hand, humanitarian concerns make borders more 
penetrable, shaping legal channels of mobility into the EU through the right 
to asylum and the right to family reunification (Cuttitta 2015: 132). On the 
other hand, as examined in the Italian case, the strengthening of border 
controls and the stipulation of agreements with the EU’s neighbouring 
countries to prevent migrants from entering the EU is presented as a way to 
better protect the human rights of migrants from violations by their 
smugglers (Ibid). The humanitarian rhetoric of increasing attention to save 
migrants’ lives has further made restrictive border policies more acceptable 
to the public (Cuttitta 2017: 9). 441 It was also noted how irregular non-EU 
migrants are more easily recognised as fellow humans when they die or 
when they risk their lives at sea than when they simply claim the right to 
travel or to remain in the European space (Cuttitta 2015: 132). As 
exemplified by the case of humanitarian operations such as Italy’s Mare 
Nostrum, humanitarian and securitarian discourses and practices are thus 
not opposite but in fact support each other in enforcing EU borders 
                                                          
441 This does not mean that humanitarian policies are to be understood as the product of calculated 
decisions to deceive the public with humanitarian actions while securitising and introducing more 
restrictive measures to curb migration. Rather, this trend should be conceived as a rather unplanned 
but increasing discursive appropriation of humanitarianism by governments in the field of border 
controls (Ibid).   
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(Cuttitta 2017: 15). Humanitarian operations such as Mare Nostrum further 
transform migrants into subaltern individuals who will not circulate as equals 
in the EU space and labour market: 
[t]he endangered lives saved at sea, as well as the resettled 
women and children, deserve compassion, which strengthens 
the asymmetry of the relationship between hosts and guests, 
between generous benefactors and subaltern beneficiaries. 
On the other hand, subaltern subject positions are also 
produced through the multiplication and differentiation of 
legal statuses resulting from humanitarian action (Cuttitta 
2017: 15).  
The transformation of access into the EU for non-EU migrants as a 
compassionate act by Member States’ governments turns their movement 
for any other reason into a criminal act. The Chinese example, with its lack 
of humanitarian channels, further substantiates this point in practice: in a 
context where migration is mainly conceived as an economic matter, the 
movement of people is restricted or relaxed based on openly stated 
economic considerations and consequently more easily accepted as a normal 
occurrence rather than an exception. With its absence of humanitarian 
discourses in migration management, the Chinese migration system shed 
new light on the ambiguous interaction of humanitarian narratives and 
security narratives currently pervading EU migration management. It further 
corroborates Cuttitta’s account of humanitarianism in contemporary EU 
migration management just presented.  
With its straightforward connection between migration and economic 
rationale and its lack of humanitarian categories, the Chinese migration 
system exemplifies how by contrast, the lack of an open articulation of the 
economic reasons behind migration management in the EU possibly 
corroborates a trend of securitisation that perpetuates itself. Of course, this 
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is not to imply that human rights commitments in the EU are to be 
discarded as mere paper requirements. At times, they do and have indeed 
served to denounce the misdeeds of national governments, as the Hirsi case 
mentioned in the same chapter importantly showed. What I wish to 
emphasise is that in spite of their emancipatory potential when vindicated in 
human rights courts, the impact of such commitments is presently 
ambivalent, insofar as they occlude the economic character of migration 
policies behind ostensibly neutral humanitarian reasons.  
Highlighting different approaches to the question of humanitarian 
concerns in migration management, this comparative overview on China 
and the EU uniquely shed light on the limits of the human rights narratives 
characterising current EU migration management. Given the deep economic 
underpinnings of the EU system, it appears that an open articulation of 
migration as an economic matter may be less conducive to securitisation 
than a system which follows neoliberal imperatives only tacitly.  
8. Political systems and the securitisation of migration  
Perhaps the most striking difference between the Chinese and the EU 
context from a European perspective is that the accommodation of growing 
numbers of migrants does not necessarily lead to politico-economic mayhem, 
as many politicians and observers in the EU context – and other migration 
regimes in the global North - would have. China’s tendency of de-
securitisation of migration, characterised by a straightforward economic 
approach in migration management, stands as an alternative answer to the 
dominant equation currently characterising the European context that more 
migration needs more security. The comparative outlook based on the 
Chinese context suggests that when politico-legal systems are 
straightforward about the economic function of migration, they are less 
likely to turn the issue of migration into a matter of security. The study of 
China’s borders is a counterpoint to reflect upon the way in which borders 
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in the EU are currently managed: in contemporary Europe, security tends to 
call for more security in spite of human rights discourses. In contemporary 
China instead, the open acknowledgment of neoliberal imperatives in 
migration management has for now led to an overall de-securitisation of the 
issue of migration.  
The comparative outlook further begs the question of whether the 
liberal-democratic ideological framework has a role in the lack of articulation 
of governments’ capitalisation on migration in the EU. More specifically, is 
an open articulation of migration as an economic, rather than a security or a 
humanitarian matter, compatible with the EU’s ideological framework? No 
matter what the answer is to this question, this comparison has revealed the 
impact of the ideological edifice on which European liberal-democracies 
base their government of populations as one which combines human rights 
and security discourses with hidden economic underpinnings. This edifice 
distinguished itself from the style of government of the population 
characterising contemporary China - an authoritarian political system which 
openly pursues economic growth as its main policy goal and currently 
derives its political legitimation from the growing of economic resources to 
improve the economic conditions of its population.  
On the subject of political systems, the comparative perspective further 
illustrated that despite its non-democratic system, current migration 
management in China is not characterised by comparable levels of 
securitisation and criminalisation of migration. Despite its democratic 
system and commitment to human rights, the EU in some respects appears 
to be more of a police state than China as far as management of non-EU 
migrants is concerned. While an assessment of which has a better track 
record in respecting the human rights of migrants in the two contexts is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the comparison has highlighted that in the 
Chinese case, migration management was characterised by more transparent 
policies on the economic rationale of migrant management while in the EU 
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context, governments’ capitalisation on migration is currently occluded by a 
conceptualisation of non-EU migration either as a humanitarian issue or as a 
security issue. On the one hand, despite the lack of legal avenues to labour 
migration into the Union, Member States grant entry to victims of political 
persecution out of compassion and generosity. On the other hand, the 
contribution of non-EU migrants to the competitiveness of EU economies 
remains hidden. Meanwhile, as repeatedly noted throughout this thesis, 
economic worth remains a laissez passer and a shortcut to legal residence 
and even citizenship acquisition for migrants in both contexts. The 
contrastive view from the Chinese context examined in this work offered an 
alternative to what seems to have become the default mentality to think 
about non-EU migration in the EU, either as a humanitarian matter or as a 
security problem.   
The current diverging trends in migration management in the two 
contexts – securitising migration in the EU and de-securitising migration in 
China - might continue or reverse. The next section discusses the possible 
future scenarios of migration management in the EU and in China. 
9. Future scenarios of migration management in the EU and in China 
As I posited in Chapter I, insofar as it is a practice, the securitisation of 
migration is always a possibility for politico-legal communities which might 
not currently be engaged in it. While currently migration is being securitised 
in the EU and de-securitised in China, these trends might reverse in the 
future. The increasing securitisation of borders in relation to migratory 
movements in the global North has been explained in various ways. While as 
mentioned above some have attributed the securitisation of borders in the 
global North to the perceived loss of control by national governments in the 
face of global capitalism, for others it is not global capitalism per se but 
rather economic crises that trigger the escalation of the criminalisation of 
migration (Palidda 2011). Perceived as beneficial in times of economic 
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growth, migrants assume instead a negative label in times of economic 
downturns. The notion that the securitisation of migration is related to times 
of crisis – whether economic, political and social – is similarly shared by 
other scholars who have remarked on how migrants easily turn into a 
scapegoat for other problems (Melossi 2003, Bigo 2004). As a matter of fact, 
governmental approaches framing migration as an issue of security and 
crime are often ‘symbolic’, mainly aimed at generating greater public trust 
rather than actually attaining the declared policy goals (Parkin 2013).  
Based on this hypothesis that migration tends to be securitised in times 
of crisis, it could be speculated that China’s current approach to migration 
management might reverse as a result of an economic crisis or economic 
slowdown. China’s spectacular growth, which has averaged 10 percent per 
year since the early 2000s, has more recently slowed down to about 7 
percent as of 2016442 An economic crisis could reverse current trends of 
hukou reform and de-securitisation of migration. Further, a reversal of 
China’s current approach could be caused by political turmoil. Despite 
political reforms of the hukou system, huge disparities still exist between 
rural migrants and residents of China’s largest metropoles, where the hukou 
system seems to have evolved into a system of city walls around China’s 
largest and richest urban centres. 
As seen in Chapter III, while since the 2000s the government has been 
increasingly concerned with the welfare of migrant workers and is 
increasingly encouraging them to vindicate their rights, this might not be 
enough to secure their political consensus. Moreover, it remains to be seen 
whether immigration will remain a marginal issue in Chinese politics. As 
remarked in this thesis, foreigners traditionally occupy an important place in 
Chinese politics and have at times been criminalised, for instance for 
diverting public attention away from internal political issues or for the 
purposes of national construction. I also noted that China’s international 
                                                          
442 http://www.indexmundi.com/china/gdp_real_growth_rate.html Accessed 10 August 2017 
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migration management is still characterised by a relative lack of integration 
of foreigners within Chinese society and political life. While for the moment 
this lack of integration has not brought about any securitisation of migration, 
this could change in the near future. Moreover, although too early a trend to 
assess, the most recent tendency to reinforce China’s external borders 
against foreigners inaugurated by the 2013 Exit Entry Law – combined with 
the weakening of China’s internal borders - could further point towards an 
asymmetrical convergence between the Chinese and the European space, 
where the erasure of internal borders for EU nationals has coincided with a 
substantial strengthening and securitisation of the borders towards Third 
Country Nationals. 
At the same time, an economic spur could lead to a de-securitisation of 
non-EU migration in the European context, perhaps triggered by a more 
direct approach to the economic function of migration for EU societies. 
This has already been the case of Northern European countries after World 
War II, opening worker schemes aimed at filling labour shortages at a time 
of economic reconstruction with a straightforward economic approach to 
migration.443 Of course, as mentioned at the beginning of this work, other 
factors do and have historically determined the closure of borders and 
restrictive migration approaches, such as populist waves or racism. 
Examples for this include the closure of borders in 1960s Britain or the 
most recent case of Brexit (El-Enany forthcoming 2018). Yet, one might 
wonder about the extent to which these closures can be actually sustained in 
the long term 444  in a neoliberal context where migrant labour is key to 
                                                          
443 It should be remarked however that in contexts such as the UK, worker schemes specifically 
targeted white European migration rather than migrants from the colonies, who were instead 
dissuaded from arriving and then restricted through legislation (El-Enany forthcoming 2018). 
444 Or rather, alleged to be maintained while allowing entry of migrants through other legal categories. 
In Chapter II I gave the example of post-1973 Europe, where while Southern European countries 
such as Italy employed amnesties to regularise migrants, over the same timeframe Central and 
Northern European Countries such as the UK regularised comparable numbers of irregular migrants 
through more lenient asylum policies (Colombo 2012: 353). 
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maintaining the competitiveness of local markets. In the EU context, the 
unlikeliness of this closure is also related to the shortages of the working age 
population which will hit EU Member States in the near future. As 
repeatedly warned by the Commission, a substantial increase in labour 
migration will solve the problem. As the 2015 Global approach to migration 
notes “…without migration the EU's working age population will decline by 
17.5 million in the next decade” thus, “[m]igration will increasingly be an 
important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to 
ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy”.445  
Yet again, perhaps it will be the very contradictions between human 
rights discourses and the reality of migration management in the 
contemporary EU to eventually push for a more substantial consideration 
and respect for the human rights of migrants. The need for more working 
age migrants contributing to Europe’s welfare system could lead to the 
promotion of ius soli in more EU countries and perhaps even acknowledge 
the fact that EU Countries themselves are “nothing more than the result of 
multiple cross-breedings and their civilisation is deeply marked, sometimes 
even determined, by the contributions of migrants” (Tsoukala 2005). What 
constitutes contemporary European cultural identity is in flux and has been 
shaped by ideas and practices which have travelled with people, migrants 
from neighbouring and distant civilisations.  
Again, non-EU migration could instead be de-securitised by a rebuttal of 
economic decisionism, replaced by a new conception of legal belonging to 
political communities which looks at politico-legal units not as units 
delineated by a territory naturally demarcating a sedentary population but as 
a de-nationalised citizenship based on domicile rather than blood or family 
ties (Kostakopoulou 2008: 112-122). As this thesis has illustrated, the way in 
which borders are being drawn by migration management in Europe and in 
China have to do with the way in which governmental power maintains a 
                                                          
445 Supra, footnote 128, p.14. 
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hold over its population and the way in which it gains legitimation from it. 
Citizenship based on domicile may become the only way to maintain a hold 
of populations in a not so far future. Should the mobility of populations 
increase, the granting of citizenship based on domicile could be 
acknowledged to be a fairer way to grant membership than the “feudal” way 
of granting membership by virtue of birth rights as the contemporary state 
system and the hukou system currently do.  
Conclusion    
In this final chapter the main findings of this comparative work were 
presented and discussed to gain new insights on the growing trend of 
securitisation of non-EU migration in the European context, where this 
journey began and where it ends. In this chapter, the evidence emerged in 
the forgoing descriptive and analytical accounts of the EU and Chinese cases 
was dissected and recomposed into a coherent argument. In spite of several 
divergences, China’s and the EU’s migration regimes presented a similar 
economic rationale orienting their management of human mobility. 
This last chapter contextualised this economic rationale as a symptom of 
both contexts’ embeddedness within global neoliberalism, as a political 
rationality which promotes the market and pervades governmental actions 
and policies beyond the market itself. The chapter further individuated a 
forthright approach to migration and its capitalisation in the Chinese case 
and in opposition to that, a tacit pursuit of economic rationale in EU 
migration management. These two different approaches were explained as 
the product of different historical legacies and trajectories. The discussion of 
such legacies led me to make more explicit the ideological foundations 
underpinning the governmentality of migration systems in the EU and in 
China. I identified the centrality of humanitarian and security concerns in 
current EU migration management as opposed to the Chinese context.  
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I noted how this dual framing of non-EU migration - either through 
humanitarian or security concerns - conceals the economic underpinnings of 
EU migration management. Although humanitarian and security concerns 
are seemingly incompatible with each other, I noted that in the 
contemporary EU they currently complement each other. By highlighting 
different approaches to the question of humanitarian and security concerns 
in migration management, the comparative overview with China uniquely 
highlighted the limits of human rights narratives in current EU migration 
management. Given the deep economic underpinnings of this system, I 
concluded that an open articulation of migration as an economic matter 
might be less likely to turn migration into a security matter than a system 
that is permeated by humanitarian concerns while being tacitly oriented by 
neoliberal imperatives. 
China’s inverse tendency of de-securitisation of migration, characterised 
by a straightforward economic approach in migration management, thus 
stands as an alternative - and perhaps unusual, to the European reader - 
answer to the dominant equation currently characterising the European 
context that more migration needs more security. Of course, this does not 
entail that migrants enjoy better rights or conditions in the Chinese context. 
Yet, this thesis has illustrated how, differently from the EU context, they are 
currently not conceptualised as a security threat. By revealing the lack of 
articulation of the centrality of economic considerations in the EU’s current 
migration management, what I described as China’s forthright economic 
approach to migration has added a new original interpretation of the current 
state of borders and migration management in the EU context. The 
comparison with China compelled to put into perspective or at least not to 
take as inherently good the centrality of the commitment to human rights 
and the rule of law framework in the EU. Acting at times as an ideological 
veil, humanitarian discourses in a neoliberal era possibly obfuscate the way 
in which current migration management grants differential access and 
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precarious legal statuses which translate into conveniently exploitable labour 
boosting the competitiveness of local markets. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began its journey in the European space, where borders are 
increasingly perceived as highly charged markers of political communities 
allegedly under siege by herds of non-EU migrants. Against the latter, walls 
and fences are erected, both physical and legal. The comparison of this 
context with China’s migration system uniquely revealed that despite the 
deep economic underpinnings of the EU migration regime, the pursuit of 
economic growth through migration management in the EU is not an 
outspokenly enunciated policy goal as in the Chinese context. This argument 
was substantiated in various stages.  
Drawing on a number of theoretical insights – ranging from critical 
geography to migration studies and political philosophy – Chapter I began 
with a rebuttal of the common-sense notion that borders are territorial or 
natural entities. In its place, Foucault’s notion of governmentality, as a new 
mode of operation of government in the modern era which has the 
population as its main target, was applied to the field of borders and 
migration law. I defined borders as shifting legal processes made of 
conglomerates of laws, policies and measures and operate as obstacles, 
impediments or incentives to mobility across politico-legal spaces. I also 
identified the notion of securitisation of migration in the EU context as a 
process observable within legislative measures, policies and official 
statements which in various ways restrict free movement and construct 
migrants as potential threats. I then posited a comparative perspective as the 
most apt method to go about my investigation and explained the “how” of 
the comparison, drawing attention to the epistemological biases existing 
when dealing with non-Western legal contexts from a Western perspective.  
     Chapter II first introduced to the EU internal and external borders 
through a recent history of legislation and policies. The account 
progressively identified a correlation between the increasing levels of 
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securitisation of (non-EU) migration, the abolition of internal border 
controls as well as the constitution of EU citizenship. The accounts of the 
history of EU migration policies and the legal categories through which 
migration is presently channelled exposed the deep economic underpinnings 
of the EU migration regime. The dynamics of the EU’s external borders 
were further examined in one national case, Italy, whose peninsular “gate-
keeper” position sharing sea borders with Third Countries makes it an 
interesting viewpoint from which to analyse the management of the EU’s 
external borders. The national case confirmed the picture already observed 
at the European level. In all, the chapter presented a situation whereby 
despite its underlying economic rationale, contemporary EU migration 
management is mainly governed through humanitarian or security concerns 
which orient its legal categories and official discourses. 
     The narration then embarked on a journey to China, a distant context 
governed by a different regime of mobility and diverse tendencies. Chapter 
III began with the introduction to China’s legal system and its main 
characteristics. An historical outline of the legislation and policies 
constituting China’s internal and external borders followed, together with a 
consideration of the legal categories through which mobility – internal and 
international - is presently channelled in the Chinese context. Similar to 
Chapter II, the chapter included a discussion of a local case. The case of 
internal borders in Beijing was selected for the capital’s reputation of being 
the one with the strictest hukou regulation and among the most popular 
destinations for internal migrants. The descriptive account of China’s 
borders revealed how from a severe restriction of internal and international 
migration in Mao’s era – where spontaneous migration was perceived as a 
security threat to the socialist state – the management of both internal and 
international migration in China has shifted to a more liberal approach 
following China’s embrace of a socialist market economy. I illustrated how 
the de-securitisation of migration has been driven by an open, at time 
ruthless, pursuit of economic growth as the main policy goal. The latter has 
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been forthrightly enunciated in legal and policy documents. The Chinese 
context sits in striking opposition to the European context, which is 
characterised by the lack of a forthright enunciation of the connection 
between the pursuit of economic growth in the management of human 
mobility. 
     Chapter IV discussed the outcomes of the comparative overview on 
borders in the EU and in China. It underlined that one thing that these two 
contexts share in spite of their differences is their embeddedness within 
global neoliberalism in their management of borders. This manifested for 
example in a race for global talents, an exploitation of irregular migration to 
profit local economies and a general capitalisation on migration which 
assumed different forms in the two contexts. The pursuit of neoliberal 
growth has produced different outcomes in China’s and the EU’s migration 
systems, which I explained as products of different historical legacies and 
trajectories. In China, the de-securitisation of migration coincided with the 
country’s experimentation with a new economic system: in this context, a 
market logic was openly espoused as part of the country’s transition from 
planned to market economy.  
In the EU context, where the market economy has been established for 
some time, I remarked that economic reasons underpin EU migration 
management yet they are not openly enunciated in official language. The 
latter is instead pervaded by security and most recently humanitarian 
concerns, which also dominate the legal categories through which non-EU 
migration is currently managed. I noted that regardless of whether this lack 
of articulation is an intention of political elites or an accidental outcome of 
Europe’s historical trajectory, there is a relationship between growing levels 
of securitisation of migration and the EU’s hidden economic approach to 
migration. The lack of articulation of the economic rationale feeds into the 
conceptualisation of movement into the EU as a security issue which is 
deemed legitimate only when it is framed in terms of humanitarian 
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protection. This finding would not have been apparent without a 
consideration of the Chinese case, where instead a forthright economic 
approach to migration management possibly produced a normalisation of 
human mobility for economic purposes and has coincided with China’s 
relative de-securitisation of migration over the last decades. 
Despite its hidden nature, the advancement of the neoliberal project in 
the EU seems to be confirmed by the latest developments of migration 
legislation in the Italian context. At the time of writing, a new law, so called 
“Minniti-Orlando” has entered into force, introducing more security 
measures in the management of asylum seekers and their applications and 
attempting to tune in this phenomenon with labour market needs.446 The 
new law abolishes the right to a second-degree appeal for rejected 
applications, further expands the net of detention centres for the purposes 
of expulsion and introduces the duty for asylum seekers to carry out 
voluntary work..447 The law, which received criticisms of unconstitutionality 
by legal experts, is another example of what in Chapter IV was described as 
an increasingly ordinary amalgamation of humanitarian and security 
concerns in EU migration management. As I have stressed in Chapter IV, 
humanitarian categories are ambivalent because with their allegedly neutral 
status they transform individuals’ access and participation to the socio-
economic space into a generous concession by the governments of migrant 
receiving states. Interestingly, the Orlando-Minniti law draws on the special 
status of asylum seekers as a justification for their different footing in their 
participation in the labour market as free labour, even if only during the time 
                                                          
446Law no.46 on urgent dispositions to speed up international protection procedures and contrast 
illegal migration (Legge n.46, recante disposizioni urgenti per l’accelerazione dei procedimenti in 
materia di protezione internazionale, nonché per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale), in force 
since 17 August 2017. 
447Camilli, A. “The decree Minniti-Orlando on Immigration is Law” (Il Decreto Minniti-Orlando e’ 
legge), Internazionale, 12 April 2017 https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-
camilli/2017/04/12/decreto-minniti-orlando-legge Accessed 1 September 2017 
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frame of their application, confirming the deep economic underpinnings of 
migration management.448  
Although in the Chinese context economic growth is openly pursued and 
migration is not securitised, Chapter III illustrated how the Chinese system 
is also based on the stratification of the population and the benefits and 
exploitation of these institutional differences to profit labour markets. As a 
matter of fact, the relaxation of the hukou system created a huge inexpensive 
labour force ready to work for Chinese and foreign enterprises at the lowest 
conceivable wages and work conditions. Despite hukou reforms, China’s 
internal borders are not vanishing but rather, are currently developing into a 
system of city walls which remains to a large extent based on location-based 
institutional exclusions. A similar mechanism pertains to low skilled foreign 
workers, who participate in China’s labour market at the lowest possible 
wages without any legal recognition. Both in the EU and China migration 
management is deeply rooted in the neoliberal ideology that populations’ 
well-being can best be promoted within an institutional framework oriented 
towards maximising economic growth. The assumption is that eventually, 
some of those economic revenues will reach those who are most affected by 
such exclusions. The practice with such system and ideology increasingly 
exposes the fact that this promise may never be fulfilled, as the neoliberal 
promise of well-being for everybody de facto profits some groups over 
others, as all ideologies.  
It remains to be seen whether in the future the pursuit of neoliberal 
economic growth is sustainable in the long term for governments to 
maintain a hold over their migrant populations or whether it will have to 
give way to other rationales, such as economic redistribution. China’s 
                                                          
448 One could draw a comparison between this new legal development and the category of indented 
labour in the United States in the XIX century, where the labour of Chinese coolies was exploited to 
build infrastructure after the abolition of slavery and only after years of unfree labour could they 
achieve freedom. 
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management of internal migration has somewhat hinted at a readjustment of 
a blunt pursuit of economic growth at all costs when it began promoting 
welfare rights of internal migrants to correct some of the most severe 
inequalities produced by the sheer pursuit of economic gains in the early 
reform period. The EU’s welfare system is also to be seen as a corrective of 
the most severe effects of market economy. 
It should further be added that despite the significant impact that 
economic considerations currently have on migration management in both 
contexts, the economic rationale identified in this thesis is not to be seen as 
an omni-comprehensive and objective process that can explain all. Rather, I 
see it as a subject that functions in conjunction with other factors. After all, 
in order to exist and produce results, neoliberal markets require government 
intervention and the guarantee of certain conditions, one of which is 
political stability and consensus. These are not always achieved through 
economic outcomes, although evidence from all over the world suggests that 
economic crises are often catalysts for political unrest. Behind economic 
crises there is the exacerbation of social inequalities. As I suggested at the 
end of Chapter IV, the future may indeed hold unforeseen reversals of the 
observed tendencies.  
The EU and Chinese migration regimes investigated in this thesis 
presented us with different modes of governing populations and its mobile 
segments and different ways of gaining legitimation from them. At the origin 
of such differences this work highlighted features including different 
historical legacies, political and ideological constellations along with different 
resource availability. While the comparative perspective has shown that 
China’s current approach to migration management is less conducive to 
securitisation, this is not to argue that the modalities of this approach are to 
be preferred or are better than the approach characterising the current EU 
context. I am also not suggesting that China’s more open embrace of 
neoliberal policies is the best avenue for migration management, even if 
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after the demise of planned economies, neoliberalism appears to be the only 
economic system on the horizon for the time being. The more modest goal 
of this comparative work, as posited at the beginning of this thesis, has been 
to look through the lens of the Chinese perspective to achieve a new 
outlook and deeper understanding of what lies beneath, and is not otherwise 
apparent, in the current legal and policy trends of migration management in 
the EU. 
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